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ABSTRACT 
 
 This work is an attempt to think the essential nature of the interrelationships 
among religion, science, and theology (RST) out of Heidegger’s engagement with the 
question of Being. Three primary questions initially motivated this inquiry: First, how are 
the interrelations (if any) among religion, science, and theology to be understood? 
Second, is a relation of “dialogue,” in some sense, possible among the three elements of 
the RST triad? And third, does theology have a rightful place in the public square 
dominated by the view that science serves as the “gold standard” for rationality and truth? 
The inquiry interweaves five threads, or lines of inquiry, which are posited as pertinent in 
the current RST discourse and central to Heidegger’s thought. The first thread consists of 
the chapter themes: phenomenology, truth, technology, and ethics. The other four 
threads—comportment toward things, reflection, thinking, and destiny—each “cross-
cut,” or traverse, the chapter themes. 
By Heidegger’s lights, each cross-cutting thread harbors a duality: comportment 
toward things as objectification or non-objectification; reflection as Reflexion or 
Besinnung (mindfulness); thinking as calculative or meditative; and destiny as fate or the 
sending of Being (Geschick). Heidegger’s critique of each duality—and the expanded 
global context suggested here for thinking the RST relation—offer fresh opportunities for 
reinscribing the customary formulation of theology (i.e., reflection upon religious 
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experience and belief) as a basis for a compelling dialogue among religion, science, and 
theology today. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it is 
no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the 
decision of this generation as to the relations between them.  We have here 
the two strongest general forces . . . which influence men, and they seem 
to be set one against the other—the force of our religious institutions, and 
the force of our impulse to accurate observation and logical deduction.
1
  
 
 
1.1 Thesis and Scope  
For decades, the religion-science relation—and the closely related science-
theology relation—have been customarily framed as a contested field of possible 
positions or states in which the two realms of meaning in each duality can be construed as 
being in relation to each other (or not). One of the more well-known frameworks 
employed in studying both relations is the four-position model of conflict, independence, 
dialogue, and integration developed by theologian and physicist Ian Barbour.
2
 No 
consensus exists among participants in the scholarly “conversation” as to how things 
stand within each binary and between them. However, some theologians, such as Philip 
Hefner and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, contend—via quite different approaches—that 
                                                 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1967), 181-82. 
First published in 1925 by Macmillan. 
 
2. Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990). (Hereafter 
cited as RIAS.) He has consistently employed this fourfold typology in subsequent publications, including 
Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues ([San Francisco]: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1997), hereafter cited as RAS, and Ian G. Barbour, When Science Meets Religion: 
Enemies, Strangers, or Partners? ([San Francisco]: HarperSanFrancisco, 2000).  
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postmodern critiques of the philosophy of science and epistemology provide new 
possibilities for genuine dialogue between science and religion, theology, or both.
3
   
This dissertation is an inquiry into the possible contribution the thought of 
philosopher Martin Heidegger can make to the question of whether dialogue, in some 
important sense, is possible in the religion-science and science-theology relations, and, 
more generally, how the threefold relation of religion, science, and theology is best 
characterized or thought. Through his creative appropriation of the phenomenological 
method, Heidegger wrote extensively about science, theology, and the religious 
dimension of existence, and consistently affirmed theology’s rightful place in public 
discourse.  
My thesis is that: (i) contemporary explications of the religion-science and 
science-theology relations are conducted in the mode of metaphysical (i.e., 
representational, reason-seeking and -giving) thinking; and that (ii) Heidegger’s thought 
provides resources for complementing such thought with non-metaphysical (i.e., 
reflective, meditative, noncalculative) thinking in ways that open a space for meaningful, 
significant dialogue in these relations. In defending this thesis, I shall argue that non-
metaphysical thinking is a possibility--and a necessity—for thinking the religion-science-
theology relation fruitfully in our time.
4
 
                                                 
3. Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1993); J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel? Theology and Science in a Postmodern World 
(Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1998).  
 
4. Although Heidegger famously declares that “science does not think” in What Is Called 
Thinking? (trans. J. Glenn Gray [New York: Harper & Row, 1968], 8), he also states that scientists are 
capable of reflective, mindful thinking. See Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” in The Question 
Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 181-
82. 
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In sum, my primary purpose is not to critique or reinterpret Heidegger’s work, but 
rather to bring his thought—and my own—to bear constructively upon the contemporary 
discourse regarding these relations. I call this agenda “thinking, with Heidegger,” an 
inquiry which is at once complementary and innovative, imaginative, and constructive. 
 
1.2 Context 
This section provides a rationale for framing this inquiry in terms of the RST 
relation rather than either the religion-science or science-theology relation. I present brief 
background information about the field of religion-science-theology studies before and 
since its ostensible founding in the 1960s.  
 
1.2.1 Religion-Science, Science-Theology, or Religion-Science-Theology? 
In a recent essay reflecting upon the study of the interrelationships among 
religion, science, and theology, theologian Philip Hefner offers reasons for regarding the 
religion-science duality as the primary focus for analysis and reflection.
5
 In the same 
compendium of essays, theologian Michael Welker defends the primacy of the science-
theology binary.
6
 In this section, I shall briefly describe their views and then proffer a 
potential bridge between these dualities as an initial step in thinking the religion-science-
theology relation holistically. 
                                                 
5. Philip Hefner, “Religion-and-Science,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. 
Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 562-76.  
 
6. Michael Welker, “Science and Theology: Their Relation at the Beginning of the Third 
Millennium,” in Clayton and Simpson, Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, 551-61.  
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Welker favors the study of the science-theology binary for two reasons.
7
 First, he 
contends that meaningful discourse between religion and science is inherently 
problematic: “There is no such thing, and there can be no such thing, as a discourse 
between a religion and a science, not to speak of a discourse between ‘religion as such’ 
and ‘science as such’, whatever that might be” (Welker, “Science and Theology,” 552). 
For Welker, the academy is the arena for meaningful discourse, so theology and religious 
studies are the appropriate dialogue partners for science. Second, he observes that 
reflection upon the religion-science relation runs the risk of settling for nonspecific 
“comparative observations” between the two fields. While he acknowledges that “general 
methodological reflections” are indeed necessary for fruitful interdisciplinary discourse 
of any sort, science-theology interaction should aim for producing mutually enriching 
results, formulated as testable truth-claims, in specific topics that are meaningful to each 
field:  
. . . the great potentials of the Science and Theology discourse lie neither in the 
establishment of a meta-level above their area of research, nor in attempts to 
synthesize both approaches. The great potential of these dialogues lie instead in 
raising boundary sensitivities and in gaining specific insights into conceptual 
limits and the dangers of pernicious reductionisms. (Welker, “Science and 
Theology,” 558) 
 
 
                                                 
7. More precisely, Welker restricts the possibility of meaningful dialogue to that between 
Theology and Science (each with capitalized initial letters). Each of these “moves between elementary 
authentic experience, observations, and thoughts [characteristic of theology and science, without capital 
letters] on the one hand, and elaborate theories [characteristic of THEOLOGY and SCIENCE, in capital 
letters], on the other” (Welker, “Science and Theology,” 557). That is, theology and science are minimalist 
in the sense that the former entails only minimal levels of conviction and “existential influence,” while the 
latter merely requires “immediate observations and reflections about nature and natural events” without 
appealing to a theoretical framework (555-56). At the other extreme, THEOLOGY and SCIENCE are 
maximalist in the sense that each entails “an elaborate interconnection of thought and conviction,” bolstered 
in the case of SCIENCE by “tested experience related to nature and its texture” (554). On his view, 
dialogue is only possible between these minimalist and maximalist expressions of theology and science. 
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Examples of topics that meet Welker’s criteria include “cosmological and natural 
religious questions,” “evolutionary theory and genetic research,” and “divine action” 
(553). 
 In contrast, Hefner favors engaging science “from a stance within religious 
experience” (Hefner, “Religion-and-Science,” 562) rather than primarily with theology 
(or its nontheistic equivalent), for two primary reasons: first, theology is increasingly 
isolated as a separate discipline within the academy, and second, Hefner construes 
“religion” broadly in terms of Tillich’s (arguably universal) notion of ultimate concern. 
Also, he notes that the terminology of “theology” and “theologian” is foreign to the 
world’s religious communities outside of Christianity (566-69). 
 Hefner calls the task of undertaking such engagement religion-and-science. He 
contends that religion-and-science is rooted in the beginnings of human history as the 
primordial quest for meaning and order. In this context, he defines meaning as “the 
establishing of a link or a ‘fit’ between what is important to us in our own lives and the 
world in which we live” (563). “Since . . . our experience of the world, to a significant 
degree, is mediated through scientific knowledge, the work of forging links of meaning is 
itself our most significant engagement with science” (ibid.) Moreover, Hefner 
distinguishes between what he calls the doing of religion-and-science and the study of 
such doing. He cites his theological model of the created co-creator
8
 as an example of 
the doing of religion-and-science and cites his reflective essay as an example of the study 
of the doing of religion-and-science (562-63).  
                                                 
8. “Human beings are God’s created co-creators whose purpose is to be the agency, acting in 
freedom, to birth the future that is most wholesome for the nature that has birthed us . . . . Exercising this 
agency is said to be God’s will for humans” (Hefner, The Human Factor, 27). 
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To emphasize, Hefner views religion-and-science as an activity originating from 
within, or out of, religious experience, rather than a disinterested approach as commonly 
taken, for example, in religious studies: 
 We do not simply observe religion-and-science or study its components; the 
grappling with meaning vis-à-vis that which is most important to us requires our 
full engagement, because it is the meaning of our lives that is at stake, not just the 
mapping of an academic terrain. (Hefner, “Religion-and-Science,” 566)  
 
In contrast to Welker, Hefner does not limit the study of religion-and-science in 
order to conform to an academic understanding of religion and its mode of discourse. 
Instead, such study takes place at the “border” between academic and religious 
communities, and necessarily incorporates different modes of thinking: “Academia 
fosters the critical thinking that is essential, but it is ambivalent about religion-and-
science, because discernment, authenticity of experience, and confessional thinking are 
not its criteria of success and advancement” (574).  
Ian Barbour agrees with Hefner in viewing the religion-science binary as primary. 
Like Hefner, Barbour invokes Tillich’s universalizing articulation of the nexus of religion 
in his own broad definition of “religion” as “total life-orientation in response to what is 
deemed worthy of ultimate concern and devotion.”9 For Barbour, the experiences and 
beliefs of the religious community are primary; these form the basis for the secondary, or 
derivative, activity of theological reflection.  Barbour also notes that, unlike theology, 
religion and science as everyday practices are unreflective. Consequently, he 
                                                 
9. Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 10. 
(Hereafter cited as Issues.) 
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acknowledges an important role for the philosophies of religion and science in his 
analysis of the religion-science relation: 
Scientists and theologians have usually tried to relate science directly to religion, 
neglecting the contribution that philosophy can make to the clarification of issues. 
On the other hand, professional philosophers have often had little contact with 
either the scientific or the religious community, and their abstract formulations 
sometimes bear little resemblance to what scientists and theologians are actually 
doing. The point of departure for philosophy of religion must be the worshiping 
community and its theological ideas; only then can philosophy serve a function 
both critical and relevant to religion. Similarly, philosophy of science must be 
based on the actual practice of scientific work. (Issues, 11) 
 
Is the border between religion-and-science and science-and-theology perhaps 
more porous than their ardent defenders claim? First, as prima facie evidence, consider 
two examples, which could easily be multiplied. As mentioned earlier, Hefner cites his 
theological model of the created co-creator as an example of the doing of religion-and-
science. Barbour first published his fourfold typology as “Ways of Relating Science and 
Theology” (emphasis added) in 1988.10 Two years later, he published the same typology, 
together with essentially the same detailed explication, as “Ways of Relating Science and 
Religion” (emphasis added)!11  
Second, the current literature in the “subfields” (as I would like to regard them) of 
religion-and-science and theology-and-science already contains language that appears to 
connect them fundamentally. I have in mind statements that regard theology, in some 
                                                 
10. Ian G. Barbour, “Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” in Physics, Philosophy and 
Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding, Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger, and George V. 
Coyne, eds. (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1988), 21-45. 
 
11. Barbour, RIAS, 3-30. The sections on Conflict, Independence, and Dialogue in these two 
publications are virtually identical. The original essay described two versions of Integration: Doctrinal 
Reformulation and Systematic Synthesis. In RIAS, the subsection, Doctrinal Reformulation, was split into 
two subsections, Natural Theology and Theology of Nature, each expanded slightly. 
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sense, as reflection upon religious experience and/or belief. Consider some examples. 
From Barbour’s writings, “Theology is systematic reflection about the beliefs of a 
particular religious community” (Issues, 10); and later, “Theology is critical reflection on 
the life and thought of the religious community” (RIAS, 267). Van Huyssteen writes: “In 
theology, as a critical reflection on religious experience . . .”12 Thus, for some writers at 
least, viewing theology as a form of reflection upon religious experience and/or belief 
perhaps can serve as a bridge between these the religion-science and science-theology 
dualities as well as between their respective academic subfields.  
Although viewing theology in this way has many adherents, others, such as 
Thomas Torrance, define theology in terms of the literal etymological meaning of theo-
logy as the study of God.
13
 In addition, some start from the premise that theology is, is 
some sense, a science or “scientific.” These three views are not mutually exclusive, 
however. Arthur Peacocke incorporates elements from the first two views to formulate 
theology as “the reflective and intellectual analysis of the experience of God and . . . 
principally the Christian forms of that experience.”14 In a variant on the first view, Alister 
McGrath understands theology as “intellectual reflection on the content of the Christian 
                                                 
12. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology 
and Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 201. (Hereafter cited as Shaping.)  
 
13. “Theology is the unique science devoted to knowledge of God, differing form other sciences 
by the uniqueness of its object which can be apprehended only on its own terms and from within the actual 
situation it has created in our existence in making itself known.” Thomas Torrance, Theological Science 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 281.  
 
14. Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural, Divine, and 
Human (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 6. 
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faith.”15 McGrath, like Torrance and Peacocke, take the methods of science to be deeply 
relevant to the task of theology.  
Despite these different characterizations of “theology,” I shall provisionally 
employ in this inquiry the formulation of theology as reflection on religious experience 
and belief as a possible means for bridging the religion-science and science-theology 
relations. At minimum, this formulation is intended to acknowledge that, in the 
investigation of either duality, the “missing” element (theology or religion) is usually, if 
not nearly always, at issue as well. Hence, unless a specific binary is under scrutiny, I 
shall continue to refer to the matter for thought in this inquiry as the religion-science-
theology relation (aka RST relation) and this field of study as the religion-science-
theology field (aka RST field). 
The formulation of theology as reflection upon religious experience and belief is 
not to be regarded in this inquiry as a definition, but rather as a question: namely, What is 
the essential nature of theology? I shall engage this question by starting from this 
proffered “formula” for theology and then interrogating it at various points in this 
inquiry. For example, in Sections 2.3 (Phenomenology and Theology) and 2.4 (Theology, 
Natural Science, and Objectification) below, we shall examine Heidegger’s engagement 
with the question of whether theology is, in some sense, a science. Also, Section 3.4 
below (Truth and Reflection) examines multiple meanings of “reflection.”  
Finally, the contrasting views of Hefner and Welker regarding the study of 
religion-and-science-and-theology briefly presented here bring into focus a central 
                                                 
15. Alistair McGrath, The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), 32.
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question for this entire inquiry: What are the most appropriate arenas and modes of 
discourse for thinking the RST relation? Based upon the brief examination of their views 
above, Welker apparently holds that such thinking is most meaningfully conducted within 
academia and its conventions regarding discourse, while Hefner opts for engaging the 
border between academic and religious communities in which different modes of 
thinking may be incorporated.
16
 Also, Welker seems to conflate “discourse” and 
“dialogue” in his defense of Theology rather than religion as the appropriate partner for 
dialogue (as discourse) with Science.
17
 
On my view, this question of appropriate arenas and modes of thinking the RST 
relation—together with the question of the essential nature of theology and the 
discourse/dialogue distinction (if any)—bear directly upon the questions that initially 
motivated this inquiry: What is the nature of the RST relation? Can “dialogue” 
meaningfully characterize this relation—at least under some circumstances? And can 
theology legitimately claim a place in the public square? 
 
1.2.2  Origins of an Academic Field?  
Two fundamental—perhaps essential--signs of an emergent academic field are the 
existence of a founding textbook and a founding journal devoted to the field of inquiry. If 
                                                 
16. Hefner does not neglect the public square as a third arena. In “Public Intellectual or 
Disciplinary Journal?”—his final editorial as editor for Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science (hereafter 
cited as Zygon)—Hefner traces the movement of Zygon between the “poles” of the public square and 
academia since its inception in 1966. “The dissonance between public square and specialized academic 
discipline is serious and important. The public sphere requires clarity, simplicity, and relevance; policy and 
action are present immediacies—they cannot be delayed interminably until research projects are completed. 
On the other hand, the complexities of specialization and research do make an irreplaceable contribution.” 
Zygon 44, no. 2 (June 2009): 239. 
 
17. I shall briefly take up the question of the dialogue/discourse difference in Section 5.1 below. 
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this claim is granted, then the year 1966 arguably marks the beginning of the RST 
academic field. In that year, Ian Barbour published Issues in Science and Religion, and 
Zygon was launched under its first editor, Ralph Burhoe. Hefner, an editor of Zygon 
during 1989-2009, observed in his retrospective on Zygon’s origins and purpose: “In 
1966, there was no religion-and-science field, no enterprise designated as ‘religion-and-
science’.”18  
What were the issues, questions, and visions that motivated the founders and 
predecessors that led to the establishment of what I am calling the RST field? Simply 
stated, why and when did this academic field get underway? Of particular interest and 
relevance to this inquiry are those concerns, questions, and hopes that are still pertinent, 
and even compelling, today, while engaging these questions in their full scope is beyond 
the purpose of this inquiry.
19
 This subsection briefly examines some of the motivational 
origins of Issues and Zygon to provide a glimpse of the origins of the RST academic 
field. 
Issues is a strong candidate for designation as a founding textbook. Robert John 
Russell, founder and director of the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences at the 
Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California, regards Issues as decisive in the initial 
formulation and development of RST studies.   
                                                 
18. Hefner, “Public Intellectual or Disciplinary Journal?, 237. 
 
19. On Heidegger’s view, such a project would be an historical reflection, because it would study 
the past for the sake of the future. He contrasts this understanding of the purposes of history with 
historiological consideration, which studies the past from the standpoint of the present. Section 3.2 refers 
to this distinction in discussing Heidegger’s critique of the customary understanding of truth as the 
correctness of the correspondence between assertions and their referents. 
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In his groundbreaking 1966 publication, Issues in Science and Religion, Ian G. 
Barbour laid out a series of well-crafted arguments involving issues in 
epistemology . . . language . . . and methodology. Together these arguments 
provide what I call the ‘bridge’ between science and religion; more than any other 
scholar’s work, these arguments, in my opinion, have made possible the 
developments of the past five decades.
20
   
 
In his Introduction to Issues, Barbour acknowledges the lack of suitable textbooks for 
study in this field: “A number of universities and seminaries have in the last decade 
introduced courses in ‘Science and Religion’ . . . ; there is need for a comprehensive text 
for such courses” (Issues, 11).  
 What propelled Barbour to devote more than five decades of his life to the RST 
field? He recently described his “intellectual and spiritual journey” from birth to his 
eightieth year (1923-2002),
21
 but, in my view, his writings in the RST field (and earlier) 
illuminate more specifically the questions, issues, and vision that have guided his 
contributions to this field. Space permits only a couple of examples. Barbour begins his 
Introduction to Issues with these three questions:  “Is the scientific method the only 
reliable guide to truth? Is man only a complex biochemical mechanism? How can God 
act if the world is law-abiding?” His largest intended audience for Issues “includes those 
persons . . . who recognize the importance of scientific and religious ideas in the modern 
world and are concerned about the relation between them” (Issues, 11-12). He closes the 
Introduction by quoting the first sentence of the paragraph from Whitehead that appears 
as the epitaph to this inquiry: “When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what 
                                                 
20. Robert John Russell, “Ian Barbour’s Methodological Breakthrough: Creating the ‘Bridge’ 
between Science and Theology,” in Fifty Years in Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and His Legacy, 
ed. Robert John Russell (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 45. 
 
21. Ian G. Barbour, “A Personal Odyssey,” in Russell, Fifty Years, 17-28. 
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science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the 
decision of this generation as to the relations between them.” 
Several years earlier, he quoted this same sentence as the lead-in for his seminal 
paper, “The Methods of Science and Religion.”22 Immediately following the quote, he 
wrote: “Alfred North Whitehead’s words of thirty years ago find new urgency in the age 
of nuclear fission and the Sputniks. What factors today hinder the co-operation of science 
and religion on which the future course of Western civilization may depend?” Barbour 
adopted, and adapted, Whitehead’s assessment of the fundamental importance of thinking 
the RST relation for the sake of the future of history as the context for his life’s work. 
Turning to Zygon, What were some of the concerns and hopes that contributed to 
its founding? In its inaugural issue, the editors articulated the meaning of the journal’s 
title and its fundamental purpose:  
Zygon, the Greek term for anything which joins two bodies, especially the yoking 
or harnessing of a team which must effectively pull together, is a symbol for this 
journal whose aim is to reunite the split team, values and knowledge, where co-
ordination is essential for a viable dynamics of human culture.  
We respond to the growing fears that the widening chasm in twentieth-
century culture between values and knowledge, or good and truth, or religion and 
science, is disruptive if not lethal for human destiny. In this split, the traditional 
faiths and philosophies, which once informed men of what is of most sacred 
concern for them, have lost their credibility and hence their power. Yet human 
fulfilment or salvation in the age of science requires not less but more insight and 
conviction concerning life’s basic values and moral requirements.23 
  
                                                 
22. Ian G. Barbour, “The Methods of Science and Religion,” in Science Ponders Religion, ed. 
Harlow Shapley (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960), 196. 
 
23. Ralph W. Burhoe et al., [inaugural editorial], in Zygon 1, no. 1 (March 1966): 1 (emphasis 
added). 
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In what way might this aim of “salvation” be understood and realized? In the 
same first issue of Zygon, the editors announced that this journal would be about the 
doing of religion-and-science as well as the study of the doing of religion-and-science. 
Writing about the roots of this journal, the editors sharpened and simplified the rather 
lengthy statement of Zygon’s purpose stated above: “. . . to develop an integration of 
religious systems with the contemporary scientific views of man and the world . . . .” 
(ibid., 119). 
The term “salvation” was evidently not chosen lightly by the Zygon editors. 
Several years earlier, Burhoe published an essay, “Salvation in the Twentieth Century.”24 
In response to “prophets of doom,” such as (in his view) Toynbee, Spengler, and Sorokin, 
Burhoe contended “that our salvation today lies in religion” (Science Ponders Religion, 
66; emphasis added). However, he qualified his claim by insisting that religion “must 
also be scientific” (ibid.), and that the notion of “religion” is best understood 
functionally—that is, in terms of religion’s social utility: 
I submit that religions in whatever culture—and the anthropologists are hardly 
able to find any culture without one—are the organs or institutions whose 
functions it is to engender attitudes and behavior that tend to adapt man to the 
conditions of his total environment in such a way as to optimize his prime values. 
I submit further that these prime values will probably be found to be essentially a 
continuation of the long-established values of all living creatures: the continuation 
and advancement of life. (Burhoe, Science Ponders Religion, 67) 
 
In the next few paragraphs, I shall draw from the editors’ summary of the three 
roots of Zygon to illuminate some of the motivating concerns and expectations therein in 
                                                 
24. Ralph Burhoe, “Salvation in the Twentieth Century,” in Shapley, Science Ponders Religion, 
65-86. 
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regard to the status of the religion-science relation. One of the roots was the Committee 
on Science and Values, established in 1950 by the American Academy for Arts and 
Sciences at the urging of Burhoe, the executive officer of the Academy at the time. The 
Committee’s charter document is consonant with the stated purpose of Zygon and the 
views of its founding editor, Burhoe:  
We believe that the sudden changing of man’s physical and mental climate 
brought about by science and technology in the last century has rendered 
inadequate ancient institutional structures and educational forms, and that the 
survival of human society depends on a re-formation of man’s world view and 
ethics, by grounding them in the revelations of modern science as well as on 
tradition and intuition.
25
  
 
A second root of Zygon was a series of summer conferences held on Star Island, a 
few miles off the coast of New Hampshire, during the 1950s. In 1950, a group of 
“freethinking theologians and clergymen” met there to launch a “Conference on the 
Coming Great Church” to increase cooperation among religious groups and expand the 
influence of religion in seeking world peace. In 1954, again at the suggestion of Burhoe, 
more than 200 liberal theologians and clergy from the 1950 conference and scientists 
from the Academy Committee met together to discuss possibilities for greater harmony 
between religion, science, and theology under the theme, “Conference on Religion in the 
Age of Science.” Burhoe summed up the conference consensus as follows: 
While there were a number of both scientists and clergymen who held that 
religious truth was hardly susceptible to being approached by scientific methods, 
except perhaps in the negative sense of being prohibited by scientific beliefs, 
there was a strong and seemingly growing recognition that today man can 
increase the scope and validity of his understanding of his destiny and of his 
                                                 
25. Ralph W. Burhoe et al., “Some Roots of Zygon,” in Zygon 1, no. 1 (March 1966): 118. 
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relationship to that “in which he lives and moves and has his being,” not only by 
reading ancient texts, but also by building up the science of theology in harmony 
with other science.
26
  
 
A few months later, the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS) was founded. 
Among the three purposes of this “nondenominational, independent society” is the 
following: “to formulate dynamic and positive relationships between the concepts 
developed by science and the goals and hopes of humanity expressed through religion.”27  
 A third root was the interest shown by a number of schools of theology and liberal 
programs at the denominational level in the activities of IRAS, especially the Star Island 
summer conferences. “During the late 1950s, the Institute sought to stimulate various 
theological schools to consider more systematically the potential role of the science in 
reformulating man’s religious conceptions of his nature and destiny.”28 
To sum up, I suggest that what we hear in these expressions of concerns and 
hopes regarding the RST relation are, for the most part, eloquent and imaginative re-
statements of Whitehead’s claim, quoted on the first page of this entire inquiry, that 
thinking (or perhaps better, re-thinking) the essential nature of the RST relation is both 
vitally important and urgent. With comparable emphasis, I would say, we also hear an 
imperative to ground—or otherwise orient, in some sense—religion and theology in the 
                                                 
26. Ralph W. Burhoe, “Religion in an Age of Science,” in Science 120 (1 October 1954): 522. 
 
27. “Mission Statement,” Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, accessed September 3, 2012, 
http://www.iras.org/Welcome.html. 
28. Burhoe et al., Zygon, 1 (1966): 118. 
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knowledge and methods of science. Bluntly speaking, the message seems to be that 
religion and theology, need to “get with it” if religion and theology are to be, in some 
sense, “effective” or “relevant” to our lives individually, and in community with others 
and the earth itself. I say, “for the most part,” because Philip Hefner, for one, approaches 
both the doing as well as the study of the doing of religion-and-science from “the stance 
of religious experience.” That is, he seeks no (illusory) Archimedean point or synoptic 
perch from which to survey dispassionately the field of religion-and-science.  
Let these tensions continue to hover over and inform this inquiry. 
 
1.2.3 Ian Barbour’s Fourfold Typology and Critical Realism Methodology 
The purpose of this section is to explicate how Barbour thinks the RST relation 
from his formulation of critical realism and, in particular, how he construes—and 
defends—the possibility of meaningful “dialogue” within this relation. Specifically, I 
shall show that Barbour’s fourfold typology—Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and 
Integration—unfolds from his methodology of critical realism.29 In so doing, we shall see 
                                                 
29. Several thinkers in the RST field have developed typologies that describe possible modes, or 
states, of relationality between religion and science, or between science and theology. One group offers 
modified formulations of some or all of Barbour’s specific modalities but posits a “gradient” of increasing 
interaction, such as Barbour’s framework. See, for example, David R. Griffin, God and Religion in the 
Postmodern World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) and John F. Haught, Science and 
Religion: From Conflict to Conversation (New York: Paulist, 1995). A second group also formulates modal 
typologies, but without an explicit or implied gradient of modalities, and often without explicit reference to 
Barbour’s fourfold schema. For example, see the eightfold typology in Ted Peters, “Science and Theology: 
Toward Consonance,” in Science and Theology: The New Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1998), 13-22. A third group has created nonmodal typologies by employing “dimension” or 
“axis” as a primal notion. For example, Mikael Stenmark embeds a reformulated version of Barbour’s 
modalities within four “dimensions”—social, teleological, epistemic, and theoretical; see Mikael Stenmark, 
How to Relate Science and Religion: A Multidimensional Model (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004). In a 
more radical move, Christian Berg advocates replacing Barbour’s four modalities with the “dimensions” of 
epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics; see Christian Berg, “Barbour’s Way(s) of Relating Science and 
Theology,” in Russell, Fifty Years, 61-75. 
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how Barbour engages the primary themes of Chapters 2 and 3 of this inquiry: namely, 
phenomenology (in general terms, the role of philosophy in thinking the RST relation) 
and truth. In Section 5.2 below, I shall engage Barbour’s views on technology and 
ethics—the themes of Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  In Issues and throughout most of 
his later writings, Barbour interprets science primarily in terms of the natural sciences 
and religion in terms of the three Abrahamic faith traditions—Christianity, Judaism, and 
Islam. 
As a form of realism, critical realism affirms that a world of objects and their 
interrelations exists independently of our minds. However, critical realism opposes naïve 
realism, which holds that our access to that which is real is direct and immediate. In 
contrast, critical realism asserts that our knowledge of these objects is always indirect and 
incomplete, mediated through language and models. Against positivism, critical realism 
contends that the real is greater than the merely perceptible. With respect to anti-realism, 
(i) critical realism rejects idealism’s claim that our ideas about reality exhaust (or even 
constitute) reality itself; and (ii) critical realism opposes instrumentalism, which reduces 
our knowledge of the real to the merely useful or functional (162-74). Briefly stated, 
Barbour describes critical realism “as a middle ground between classical realism and 
instrumentalism.”30 
Barbour nuanced explication of truth is based upon his critical realist orientation: 
“. . . the meaning of truth is correspondence with reality. But because reality is 
inaccessible to us, the criteria of truth must include all four of the [following] criteria . . . 
                                                 
30. Barbour, “Personal Odyssey,” in Russell, Fifty Years, 23. 
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.” (RAS, 110): namely, agreement with data, coherence, scope, and fertility. These are 
four criteria “for assessing theories in normal scientific research” (109). The first 
criterion reflects the classical realist understanding of truth. By including the other three 
criteria, Barbour intends to incorporate as well the coherence view of truth (“a set of 
propositions is true if it is comprehensive and internally coherent”) and the pragmatic 
view (“a proposition is true if it works in practice”) (109-10). In sum, he says: “Because 
correspondence is taken as the definition of truth, this is a form of realism, but it is a 
critical realism because a combination of criteria is used” (109). Barbour subsequently 
employs this twofold formulation of truth in explicating the nature of truth-claims of 
religion. In so doing, Barbour reinterprets the four criteria in ways appropriate to religion, 
while acknowledging important—even fundamental—differences between religion and 
science (110-13). 
For Barbour, methodology has at least two distinct meanings. Taken broadly, 
“methodology” refers to his formulation of critical realism,31 which encompasses 
distinctive positions with respect to metaphysics, epistemology, and language, together 
with the analysis of “methodology” in a narrower sense. The latter (“method-ology” in 
                                                 
31. Other contributors to the RST discourse have developed slightly different formulations of 
critical realism. See, for example, Arthur Peacocke, Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism in Science and 
Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and John Polkinghorne, One World: The 
Interaction of Science and Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). Polkinghorne has 
described the differences and similarities in the formulations of critical realism by himself, Barbour, and 
Peacocke in John Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, 
Arthur Peacocke, and John Polkinghorne (London: SPCK, 1996). For a critique of critical realism itself, 
see Niels H. Gregersen, “Critical Realism and Other Realisms,” in Russell, Fifty Years, 77-95. 
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the narrower sense) refers to Barbour’s extensive examination of similarities and 
differences between the methods of science and those of religion.
32
  
Describing the intertwining of methodology and typology in Issues will show it 
exemplifies both the study of the doing of RST as well as the doing itself.
33
 Indeed, in 
Barbour’s own words, Issues has these two complementary objectives: “to compare 
alternative positions [regarding the RST relation] and to suggest a consistent constructive 
position in relation to these alternatives” (Issues, 9; original emphases). To establish the 
first half of the claim, I shall briefly trace in Issues Barbour’s explication of “conflict,” 
“independence,” “dialogue,” and (implicitly) “integration” as possible modalities for the 
religion-science relation. For the second half of the claim, I shall briefly analyze the key 
role of critical realism in his explication—and defense—of a form of process theology 
that exemplifies what he later calls “integration.”  
Throughout Issues, Barbour’s analysis of the RST relation is thought 
philosophically: “. . . a central concern of this volume is the relationship between 
philosophy of religion and philosophy of science, that is, comparative questions of 
epistemology, metaphysics, and language analysis in the two fields” (ibid., 11). For 
Barbour, engaging philosophy in thinking the RST relation is essential, because the 
everyday practices of religion and science are unreflective. In particular, critical realism 
is explicated in epistemic and metaphysical terms:  
                                                 
32. Barbour analyzes the similarities and differences between religion and science in terms of their 
methods rather than their content because of the widely-held “assumption that the scientific method is the 
only road to knowledge” (Issues, 137).  
 
33. This will also bolster the plausibility of regarding Issues as a founding textbook for the RST 
field. 
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Among the areas of classical philosophy that bear on religion (and on science), 
epistemology deals with the nature of knowledge (methods of inquiry, criteria of 
truth, the role of the knower, the status of theories)), and metaphysics deals with 
the most general categories for interpreting the structure of reality (time, 
causality, mind, matter, and so forth). (Issues, 11) 
 
Let us now briefly examine Barbour’s four-position model for describing possible 
relationships between religion and science (alternatively, theology and science).
34
 For the 
purposes of this inquiry, the modalities of Dialogue and Integration are of special interest. 
As we examine these modalities, keep in mind that Barbour viewed their employment in 
thinking the RST relation flexibly. 
Conflict. Scientific materialism and biblical literalism are Barbour’s canonical 
examples of irreconcilable conflict between religion and science. On his view, epistemic 
and metaphysical issues are at the center of both manifestations of Conflict.
35
 In his 
Gifford lectures (1989-91), Barbour noted that this “inflation” of science to a philosophy 
of “scientific materialism” continues today. Its tenets are epistemological (science is the 
only reliable road to knowledge) and metaphysical (matter is [or matter and energy are] 
the basic reality of the universe) (RIAS, 4-7). 
In Barbour’s view, then, the conflict between science and religion posed by 
scientific materialism is only apparent, as it is based upon a conflation of philosophical 
claims with findings based upon scientific reasoning. Similarly, biblical literalism has 
“overreached” its domain for centuries by making “scientific” claims about nature and 
                                                 
34. As pointed out earlier, Barbour employs the same four-position model in examining both 
binary relations. 
 
35. In this section (and hereafter, as appropriate) I shall follow Barbour’s practice (in RIAS) of 
capitalizing each of the modalities in his fourfold typology: thus, Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and 
Integration. 
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the world. Although Barbour acknowledges the historical importance of the Conflict 
modality, he treats Conflict, in effect, as a foil for delineating the other three modalities in 
more detail.  
Independence. In this modality, religion and science separate into nonoverlapping 
compartments, “motivated . . . not simply by the desire to avoid unnecessary conflicts, 
but also by the desire to be faithful to the distinctive character of each area of life and 
thought” (10). In Issues, Barbour traces the rise of three 20th century “movements” that 
serve to highlight differences between the methods of religion and science: neo-
orthodoxy, existentialism, and linguistic analysis. Within each movement, conflict 
between religion and science is avoided because the domains do not overlap: 
In neo-orthodoxy, it is the uniqueness of revelation that distinguishes theology 
from all human discovery. In existentialism, the dichotomy between personal 
existence and impersonal objects is the ground of the contrast. For linguistic 
analysis, the difference in the functions of religious and scientific language is the 
basis of the distinction. (Issues, 116) 
 
In effect, the “two language” view of linguistic analysis gives rise to a “two-world” view 
of reality, which Barbour finds unacceptable. “I advocate a critical realism holding that 
both communities make cognitive claims about realities beyond the human world. We 
cannot remain content with a plurality of unrelated languages if they are languages about 
the same world” (RAS, 89). 
Dialogue. This modality requires “indirect interactions between science and 
religion [or science and theology] involving boundary questions and methods [i.e., 
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methodological parallels]” (RIAS, 16).36 Barbour’s detailed defense of cognitive claims in 
religious language relies on critical realism: “[W]e seek in religion, as in science, a 
critical realism which preserves what is valid in both positivism and linguistic analysis, 
without being restricted to ‘summaries of sense-data,’ on the one hand, or ‘useful 
fictions’ on the other.”37  
Barbour defends the possibility of cognitive claims in religious language by 
examining similarities (as well as differences) in the criteria for evaluating religious 
beliefs and scientific theories stated above. In his view, religion and science share the 
common goal of the “intelligible ordering of experience”; the methods of both are 
grounded in the interweaving of experience and interpretation. Barbour delineates three 
common criteria of intelligibility across science and religion: (1) relation to “data,” (2) 
coherence, and (3) comprehensiveness, although the interpretation of these criteria is 
specific to each field (253).  
Barbour turns to metaphysics to bolster his case for the legitimacy of a modality 
of Dialogue between religion and science. Both of them, he says, are necessarily linked to 
metaphysics in a significant sense. For Barbour, a set of religious beliefs constitutes a 
“world view” because such beliefs not only function in the domain of worship and 
personal experience but also make claims about nature, God, and humanity. Such a 
collection of beliefs may therefore be viewed as metaphysical in the sense that they 
                                                 
36. Except for the replacement of “religion” with “theology,” exactly the same phrase appears in 
Barbour’s earlier essay, “Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” 33 (see n. 10). I therefore shall regard 
hereafter the two expressions as equivalent characterizations of Barbour’s modality of Dialogue. 
 
37. Issues, 248, original emphasis. 
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include assertions about the “fundamental character of reality” (261). Thus, for Barbour, 
religious beliefs inescapably make use of metaphysical categories and hence share a 
kinship with scientific theories.  
Integration. This modality requires a move beyond demonstrating “indirect 
interaction” between religion and science (sufficient for Dialogue) to “direct 
relationships” that meet at least one of two criteria: namely, “when scientific theories 
influence religious beliefs, or when they both contribute to the formulation of a coherent 
world view or a systematic metaphysics” (RIAS, 16).38 In particular, this modality entails 
integration “between the content of theology and the content of science” (23, emphasis 
added).
39
  
Barbour revisits the three “movements” discussed under Independence—neo-
orthodoxy, existentialism, and linguistic analysis—and examines other “classical views” 
(e.g., neo-Thomism) with regard to the relation between God and nature. (Issues, Chapter 
13, Sections I and II). Roughly speaking, neo-orthodoxy, existentialism, and linguistic 
analysis ignore nature as nature. Natural theology, such as neo-Thomism, can at best 
establish the plausibility of the existence of God but can say nothing about God’s 
relationship to the world (ibid.). He then turns to process philosophy, as developed by 
Whitehead and refined by Charles Hartshorne, to develop his own theology of nature as a 
contemporary example of an inclusive metaphysical system that incorporates essential 
                                                 
38. Barbour’s characterization of Integration for the science-theology relation is identical; see 
Barbour, “Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” 33. 
 
39. Barbour’s criteria for Integration, and his inclusion of boundary questions in his criteria for 
Dialogue, seem consistent with Welker’s statement of “the great potentials of the Science and Theology 
discourse” (Welker, “Science and Theology,” 558); also quoted in Subsection 1.2.1 above. 
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elements of science and religion, thus satisfying the second criterion for the modality of 
integration (ibid., Section III).  
I omit details here, except to note Barbour’s indebtedness to critical realism in his 
adaptation of concepts from process thought: “. . . Whitehead does affirm that God makes 
a difference in the world, not just in our attitudes toward the world. A critical realism 
acknowledges the symbolic character of all languages, but insists that they refer to a 
single world” (463). 
To summarize: Issues prefigures the modalities in Barbour’s well-known fourfold 
typology of the RST relation more than two decades prior to its formal publication. The 
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of critical realism are essential in 
Barbour’s arguments for establishing Dialogue and Integration as legitimate modalities. 
Although Independence is a helpful “first approximation” to thinking the RST relation, 
its insufficiency is glaring in light of the imperative to think the relation in terms of the 
“one world” we all live in. The possibility of Integration emerges from his commitment 
to a robust theology of nature—rooted in communities of faith and supported by certain 
resources of process thought. For more than four decades, Barbour has continued to 
develop and refine these basic insights found in Issues.
40
 
                                                 
40. Some other writers contend that non-typological approaches are needed for thinking the RST 
relation, in light of increasing pluralisms in religion, the philosophy of science, and cognition in general. 
See, for example, Niels H. Gregersen and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, “Theology and Science in a Pluralist 
World: An Introduction,” in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue, eds. 
Niels H. Gregersen and J. Wentzel van Huysstteen (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 3-6. Barbour 
defends the use of typologies in thinking the RST relation against the charge that they are too static and too 
simple in his article, “On Typologies for Relating Science and Religion,” in Zygon: Journal of Religion and 
Science 37, no. 2 (June 2002): 345-59. 
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 This section sets the stage for thinking the RST relation with Heidegger. First, it 
provides a rationale for engaging the RST relation instead of either the religion-science or 
science-theology binary (or both). It does so by employing (and subsequently critiquing) 
the customary formulation of theology as the reflection of religious experience and belief. 
Second, reviewing key elements of Ian Barbour’s fourfold typology (applicable to either 
binary) and its basis in critical realism illustrates two themes that are central to this 
inquiry—the role of philosophy and the question of truth. And third, examining the 
ostensible origins of the RST academic field in Barbour’s work and the founding of 
Zygon supports my claim that thinking the RST relation is of crucial importance. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
Any attempt to think the RST relation with Heidegger—or to think, with him, any 
other question or matter—must acknowledge from the start that Heidegger’s contribution 
(if any) will be made out of thinking the question of Being. Briefly stated, the 
“methodology” that I have tried to employ in this inquiry is to become cognizant of the 
principles, procedures, and practices that Heidegger has used in thinking the question of 
Being and to employ, or otherwise imaginatively adapt, them to the purposes of this 
inquiry. 
Any discussion of methodology in Heidegger’s work is tricky, for he regarded 
method itself as deeply problematic. He understood “method” as not only the path by 
which science gains knowledge, but method as the heart of science itself. “Method, 
especially in today’s modern scientific thought, is not a mere instrument serving the 
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sciences; rather, it has pressed the sciences into its own service.”41 I shall discuss this 
later in Section 4.4 (Technology, Science, and Thinking), in which Heidegger’s claim 
that “science does not think”—and his explication of the nature of thinking itself—are 
examined. Despite this caveat concerning “method,” Heidegger did employ a 
methodology—i.e., phenomenology—but in a sense very different from the method(s) of 
the sciences. 
Following a brief explication of Heidegger’s formulation of the question of Being, 
I shall explicate several ways in which Heidegger’s engagement with this question has 
decisively shaped the principles, procedures, and practices that have guided this inquiry. 
In turn, these elements of my methodology are reflected in the chapter-by-chapter outline 
in Section 1.5 below.  
In Being and Time,
42
 Heidegger contends that the question of Being has been 
forgotten, or covered over, in the history of philosophy since Plato and Aristotle. On his 
view, metaphysics—or more precisely, ontology—has focused instead upon the question 
of beings as such and in their entirety (i.e., beings as beings). Heidegger seeks instead the 
meaning of Being itself—also expressed as “that which determines entities as entities” 
(BT, 6).
43
 As he sees it, “[t]he task of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the 
                                                 
41. Martin Heidegger, “The Nature of Language,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. 
Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 74. (On the Way to Language is hereafter cited as OWL.) 
 
42. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962). (Hereafter cited as BT.) All pages cited from Being and Time throughout this 
dissertation use the standard pagination from Sein und Zeit—that is, the page numbers that appear in the 
margins of Being and Time. 
 
43. Heidegger distinguishes absolutely between “Being” (das Sein) and “being” (das Seiende), as 
the latter (with lower case “b”) is equivalent to “entity” (i.e., anything that is). This absolute distinction is 
referred to as the ontological difference. Some translators and other interlocutors prefer to employ “being” 
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Being of entities stand out in full relief” (27). Roughly speaking, phenomenology is the 
method employed by Heidegger to investigate the question of Being.
44
   
First, Heidegger necessarily approaches the question of Being indirectly—in the 
sense of interrogating something other than Being itself in order to comprehend the 
meaning, or sense (Sinn), of Being. This indirect approach is necessary, as Being does not 
have the character of an entity (i.e., being). Thus, it is meaningless to ask, What is 
Being?, as “Being” cannot be the predicate of an assertion. Heidegger’s indirect approach 
is to interrogate that entity “which each of us is himself45 and which includes inquiring as 
one of the possibilities of its Being”—namely, Dasein (7). He expresses this rubric, or 
pattern, of analysis compactly as: das Gefragte—that which is asked about (i.e., Being); 
das Erfragte—that which is to be found out by the asking (i.e., the meaning of Being); 
and das Befragte—that which is interrogated (i.e., Dasein) (5).46 
In this inquiry, it will also be necessary to approach the question of the essence, or 
nature, of the RST relation indirectly for the most part, because Heidegger wrote very 
little specifically on this topic. In the language of the G-E-B pattern, we could describe 
our inquiry as follows: the Gefragte is the RST relation, and the Erfragten (plural) are, 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the sense of “Being.” In this inquiry, I shall usually defer to the translator or other interlocutor involved. 
The context in which “being” appears usually is sufficient to clarify its intended meaning. In some cases, I 
have written “being itself” to address possible ambiguities.   
 
44. Heidegger provides an extensive explication of “phenomenology” in Section 7 of Being and 
Time: “The Phenomenological Method of Investigation” (BT, 27-38). 
 
45. The gender-exclusive language is from Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Heidegger’s 
original German line, which does not contain such gendering: “das wir selbst je sind” (GA2, 7).  
 
46. The term “Dasein” is intended by Heidegger to express its Being. Dasein is distinguished from 
all other beings in that Being is an issue for Dasein, and this fact constitutes Dasein (BT, 12). Moreover, 
Dasein “always understands itself in terms of its existence . . .”  (ibid.). For this reason, Heidegger’s 
investigation of Being by interrogating Dasein is often referred to as an existential analytic of Dasein (13). 
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first, the essence of the relation itself, and second, whether, in some sense, “dialogue” 
might possibly obtain within the relation. The primary Befragten may be read off the 
titles of Chapters 2-5: phenomenology, truth, technology, and ethics—as interpreted by 
Heidegger. The G-E-B rubric also operates within some chapters. For example, in 
Chapter 4 (Technology and the RST Relation), the Gefragte is modern technology, the 
Erfragte is its essence, and the Befragten are the technology-art relation (Section 4.1), the 
technology-poetry relation (Section 4.2), and the science-fourfold relation as mediated by 
Heidegger’s analysis of the “thing” (Section 4.3).  
In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,
47
 Heidegger employs the G-E-B 
pattern in a distinctive way that informs the entire structure of my inquiry. In BPP, 
Heidegger asserts that the essence, or nature, of phenomenology itself can be approached 
by examining in detail four basic problems.
48
 Moreover, he claims that these problems 
are the four basic ontological problems (BPP, 225), and that they “grow out of the inner 
systematic coherence of the general problem of being” (19). In the language of the G-E-B 
rubric, the Gefragte is phenomenology itself, the Erfragte is its essence, and the Befragten 
are the four basic problems. 
 In a roughly analogous fashion, I posit that four questions are fundamental in the 
RST discourse; these serve as guiding questions for the following chapters: Chapter 2 
(Phenomenology and the RST Relation): What is the proper role of philosophy in 
                                                 
47. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). (Hereafter cited as BPP.) 
 
48. “[F]irst, the problem of the ontological difference, the distinction between being and beings; 
secondly, the problem of the basic articulation of being, the essential content of a being and its mode of 
being; thirdly, the problem of the possible modifications of being and of the unity of the concept of being in 
its ambiguity; fourthly, the problem of the truth-character of being” (BPP, 225; original italics).  
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thinking the RST relation? (An important related question will be taken up in Sections 
2.3 and 2.4 below: namely, is theology a “science” or otherwise “scientific” in some 
sense?) Chapter 3 (Truth and the RST Relation): In what sense(s)—comparable or not—
are the claims of religion, science, and theology “true”? Chapter 4 (Technology and the 
RST Relation): What is the relation of technology to the RST triad? Chapter 5 (Ethics 
and the RST Relation): Is thinking the RST relation compelling for our time? That is, 
does such thinking truly matter for our dwelling (ethos) and destiny on planet earth? 
From this perspective, the Gefragte and the Erfragten remain as before (i.e., the RST 
relation and its essence), but the Befragten are the four basic questions just listed.
49
   
Second, Heidegger frequently engages his primary question of Being in relation to 
other fundamental questions, some of which can be read directly from the Chapter 
headings—for example, the question of truth (Chapter 3) and the question of technology 
(Chapter 4). Other basic questions cross cut, or traverse, the questions implicit in the 
chapter headings. For example, the question of truth is in the foreground throughout 
Basic Questions of Philosophy.
50
 Yet Heidegger tells us that this question is inseparable 
from the question of Being (BQP, 41) and from the question of “man”—i.e., the question 
of what it means to be human. (ibid., 20). In What Is Called Thinking?,
51
 the questions of 
                                                 
49. However, I do not claim, as Heidegger does, that these four questions are the basic questions 
of the RST relation, nor that they “constitute an intrinsic unit,” as he says regarding the four basic problems 
of phenomenology (BPP, 225). 
 
50. Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,” trans. 
Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). (Hereafter cited as 
BQP.) 
 
51. Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 
1968.) (Hereafter cited as WCT.) 
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thinking, man, and destiny (the last in the form of the question of nihilism) predominate 
in Part I, while the question of Being “joins,” so to speak, the question of thinking in the 
foreground in Part II.  
In any of Heidegger’s works, I contend that the question of Being is always at 
issue—explicitly or implicitly. Other basic questions come into play in relation to the 
question of Being and in relation to each other. For example, in The Principle of Reason, 
the questionable interpretation of man as animal rationale is directly linked to the 
question of the hegemony of calculative thinking.
52
 Furthermore, not only are the 
fundamental questions linked to the question of Being and to each other, I suggest that 
this family of questions is essentially a single question—the question of Being, a question 
that Heidegger continually engages, explicitly or not, in its many guises. 
Third, for Heidegger, the merely correct is not wrong but is “on the way to truth.” 
Heidegger often begins his inquiries by starting with the customary understanding of 
something with the intention of thinking it more essentially, more originarily. One 
example that comes to light in this inquiry is the traditional notion of truth as the 
correctness of an assertion (more precisely, the correspondence of an assertion with its 
object or referent). (See Sections 3.1 and 3.2.) Another is the traditional notion of 
causality in terms of four “causes” (more precisely, four senses of “cause”). (See Sections 
4.1 on the essence of modern technology and Section 4.3 on the nature of the thing.) I 
have applied this principle myself throughout this inquiry by starting with the widespread 
characterization of theology as reflection on religious experience and/or belief.  
                                                 
52. Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1991), 129. (Hereafter cited as POR.) 
  
32 
 
 
 
 Fourth, Heidegger’s relentless questioning, putting question after question to 
himself and to his readers, permeates his works. Already up to this point in the 
Introduction to this inquiry, page after page contains questions as questions, as well as 
references to the questions of Being, thinking, technology, etc. For Heidegger, 
questioning is never to “know” more but rather is always in the service of thinking the 
question of Being. At the close of his 1955 lecture, “The Question Concerning 
Technology,” he writes: “For questioning is the piety of thought” (QCT, 35).53 In a later 
lecture, he explicates the meaning of piety and brings to light the relation between 
thinking and listening: 
‘Piety’ is meant here in the ancient sense: obedient, or submissive, and in this case 
submitting to what thinking has to think about. . . .The lecture ending with that 
sentence was already in the ambiance of the realization that the true stance of 
thinking cannot be to put questions, but must be to listen to that which our 
questioning vouchsafes—and all questioning begins to be a questioning only in 
virtue of pursuing its quest for essential being. 
54
 
 
Heidegger sums it up: “The authentic attitude of thinking is not a putting of questions—
rather, it is a listening to the grant, the promise of what is to be put in question” (OWL, 
71).   
 Finally, keeping in mind Heidegger’s understanding of essence will be important 
throughout this inquiry. For example, in the chapters ahead we shall examine Heidegger’s 
explications of the essence of phenomenology, religion, science, truth, and modern 
                                                 
53. Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning 
Technology, and other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). Hereafter, The 
Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays is cited as QCT. In order to differentiate between this 
collection of essays and the specific essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” that is included in this 
collection, the latter is denoted hereafter by “the QCT essay” or “the QCT lecture.” 
 
54. Heidegger, “Nature of Language,” in OWL, 72.  
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technology. Briefly stated, the essence of an entity or being is not something timeless and 
ahistorical, but rather that which persistently endures over a period of time (QCT, 29-31). 
Furthermore, the essence of something is not limited to its “whatness,” as Plato held. 
Section 3.2 examines Heidegger’s notion of “essence” in light of his critique of the 
traditional understanding of truth as the correctness of an assertion (Section 3.2) and his 
explication of the essence of modern technology (Section 4.1). 
 
1.4  Significance and Contribution  
 The question or matter of the significance of this inquiry has two parts: first, the 
significance of thinking the RST relation at all; and second, the significance (if any) of 
this particular inquiry. 
In response to the first question, I suggest that my brief investigation in Sections 
1.2.1 and 1.2.2 above attest to the continued relevance of thinking the RST relation—not 
only for academic reasons, but for the sake of the future. In Section 1.2.1, I quote 
theologian Philip Hefner who expresses it thusly:  
We do not simply observe religion-and-science or study its components; the 
grappling with meaning vis-à-vis that which is most important to us requires our 
full engagement, because it is the meaning of our lives that is at stake, not just the 
mapping of an academic terrain.”55  
 
Forty years earlier, Whitehead declared that religion and science are the two most 
powerful forces shaping human history. He felt that it was vitally important that there be 
some sort of rapprochement between them. His words have clearly inspired Ian Barbour 
                                                 
55. Hefner, “Religion-and-Science,” 566. 
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to devote more than five decades to doing what Hefner calls religion-and-science, but 
also studying the doing of religion-and-science. In Section 1.2.2, the editors of Zygon 
articulated the purpose of their new journal in terms of responding to the “growing fears 
that the widening chasm in twentieth century culture between values and knowledge, . . . 
is disruptive, if not lethal, for human destiny” (Zygon 1 [1966]: 1). I have tried to 
structure and carry out this inquiry from this overarching context. (That said, I do not 
agree with those who seem to assume from the beginning that religion and/or theology 
are “out of step” in some way.) Moreover, judging from the growing literature on the 
religion-science and science-theology relations and the lack of consensus on their proper 
construal, the topic is widely taken to be of enduring importance.  
With regard to the second question, research into Heidegger’s examination of the 
individual elements of the relation—and the relation itself—via his method of 
phenomenological analysis may shed light on whether the lack of consensus in thinking 
the RST relation is an essential feature of these relations or whether the essence of these 
relations itself remains to be more fruitfully thought through.  
In addition, based upon my review of the many texts and publications available in 
the RST literature, few of the writers in the field engage Heidegger explicitly in 
conducting their own analyses in the doing of RST and the study of such doing, as Philip 
Hefner might put it. These include, for example, such authors as: Albert Borgmann, 
Frederick Ferré, Alister McGrath, and Carl Mitcham.
56
 (Selected works from their 
writings on the RST relation, including those that refer to Heidegger, are listed in the 
                                                 
56. I am grateful to Dr. Ian Barbour for bringing to my attention the work of Borgmann and Ferré, 
especially their analyses of the theology-technology relation. (E-mail message, January 18, 2010.) 
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Bibliography.) While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to critique the limited 
employment of Heidegger’s thinking in their own work, the purpose of this inquiry is to 
bring Heidegger’s thinking explicitly to bear what I consider to be fundamental, enduring 
issues in the RST relation and then to articulate my own views. Suffice it to say that none 
of their treatments of Heidegger with regard to the RST relation engage his thought with 
the scope intended in this inquiry.  
 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
The body of this work is structured as a series of five interwoven “threads,” each 
pertinent to thinking the RST relation, and each thought out of Heidegger’s engagement 
with the question of Being. The first thread is a set of four questions that I take to be 
fundamental in thinking the RST relation (and that arguably are reflected in much of the 
RST literature). These questions are directly reflected in the titles of Chapters 2-5. The 
other four threads—comportment (to things), reflection, thinking, and destiny—“cross-
cut,” or traverse, the stated themes of these four chapters and their underlying questions. 
(These transversal themes are successively introduced in Chapters 2-5, respectively.) In 
particular, these four cross-cutting threads serve to interrogate the common formulation 
of theology as reflection on religious experience and belief. I display the chapter outline 
and these threads as follows: 
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Chapter 2: Phenomenology and the RST Relation 
 What is the role of philosophy in the RST relation? 
 (Transversal thread: comportment to things) What is objectification?  
 Is theology “objectifying,” in some sense? That is, does it possess 
characteristics of a science? 
Chapter 3: Truth and the RST Relation 
 What is truth for each element in the RST relation, and for the relation 
itself? 
 (Transversal thread: reflection) What is “reflection”? 
 In what sense is theology “reflective”? 
Chapter 4: Technology and the RST Relation 
 What is the standing of technology with regard to the RST relation? 
 (Transversal thread: thinking) What is (called) thinking? 
 What sort of thinking characterizes theology: calculative thinking, 
meditative thinking, neither, or both?  
Chapter 5: Ethics and the RST Relation 
 What is the significance for thinking the RST relation with regard to our 
dwelling (ethos) on planet earth? 
 (Transversal thread : destiny) What is destiny? 
 Does theology have a role in shaping our destiny?  
The overall structure of this inquiry is also shaped by Heidegger’s retrospective 
description of his life-long engagement with the question of being as “three successive 
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formulations” of the “question of being as being”: the meaning, or sense, of being; the 
truth of being, and the place, or location, of being.
57
 Roughly speaking, these three 
formulations of the question of being serve as the “arc” of this entire inquiry. The 
meaning, or sense, of being undergirds Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses of 
religion, science, and theology in Chapter 2; the truth of being is the leitmotiv of Chapter 
3 and an underlying theme in Chapter 4; and the place of being, resonant with “dwelling” 
(ethos), is the opening context for Chapter 5.  
In light of this synoptic view of the entire work, I now briefly describe the focus 
of each chapter and the Epilogue. The Appendix contains a one-page schema of the entire 
work. 
Chapter 2 sequentially examines Heidegger’s explication of religion, science, and 
theology through the lens of phenomenology. Each is interpreted as one of Dasein’s 
modes of Being-in-the-world. The possibility—and implications—of thinking theology 
as a science is addressed. The different meanings of objectification in terms of “object” 
as Gegenstand and Okjekt are elucidated and employed to clarify similarities and 
differences between science and theology. On Heidegger’s view, if theology were a 
science, it would be the science of faith. And if this were the case, philosophy (as 
ontology) would have a role in clarifying the basic concepts that underlie theology. 
Evidence indicates, however, that Heidegger did not hold that theology is, in fact, a 
science. Throughout this chapter, “religion” is taken as Christian (factical) life 
experience (aka Christianness), grounded in faith, and “theology” as Christian theology. 
                                                 
57. Martin Heidegger, “Seminar in Le Thor 1969,” in Four Seminars, trans. Andrew Mitchell and 
François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 46-47. 
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Heidegger’s explication of the phenomenology of religious life is prefaced by articulating 
the meaning, or sense, of being in the “analogical moments” of content, relationality, and 
enactment. 
Chapter 3 presents Heidegger’s critique of the customary understanding of truth 
as the “correctness” of the correspondence between assertions and their referents. He 
recovers the pre-Socratic understanding of truth as disclosure and traces its transmutation 
to truth as correctness (Aristotle), thence to truth as certainty (Descartes). At issue is 
whether or not the question of the essence of truth is best engaged as a “problem” of 
logic. Heidegger’s claim that truth and untruth are inextricably intertwined is also 
presented. In the third section, theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s characterization of 
theology in terms of reason-seeking and giving is examined in light of Heidegger’s 
critique of Leibniz’s grand principle of reason: nihil est sine ratione.58 The final section 
presents Heidegger’s distinction between the two senses of reflection as Reflexion (based 
upon representational, idea-forming thinking) and Besinnung (mindfulness). These last 
two sections raise questions about the essential nature of theology: namely, Is reason-
seeking and giving sufficient to characterize theology? And, in what sense(s) of reflection 
is might theology be understood as “reflection on religious experience and belief” with 
regard to thinking the RST relation? 
Chapter 4 examines the essences of modern technology and modern science and 
their interrelation, together with Heidegger’s explication of the relationships of art, 
poetry, and the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and divinities, to technology and to the 
                                                 
58. Literally, “nothing is without reason,” paraphrased as “everything has a reason.” 
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holy/divine. The first two sections examine Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of 
technology and his claim that a “saving power” grows in the midst of the extreme danger 
posed by this essence. Heidegger explicates the possibility that art and poetry offer paths 
for hope and constructive response in the face of the growing hegemony of the essence of 
modern technology. Heidegger’s explication of “thingness” in relation to the fourfold 
points to a mode of relating to entities other than by objectification in either of its senses. 
The final section presents Heidegger’s analysis of the essential nature of thinking. 
Representational, idea-forming thinking (aka “calculative thinking”)—characteristic of 
science and reflection as Reflexion—is contrasted with meditative, reflective thinking in 
the sense of mindfulness (Besinnung). Questions for theology: Which form(s) of 
thinking, if any, meaningfully apply to theology? What can theology learn from poetry’s 
task of giving expression to wholeness in the midst of unwholeness? 
Chapter 5 engages Heidegger explication of “ethics” in the sense of dwelling or 
abode (ethos), in relation to destiny. Here, Heidegger’s understanding of “destiny” as the 
“sending of Being” (Geschick)—as well as its customary understanding as our fate, in 
some sense—are both in play. His analysis of the crucial roles of poetry and thinking—
separately and together—in service of dwelling is explicated. Ian Barbour’s analysis of 
technology, including the central role of “values” in developing effective responses to its 
dangers, is contrasted with Heidegger’s critique of the notion of “values.” Nietzsche’s 
epigram for nihilism, “God is dead,” and its implications for thinking the essence of 
religion, science, and theology are examined. In closing, the question of destiny—and the 
urgency and importance of thinking the RST relation—is considered in light of 
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Heidegger’s formulation of Nietzsche’s question, “Is the man of today in his 
metaphysical nature prepared to assume dominion over the earth as a whole?” (WCT, 
65).
59
 
 In the Epilogue, I return to the original motivating questions for this inquiry: 
What is the essence of the RST relation? Is “dialogue,” in some sense, possible in the 
RST triad? And does theology have a legitimate place in the public square in an age 
dominated by scientific, calculative thinking? In response, I re-examine the proffered 
formula of theology as reflection on religious experience and belief in light of the 
underlying questions and transversal themes addressed in the intervening four chapters. 
This context is expanded in view of the unquestionable and growing impact of human 
activity across the earth. In my view, this entails incorporating within theology both 
senses of comportment to things, reflection, and thinking—including poeticizing. And 
finally, the forums for such theologizing can—and must—include the public square as 
well as the academy and religious communities. 
  
                                                 
59. Unless otherwise noted, “man” and “mankind” are translations of der Mensch, which also 
connotes more broadly “human being” and “people,” in all portions of Heidegger’s works cited in this 
dissertation. Unless otherwise noted, I interpret as well the use of “man” and “mankind” by others cited 
herein in the broad sense of der Mensch.  
  
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Phenomenology and the RST Relation 
 
 
This chapter examines Heidegger’s explication of “phenomenology” and its 
employment in understanding the essential nature of religion, science, theology, and their 
interrelations. In so doing, I shall begin to engage one of the basic questions in the RST 
discourse and this inquiry: namely, What is the appropriate role of philosophy in thinking 
the RST relation? In Being and Time, Heidegger avers that phenomenology is the method 
of philosophy, taken as ontology—the study of Being itself. On his view, phenomenology 
is not merely a branch, or field, in philosophy—along with ethics, epistemology, etc.—
but the only path to follow to think Being itself.
60
  
The first three sections of this chapter focus upon Heidegger’s analyses of 
religion, science, and theology, respectively, through the lens of phenomenology. As we 
shall see, however, all three members of the RST relation are unavoidably “in play” in 
each section. The first section (2.1 The Phenomenology of Religion) provides a formal, 
but preliminary, characterization of the phenomenological method and employs it to: (i) 
interpret specific “religious phenomena” in several of Paul’s letters in the New 
Testament, and (ii) characterize the life experience of early Christians. The next section 
                                                 
60. “Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. 
These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object. 
Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology . . .” (BT, 38). Heidegger explicates “The Preliminary 
Conception of Phenomenology” in BT, 34-39. A reminder: In this chapter and throughout the remainder of 
this inquiry, page numbers in BT refer to the standard pagination of Sein und Zeit. These “standard” pages 
appear in the margins of Being and Time. 
  
42 
 
 
 
(2.2 Phenomenology and Science) focuses upon Heidegger’s explication of the essence of 
science in terms of the existential analytic of Dasein as presented in Being and Time. On 
Heidegger’s view, “science” (Wissenschaft) is a specific mode of Dasein as Being-in-the-
World—a view very different from regarding science as “the totality established through 
an interconnection of true propositions” (BT, 11). In the following section (2.3 
Phenomenology and Theology), Heidegger investigates what might be learned by 
regarding theology and phenomenology as “sciences.” In so doing, he characterizes 
theology as the “science of faith” and argues that philosophy can assist theology in 
clarifying its fundamental concepts by articulating the ontological bases for them. The 
final section (2.4 Theology, Natural Science, and Objectification) takes up the question of 
whether theology is a “non-objectifying thinking and speaking” and provisionally 
examines the notion of “objectification” itself—a recurring theme in this inquiry. 
 
2.1 The Phenomenology of Religion 
What does Heidegger mean by “phenomenology,” and in what way(s) does it 
illuminate the nature, or essence, of religion? I shall engage these guiding questions by 
drawing upon Heidegger’s lecture course of 1920-21, titled “Introduction to the 
Phenomenology of Religion.”61 This lecture course consists of two parts. Part I examines 
essential differences between philosophy and science and provides a formal definition of 
phenomenology in terms of a threefold understanding of the sense (Sinn), or meaning, of 
                                                 
61. Heidegger’s notes, and notes from his students for this lecture course have been compiled and 
published in The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthew Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-
Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 3-111. The Phenomenology of Religious Life is 
hereafter cited as PRL. 
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“experience.” Heidegger names these three “directions” of sense (Sinnesrichtungen) of 
experience as the content-sense, relational-sense, and enactment-sense of experience. In 
Part II, Heidegger employs this threefold understanding of experience to interpret key 
events and claims in several of Paul’s letters in the New Testament and, more broadly, to 
explicate characteristics of early Christian life. In contrast to this three-fold meaning of 
Christian life experience, Heidegger contends that the horizon of science is limited to the 
content-sense of experience: that is, what is experienced.  
Before proffering a formal definition of “phenomenology,” Heidegger draws 
several sharp distinctions between philosophy and science and then explicates his 
fundamental notion of factical life experience. On his view, each scientific discipline is 
founded upon a specific and delimited “material complex,” out of which its concepts are 
formed. Moreover, the greater the familiarity with the complex, the greater the exactness 
with which its concepts may be formulated. Philosophy, however, does not have access to 
any such complex. Hence its concepts are necessarily “vacillating, vague, manifold, and 
fluctuating” (PRL, 3). Heidegger also contends that science cannot determine its own 
essence, but that the constant reappraisal of its basic notions and its very essence is 
constitutive of philosophy itself (6-7).  
In light of the absence of any material complex within which to secure its 
concepts, philosophy (as phenomenology) must turn elsewhere to begin philosophizing. 
For Heidegger, factical life experience is the “point of departure” and the goal of 
philosophy (11). Let us examine Heidegger’s interpretation of this key term, starting with 
“experience.” On his view, every experience entails a twofold meaning: (i) the activity of 
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experiencing, and (ii) that which is experienced by means of this activity (7). Moreover, 
he says, regarding these two expressions as inseparable is essential for factical life 
experience. By “life experience,” Heidegger means “the active and passive pose of the 
human being toward the world” (8). Heidegger further delineates “world” as surrounding 
world (i.e., all that we encounter, including “ideal objectivities”); communal world (i.e., 
other human beings in specific characterizations—e.g., student, relative, etc.); and self-
world. The term “world” is not an object but instead points to “that in which we can live.” 
By applying the adjective “factical” to “life experience,” Heidegger intends to 
articulate a particular character or manner of the pose (Stellung), or stance, toward the 
world. I suggest that factical life experience can be expressed compactly as relational 
indifference toward the worlds in which we live—the self-world, the communal world, 
and the surrounding world.
62
 
The peculiarity of factical life experience consists in the fact that ‘how I stand 
with regard to things,’ the manner of experiencing, is not co-experienced. . . . 
Factical life experience puts all its weight on its content; the how of factical life 
experience at most merges into its content. . . .  factical life experience manifests 
an indifference with regard to the manner of experiencing. (PRL, 9) 
 
Heidegger’s notion of factical life experience is further clarified by his formal 
characterizations of “phenomenon” and “phenomenology” in terms of the three directions 
of sense in experience. The two-fold meaning of experience unfolds into three basic 
ways, or directions, of inquiring after the experience: (i) What was experienced? (a 
content question). (i) How was the experience experienced? (a relational question) and 
                                                 
62. Heidegger provides a comprehensive “formula”: “Factical life experience is ‘the attitudinal, 
falling, relationally indifferent, self-sufficient concern for significance’” (PRL, 11). 
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(iii) How was the relational meaning of the experience acted upon and fulfilled? (a 
question of enactment) (43). Then phenomenon is “the totality of sense in these three 
directions,” and phenomenology is the “explication of this totality of sense” (43).63  
In terms of the threefold sense of experience, factical life experience is “one-
dimensional,” so to speak, as it is dominated by the direction of content-sense. Factical 
life experience reduces the twofold nature of experience to the “onefold” of what is 
experienced and ignores how the experiencing itself unfolds. Moreover, it turns to science 
for its basic orientation, as it “constantly strives for an articulation in science and 
ultimately for a ‘scientific culture’” (11).  
In Part Two, Heidegger employs the three directions of sense to explicate the 
meaning of early Christian factical life experience (aka, “primordial Christian 
religiosity”). On his view, primordial Christian religiosity is not only in factical life 
experience, but is factical life experience itself (57).
64
 On the face of it, this hypothetical 
claim is paradoxical. On the one hand, as I shall show below, he claims that early 
Christian factical life experience exhibits the characteristics of all three directions of 
“sense.” On the other hand, we have just cited passages that emphasize the relational 
indifference and content-heavy character of factical life experience itself. Heidegger 
writes: “We attempt to understand this [apparent paradox] from out of the apostolic 
                                                 
63. Heidegger names this threefold, yet unitary, sense of phenomenological explication, formal 
indication (PRL, 38). It is intended to guide such explication without theoretical preconceptions 
(characteristic of formalization) or approaches based upon classification (characteristic of generalization) 
(ibid., 39-44). For a deeper examination of Heidegger’s notion of formal indication, see Leslie MacAvoy, 
“Formal Indication and the Hermeneutics of Facticity,” in Philosophy Today 54 (2010): 84-90, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/762702248?accountid=14608. 
 
64.This is a more compelling claim that his earlier statement: “Primordial Christian religiosity is 
in primordial Christian life experience and is itself such” (PRL, 55; emphasis added). 
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proclamation of Paul” (93, original emphasis). Paul’s proclamation is that Jesus is the 
Messiah (83).  
Acceptance of the apostolic proclamation by the early Christian communities, 
such as the Thessalonians, is a “having-become,” says Heidegger (65f).  “Having-
become” entails mundane as well as “spiritual,” so to speak, consequences. “The having-
become is understood such that with the acceptance, the one who accepts treads upon an 
effective connection with God. . . . That which is accepted concerns the how of self-
conduct in factical life” (66). Acceptance of the proclamation is transformational—an 
“absolute turning-around, more precisely about a turning-toward God and a turning-
away from idol-images” (ibid.). Furthermore, understood as the acceptance of the 
apostolic proclamation, the “having-become” is not a once-and-for-all experience, but 
rather is “incessantly co-experienced” (ibid.). In sum, “having-become” is the relational-
sense of Christian factical life experience, as it expresses how the experience of hearing 
the apostolic proclamation was experienced—namely, transformationally. In turn, 
“having become” gives rise to the enactment-sense of this experience as well: 
Christian factical life experience is historically determined by its emergence with 
the proclamation that hits the people in a moment, and then is unceasingly also 
alive in the enactment of life. Further, this life experience determines, for its part, 
the relations which are found in it. (PRL, 83)  
 
The paradox still at issue is illuminated by Paul’s response to the urgent question 
of many—perhaps most—early Christians: When will the parousia65 take place? On 
                                                 
65. Heidegger traces the meaning of parousia from its classical roots (meaning “arrival”) through 
Judaism to its Christian meaning as “the appearing again of the already appeared Messiah” (PRL, 71). 
Equivalently, he says, the Christian meaning of parousia may be expressed as “the second coming of Christ 
at the end of time.” 
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Heidegger’s reading of Paul’s letters, Paul ignores the content-sense of the question but 
provides an enactment-sense response instead. Heidegger summarizes the heart of Paul’s 
reply:  “What is decisive is how I comport [verhalte] myself to it in actual life. From that 
results the meaning of the ‘when?,’ time and the moment” (70, emphasis added; see also 
51). By “comportment,” Heidegger means the enactment-sense of early Christian life 
experience—i.e., how the transformative experience of being “hit” with the apostolic 
proclamation is lived out in one’s surrounding, communal, and self-worlds (84).66 
Heidegger turns to Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians to explicate in more detail 
what such comportment entails. “Let each one of you remain in the condition in which 
you were called.”67 Heidegger gives examples. If a Christian is a slave, he or she should 
anticipate remaining a slave. If Christian men are married, they “should be such that 
those who have a wife, should have her in such a way, that they do not have her, etc.” 
(85, original emphasis).68  
This example illuminates and affirms the tension in the paradoxical claim that 
early Christian factical like experience “is factical life experience itself” (57). On the one 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
66. “Comportment” is one of the translations of das Verhalten; others include “attitude,” 
“manner,” “conduct,”  “bearing,” and “demeanor.” The translations of the infinitive, verhalten, are more 
specific: “to restrain, contain, hold, control, curb.” Online Dictionary English-German, s.v. “Verhalten,” 
accessed October 26, 2012, http://www.dict.cc/?s=Verhalten. In this inquiry, I shall use “comportment” in 
its more general sense. (See chap. 4, n. 161, regarding the translation of die Haltung as “comportment.”) 
 
67. 1 Cor. 7:20 (New Revised Standard Version). Heidegger’s version: “One should remain in the 
calling in which one is” (PRL, 84). 
 
68. Heidegger translates ώς μή (1 Cor. 7:29) as “that . . . do not” and critiques the insertion of the 
conditional “if” in its customary translation “as if not” or some close variation (PRL, 84-86). Examples of 
such translations are “as if  . . . none” (New International Version) and “as though . . . none” (NRSV) 
(emphases added). By so doing, he guards against implying that either relation, slavery or marriage, is to be 
avoided or preferred. In support of Heidegger’s move, ώς μή literally means “that (or as) not,” which does 
not imply a conditional (Dennis Haugh, personal communication). 
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hand, married men who have become Christians should stay married, Paul says.  As 
Heidegger puts it, “[T]he Christian does not step out of the world” (85). On the other 
hand, Heidegger states that their marriage relationships, like “all surrounding-world 
relations,” “must pass through the complex of enactment having-become, so that this 
complex is then co-present, but the relations themselves, and that to which they refer, are 
in no way touched” (86). Given the polysemic understanding of “experience,” we can 
affirm that early Christian factical life experience is factical life experience itself. 
To sum up, early Christian factical life experience is grounded in the “having 
become” as the transformational acceptance of the apostolic proclamation, “Jesus is the 
Messiah.” This relational sense of Christian factical life experience gives rise to enacting, 
or living out, that transforming experience in ways that, in turn, transform the manner of 
one’s relationships to all the worlds of life experience—surrounding, communal, and 
self—without altering their content and the relations therein. Christian factical life 
experience is factical life experience in the fullest meaning of “experience.” It is beyond 
human power to effect this enactment, Heidegger says. God is the source of this Christian 
facticity—“the phenomenon of the effects of grace” (87). One’s comportment to this 
facticity is decisive. 
What about theology? In terms of Christian theology, Heidegger says that it is 
grounded in the enactment of Christian factical life experience. Specifically, it is 
grounded in the knowledge that arises from the “having become”:  
Knowledge of one’s own having-become is the starting point and the origin of 
theology. In the explication of this knowledge and its conceptual form of 
expression the sense of a theological conceptual formation arises. (PRL, 66) 
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Heidegger interprets Paul’s explications of comportment to both faith and law (Phil. 
Chapter 3) as a form of theology, but not as a system of theology. On Heidegger’s view, 
Paul is articulating the “consciousness of faith, in the sense of making comprehensible 
the posture of faith for the individual himself” (51).  
Heidegger sharply distinguishes his phenomenological explication of theology, 
thought from out of early Christian life experience, from Troeltsch’s philosophy of 
religion. On Heidegger’s view, Troeltsch attempts a scientific approach to discern the 
essence of religion (19).69 This entails regarding religion as an object (Objekt) for 
scientific analysis. “Religion is for him an external object and can as such be integrated 
into different material complexes (as appropriate to different philosophical ‘systems’)” 
(20).  In contrast to Troeltsch’s objectification of religion, Heidegger regards “faith in the 
existence of God” as the primal phenomenon of religion. The question of 
“objectification” for religion, science, and theology runs through this entire inquiry. 
I close this section with two observations with regard to thinking the RST 
relation. First, on Heidegger’s view, religion and science can be distinguished in terms of 
the span, or range, of the directions of sense in experience that each engages: roughly 
speaking, three for religion, one for science. As for theology, perhaps we could say 
“three” in light of Heidegger’s phenomenological articulation of theology as grounded in 
the “having-become” and “one” for Troeltsch’s scientific study of the essence of religion. 
This doesn’t quite wash, however, as Troeltsch’s work is philosophy of religion—not 
theology. Nonetheless, Troeltsch’s analysis of religion raises the question of whether 
                                                 
69. Heidegger takes issue with attempts to explicate the “essence” of religion. “Everything that is 
said of the—for reason—indissoluble residue that supposedly remains in all religions, is merely an 
aesthetic play with things that are not understood” (PRL, 55).   
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theology is, in some sense, a science—and if not, whether it could, or even should, be. 
We shall take up these questions in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.  
Second, Heidegger’s characterization of Christian theology as grounded upon the 
“having become” has implications for thinking anew the “formula” of theology as 
reflection on religious experience and belief. In particular, the conventional formula is 
silent about the place of faith. In terms of Christian factical life experience, the relational-
sense of religious experience (i.e., the “having become”) is grounded upon the faith-filled 
acceptance of the apostolic proclamation. Thus, Christian faith and Christian (factical 
life) experience are inseparable. Still to be clarified: What is the relation between 
Christian faith and belief? And what is the meaning, or sense (in all three directions) of 
the phenomenon of “reflection”? 
 
2.2 Phenomenology and Science 
The primary task of this section is to examine Heidegger’s explication of the 
nature, or essence, of science in phenomenological terms as it is presented in Being and 
Time.
70
 My guiding questions are: What makes science possible? That is, thought 
phenomenologically, what are the conditions necessary for doing science? What is the 
phenomenological understanding of the nature of scientific activity? How does it differ 
from conventional understandings, and how does the latter flow from the former? To 
address these questions, I shall focus on the distinctive manner in which science engages, 
or otherwise relates, to the entities that it analyzes. In the following two sections of this 
                                                 
70. The question of the essential nature of science will also be investigated in other sections that 
reference other writings by Heidegger.  
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chapter, I shall compare and contrast the manner of science and the manner of theology in 
such engaging and relating. 
I take as a starting point Heidegger’s claim that science is a mode of Being-in-the-
World (BT, 357). According to Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is Dasein’s basic state or 
structure (53).
71
 Roughly speaking, this means that, as human beings, we always “show 
up” already embedded in a world of entities (aka beings), other Dasein, and relations 
among them before “science” or any other concept is—or can be—formulated and 
appropriated intelligibly.  Just as Heidegger approaches the meaning, or sense, of Being 
itself by interrogating Dasein as Being-in-the-world, so he interrogates this basic state by 
examining the “world” of everyday Dasein and the entities within it. This examination 
consists of “an ontological Interpretation of those entities within-the-environment which 
we encounter as closest to us” (66).72 Such entities, he says, are those that we deal with or 
that otherwise concern us.
73
 Heidegger calls such entities equipment—understood as 
“essentially something ‘in-order-to’” (68). That is, equipment is purposeful. 
Ontologically speaking, equipment is a presencing of Being (as the Being of an entity) 
that Heidegger calls readiness-to-hand (69).  
                                                 
71. This follows from his development of the existential analytic of Dasein, which was briefly 
described in the Methodology section (1.3). 
 
72. More precisely, his method seeks “the worldhood of the environment . . .” (BT, 66). For 
Heidegger, “world,” denotes, in this context, “that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’” 
(65).  “Environment” is “that world of everyday Dasein which is closest to it” (66). The “worldhood of the 
world” is “the Being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be 
discovered at all” (88). 
 
73. For Heidegger, “concern” (Besorgen) designates “the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-
World” (BT, 57). According to Macquarrie and Robinson, it is meant in the sense of concerning ourselves 
with activities or purchases (57, n. 1). This mode, like other modes, can also manifest itself in a deficient 
manner, such as renouncing and neglecting (57).  
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To illustrate, Heidegger explicates this mode of the presencing of Being of a 
hammer and contrasts it with a second mode. It might seem obvious that readiness-to-
hand would characterize the presencing of Being of a hammer, since a hammer as such 
clearly fits the conventional understanding of “equipment” as something ready to be used 
by a carpenter, say. According to Heidegger, however, we cannot tell the mode in which 
the Being of something presences just by looking at it. “No matter how sharply we just 
look at the ‘outward appearance’ of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot 
discover anything ready-to-hand” (69; original emphasis). However, “the less we just 
stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more 
primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered 
as that which it is—as equipment” (ibid.). In contrast, suppose we focus on the heaviness 
of the hammer, say, as a property of some sort, viewing the hammer “not as a tool, but as 
a corporeal Thing subject to the law of gravity” (361). We would then be looking at the 
hammer, he says, as something present-at-hand. What the hammer is has not changed, 
but the mode of the presencing of Being of the hammer “has changed over” from 
readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand (361). 
The contrast between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand may be expressed 
by relating them to the three directions of sense that together comprise “phenomenon” as 
discussed in Section 2.1. On one hand, the experience of hammering just described 
clearly includes the relational-sense and enactment-sense of the phenomenon of the 
hammer. On the other hand, by focusing on the heaviness of the hammer in isolation, its 
Being presences as presence-at-hand, limiting its meaning to content-sense only. In other 
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words, readiness-to-hand encompasses the how as well as the what of the hammer as 
phenomenon, while presence-at-hand limits the extent of its sense, or meaning, to the 
what of the hammer, now as mere entity. 
 Heidegger explicates in detail the manner by which this changeover of the mode 
of the presencing of Being of entities within-the-world of Dasein can take place. Briefly 
stated, the circumspective concern of the readiness-to-hand is modified to the theoretical 
discovery of the presence-at-hand (357-61). Both modes in which Being presences 
involve sight or seeing, but in very different ways. Circumspection (Umsicht) means 
“looking around,” or “looking in order to get something done” (69, n. 2)—a manner of 
sight appropriate for the concernful involvement that characterizes readiness-to-hand. In 
contrast, the theoretical has its own form of looking as observation, in which the “in-
order-to” is absent (69). On the one hand, the modification from the practical to the 
theoretical ignores, or even eliminates, the purposiveness of the readiness-to-hand. On the 
other hand, the shift to the theoretical releases the entities in Dasein’s environment from 
their confinement, due to circumspective concern, to possibly become an “area of 
subject-matter for a science . . .” (362). By the changeover, the hammer’s mode of the 
presencing of Being is no longer that of a phenomenon (in the three directions of its 
meaning) but has become the presencing of Being as merely an entity whose meaning has 
become reduced to its whatness. 
The shift from the practical to the theoretical is on the path to science, so to speak, 
but more is needed. Heidegger selects mathematical physics in order to illuminate 
additional features of the theoretical. For this natural science and others, the 
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mathematical projection of Nature is key (ibid.). Such projection has both a 
determinative and restricting effect. On the one hand, the projection provides for the 
explicit quantification of such fundamental concepts as force, location, and motion; on 
the other hand, the projection delimits the horizon within which entities taken as its 
theme can be discovered (ibid.). The shift from circumspective concern to theoretical 
discovery thus entails a trade-off: namely, securing a measure of the what, or content, of 
the phenomenon, now merely an entity, while excluding the how of relationality and 
enactment that flesh out the meaning, or sense, of the phenomenon itself.  
Briefly stated, phenomena become Objects (Objekte)
74
 under mathematical 
projection. Considered comprehensively as thematizing, such projection determines the 
understanding of the Being of its entities and identifies the region of its theoretically 
discovered entities. Thematizing is objectivizing; it “awaits solely the discoveredness of 
the present-at-hand” (363).  
Heidegger’s explication of the changeover from the ready-to-hand (i.e., the 
practical) to presence-at-hand (i.e., the theoretical) substantiates his claim that science, 
thought phenomenologically, is a mode of Dasein’s fundamental state as Being-in-the-
world:  
When the basic concepts of that understanding of Being by which we are guided 
have been worked out, the clues of its methods, the structure of its way of 
conceiving things, the possibility of truth and certainty which belongs to it, the 
ways in which things get grounded or proved, the mode in which it is binding for 
us, and the way it is communicated—all these will be Determined. The totality of 
                                                 
74. Consider these etymological connections: “Projection” (Entwurf) basically denotes “throwing 
off” or “throwing away.” (BT, 145, n. 1). “Object” (Objekt) has the literal meaning of “something thrown 
against” (363, n. 1).  
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these items constitutes the full existential conception of science. (BT, 362-63; 
emphasis added)
75
` 
 
Heidegger sharply distinguishes this existential conception of science from “. . . the 
‘logical’ conception which understands science with regard to its results and defines it as 
‘something established on an interconnection of true propositions—that is, propositions 
counted as valid” (357).  
To sum up, two points appear to be germane to our inquiry into the nature of the 
RST relation—in particular, to the thread of comportment to things. First, presence-at-
hand and ready-to-hand are different modes of the presencing of Being of entities. The 
sharp distinctions between them arise from the different modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-
world—roughly speaking, science mode and non-science mode, respectively. As the 
example of the hammer illustrates, the presencing of Being may manifest in either mode, 
and the modes may “coexist”: “The ready-to-hand can become the ‘Object’ of a science 
without having to lose its character as equipment” (361). Thus, entities in Dasein’s 
environment do not possess inherent characteristics that can be used to sort them into 
stable, disjoint categories of phenomena (in which all three directions of sense are 
operative) and mere entities (in which sense or meaning is reduced to whatness).  
Second, ready-to-hand is a primary mode for Heidegger in at least two important 
senses. Heidegger’s explication of science as the mathematical projection of nature is 
derived from the changeover from ready-to-hand to presence-at-hand. So, in a sense, the 
latter is derivative of the former. Also, the ready-to-hand can be viewed, in some sense, 
                                                 
75. Heidegger distinguishes this existential conception of science from what he calls “the ‘logical’ 
conception which understands science with regard to its results and defines it as ‘something established on 
an interconnection of true propositions—that is, propositions counted as valid’” (BT, 357). 
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as the “default” option among the two modes of the presencing of Being. In writing about 
the relation of Dasein to involvement with entities in its environment, he states:  “Dasein 
always assigns itself from a ‘for the sake of which’ to the ‘with which’ of an 
involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as 
ready-to-hand” (86; emphasis added). In addition, the potential reach of the mode of 
readiness-to-hand appears to be almost without limit. It might seem that equipment 
applies to only a small fraction of what Heidegger calls “Things of Nature,” such as 
woodworking tools, golfing gear, surgical instruments, and so forth. However, Heidegger 
seems to say that the range of the readiness-to-hand apparently can extend as far as the 
range of our concern and dealings—even to Nature, appropriately understood: 
Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the 
domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world. Along with this 
public world, the environing Nature  . . . is discovered and is accessible to 
everyone. (BT, 71) 
 
Could it be inferred from this claim that Dasein, in its basic mode of Being-in-the-
World, can impute, or co-determine, in some sense, the mode of the presencing of Being 
of entities in Dasein’s environment—simply by dealing with or concerning oneself with 
them? For example, if I concern myself with, say, preserving a threatened or endangered 
species, then does the Being of such a plant or animal—individually or collectively—
necessarily presence as ready-to-hand? In other words, is the ready-to-hand mode of the 
presencing of Being of a threatened or endangered organism ”triggered,” in some sense, 
simply by my dealings with the organism and the matter of its threatened or endangered 
status? It seems so, as Heidegger writes:  
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To the extent that any entity shows itself to concern—that is, to the extent that it is 
discovered in its Being—it is already something ready-to-hand environmentally; 
it just is not ’proximally’ a ‘world-stuff’ that is merely present-at-hand. (BT, 85) 
 
 
 Before closing this section, I wish to indicate how Being and Time explicitly sets 
the stage for the next two sections that bring theology into the foreground of our inquiry. 
Prefiguring Thomas Kuhn’s explanation 35 years later of the dynamic process by which 
the fundamental assumptions of normal science are called into question and eventually 
replaced,
76
 Heidegger states that major changes occur in the sciences when their basic 
concepts are challenged. Taking theology to be a “science,” in some sense, he succinctly 
states his understanding of the crisis facing theology and signals the approach he will 
soon take to respond to it: 
The real movement of the sciences takes places when their basic concepts 
undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level 
which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in 
its basic concepts. . . . Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of 
man’s Being toward God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining 
within it. It is slowly beginning to understanding once more Luther’s insight that 
the ‘foundation’ on which its system of dogma rests has not arisen from an 
inquiry in which faith is primary, and that conceptually this ‘foundation’ is not 
only inadequate for the problematic of theology, but conceals and distorts it. (BT, 
9-10; original emphasis) 
 
 
 
2.3 Phenomenology and Theology 
The purpose of this section is to examine Heidegger’s explication of the 
relationship between phenomenology and theology by a close reading of his work, 
                                                 
76. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970). First published in 1962 by University of Chicago Press. 
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“Phenomenology and Theology.”77 A few months after delivering this lecture for the 
second time in 1928, Heidegger expressed its purpose succinctly in a private letter: “. . . 
to see what theology can—and cannot—learn from phenomenology.”78  
 As explicitly stated in the PAT lecture, Heidegger’s thesis is that “. . . theology is 
a positive science, and as such, therefore, is absolutely different from philosophy” (P, 41, 
original emphasis).
  
The gloss of phenomenology/philosophy is addressed in the Preface, 
in which Heidegger refers the reader to portions of the Introduction to Being and Time 
that discuss “the notion of phenomenology (as well as its relation to the positive sciences) 
that guides the presentation here” (39). Briefly put,  
Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines 
among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object 
and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological 
ontology . . . . (BT, 38) 
 
Following Heidegger, I shall use the term “philosophy” for “phenomenology” in 
discussing the PAT lecture in this section. 
Heidegger begins his analysis of the theology-philosophy relation with a formal 
definition of “science” (Wissenshaft) as “the founding disclosure, for the sheer sake of 
                                                 
77. Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology,” trans. James G. Hart and John C. 
Maraldo, in Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 39-62. (Pathmarks is hereafter cited as P.) 
This work consists of three parts—a lecture, an Appendix, and a Preface. The Preface states that the lecture 
portion of this work is based upon a reworking of the second delivery of the lecture in February 1928; the 
lecture was first given in March 1927. Hereafter, I shall refer to this lecture as “the 1927/28 lecture” or “the 
PAT lecture.” The Appendix (Anhang) is described in Heidegger’s Preface as a “letter” for a theological 
discussion at Drew University in April 1964. In the following section, I shall provide additional 
background about the discussion and a close reading of this letter (hereafter, “the 1964 letter,” “the 1964 
Appendix,” “the PAT letter,” or “the PAT Appendix”). 
 
78. “. . . was kann ein Theologie von der Phänomenologie lernen u. was nicht.” Martin Heidegger 
to Elisabeth Blochmann, 8 August 1928, in Martin Heidegger — Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel 
1918–1969, 2nd ed., ed. Joachim W. Storck (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsches Literatur-Archiv, 1990), 24 
(my translation, with assistance from Stephanie Carlson). 
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disclosure, of a self-contained region of beings, or of being” (P, 41). This 
phenomenological definition of science readily leads to its partitioning into philosophy 
(as the ontological science of Being—i.e., ontology), and the positive sciences (as the 
ontic sciences of beings). For Heidegger, the latter includes theology as well as modern 
sciences. Thus “. . . theology, as a positive science, is in principle closer to chemistry and 
mathematics than to philosophy” (ibid.).   
On the face of it, treating philosophy as a science would seem to contradict the 
sharp contrasts between science and philosophy that Heidegger explicated only a few 
years earlier in “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion”: namely, that scientific 
concepts are formed out of a material complex, while philosophy does not have access to 
any such complex (PRL, 3).  
Indeed, Heidegger does say that he sees the question of the relationship between theology 
and phenomenology as a “question about the relationship of two sciences”—but not as a 
matter of “comparing the factical circumstances of two historically given sciences” (P, 
40). He concludes: 
Thus what is needed as a basis for a fundamental discussion of the problem is an 
ideal construction of the ideas behind the two sciences. One can decide their 
possible relationship to one another from the possibilities they both have as 
sciences. (P, 40; emphasis added) 
 
That is, Heidegger is not claiming that philosophy and theology are sciences—either in 
their historical manifestations or even “ideally.” Instead, he is suggesting that something 
might be learned regarding their possible relationship by “bracketing” any claims as to 
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whether either of them is actually, or even possibly, a science, in some sense.
79
 In other 
words, Heidegger’s analysis of the possible relationship between philosophy and 
theology proceeds as if theology and philosophy are sciences—but without committing 
one way or another as to whether this is actually the case or not.
80
  
Returning to Heidegger’s explication in the PAT lecture, he implies that all other 
positive sciences—which include mathematics, economics, and those disciplines 
typically associated with modern science, such as chemistry, physics, and biology—are 
also absolutely different from philosophy. It follows that modern Western science and 
theology are both “absolutely different” from philosophy. Hence we have a limited, 
preliminary characterization of the (modern) science-theology relation, subject to the 
hypothetical claim briefly stated: namely, theology and the modern sciences are positive 
sciences and share the characteristic of their “absolute difference” with philosophy.  
Before attempting to characterize further the theology-philosophy relation, 
Heidegger defends in detail the claim that theology is a positive science. A positive 
science is positive by virtue of having a positum—i.e., “a given being that in a certain 
manner is always already disclosed prior to scientific disclosure” (P, 41). Roughly 
speaking, a positum for a positive science is a region of beings (i.e., entities) that 
determines the form and extent of that science’s ontic inquiry. In harmony with the 
phenomenological slant to his formal definition of science, Heidegger links the positive 
                                                 
79. This “bracketing” can be described as formal indication—a term explicated in “Introduction to 
the Phenomenology of Religion” (PRL, 38-45) and employed later in this lecture, as we shall see. Note also 
that Heidegger characterizes his definition of science as “formal.” 
 
80. I shall engage the question of whether, in fact, Heidegger considered theology to be a science 
in the closing paragraphs of this section. Until then, this hypothetical assumption is tacitly in effect. 
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character of any ontic science to the question of Being itself: “. . . this scientific 
comportment toward whatever is given (nature, history, economy, space, number) is also 
already illuminated and guided by an understanding of being—even if it be 
nonconceptual” (42). Since the subject matter of ontology is being itself—i.e., not an 
entity, or region thereof—this ontological science is barred by definition from having a 
positum. Therefore the presence, or absence, of a positum absolutely distinguishes the 
positive, ontic sciences (including theology) from the single ontological science of 
philosophy—namely, ontology.  
What makes theology a positive science for Heidegger? In particular, what is 
theology’s positum? And in what way(s), if any, is theology different from (and possibly 
unique among) the other ontic sciences? Throughout the remainder of this lecture, 
Heidegger confines himself to Christian theology, although he acknowledges that 
“Christian theology is not the only theology” (ibid.).81 (Hereinafter in this section, 
“theology” shall therefore refer to Christian theology.) Compactly stated, Heidegger 
responds to the first two questions by claiming that the positum of theology is 
Christianness (Christlichkeit) (43), and that theology is the science of faith (45). On the 
face of it, then, it may seem as though faith is another positum of theology in addition to 
Christianness, or that the two are synonymous. In what follows, I shall attempt to clarify 
this apparent conundrum, and I shall argue that the uniqueness of theology among the 
ontic sciences follows from a “reciprocal” relation between faith and theology. 
                                                 
81. Heidegger offers no substantive justification for this move. Following the quote, Heidegger 
instead explains that he must first clarify “the idea of theology” before he can address the question of 
whether theology is a (positive) science. But then his ensuing clarification explicitly incorporates Christian 
themes. 
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As the positum of theology, Christianness denotes, by definition, the being which 
is given to theology for further disclosure, after its primal disclosure. But what does 
“Christianness” mean?82 Heidegger writes:  “For the ‘Christian’ faith, that being which is 
primarily revealed to faith, and only to it, and which, as revelation, first gives rise to 
faith, is Christ, the crucified God” (44). Thus, faith and revelation have a reciprocal 
relationship in disclosing the positum of theology, since faith “owes its existence,” so to 
speak, to revelation and is nevertheless the only means by which revelation can appear 
and be received as revelation. 
Now, disclosure can be understood in two complementary ways: namely, as what 
is disclosed, and as how that which is disclosed is disclosed (i.e., the process by which the 
disclosure is effected or, equivalently, its mode of existence). With that distinction in 
mind, I contend that the what of Christianness, as the positum of theology, is “Christ, the 
crucified God,” and that the how of this positum is faith, including its equivalence as 
rebirth.
83
 Such a reading is supported by these statements by Heidegger:  
The totality of this being [i.e., the Crucified] that is disclosed by faith . . . 
constitutes the character of the positum that theology finds before it. . . . theology 
is constituted in thematizing faith and that which is disclosed through faith, that 
which is “revealed.” (P, 45)  
 
                                                 
82. In the Preface, Heidegger refers to theologian Franz Overbeck, who “established the world-
denying expectation of the end as the basic characteristic of what is primordially Christian.” .See Franz 
Overbeck, On the Christianity of Theology, trans. John Elbert Wilson (San Jose, CA: Pickwick, 2002). This 
is a translation of Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie (On the Christianity of Our Today’s 
Theology), 2nd. ed.  Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1903. First ed. Leipzig: E. W. Frisch, 1873. 
 
83. In other words, “Christ, the crucified God” is the content-sense of Christianness, and “faith” is 
the relational-sense of Christianness. Cf. the discussion in Section 2.1 in which the phenomenological 
meaning, or sense, of early Christian life experience is expressed in three “directions” of sense as “the 
apostolic proclamation” (content-sense), “having become” (relational-sense), and “comportment to this 
having become” (enactment-sense).  
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Briefly stated, Christianness is co-constituted by faith and by that which is disclosed 
primarily by faith (and only to it)—namely, Christ, the crucified God.  
Next, he moves to “radically revise” the basic theological concept of faith and to 
thereby justify his claim that “theology is the science of faith”—but in a way that remains 
consonant with affirming that Christ, the crucified God, as revealed solely to faith, co-
constitutes theology’s positum. His summary claim: “Formally considered, then, faith as 
the existing relation to the Crucified is a mode of historical Dasein, of human existence, 
of historically being in a history that discloses itself only in and for faith” (46). Space 
permits only a sketch of his argument. Just as Heidegger approaches his analysis of Being 
in Being and Time through interrogating the modes of existence of Dasein, so here he 
explicates “faith” as a particular mode of existence of Dasein. 
That which is primarily disclosed (i.e., Christ, the crucified God) is revealed in 
faith to “individual human beings factically existing historically” (44). That is, this 
revelation is imparted to persons in the midst of everyday living in such a way that lets 
the faithful take part in this revelation event. Such “part-taking” is a reorientation of 
one’s existence “in and through the mercy of God grasped in faith” (ibid.). This 
reorientation, or rebirth, is the existentiell meaning of faith.
84
 For Heidegger, then, faith is 
not belief “in some coherent order of propositions” or “a modified type of knowing” 
(ibid.) but rather “is the believing-understanding mode of existing in the history revealed, 
i.e., occurring, with the Crucified” (45, original emphasis).  
                                                 
84. In other words, the life of faith, as rebirth, occurs in the midst of ongoing ordinary life. Rebirth 
is daily existence, lived out of “part-taking” in the revelation event. Re-birth is the fulfillment of the faith 
relation to the apostolic proclamation. Rebirth is the enactment-sense of Christianness.  
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Just as the faith-revelation relation is reciprocal, analogously so is the theology-
faith relation. This reciprocal relationship between faith and theology is the basis for 
Heidegger’s claim that theology is the science of faith. “Theology . . . is the science of 
faith, not only insofar as it makes faith and that which is believed its object, but because 
it itself arises out of faith” (46). Theology is unique among the ontic sciences insofar as 
what it thematizes is also is origin. Physics, for example, is “absolutely different” from 
theology in that it does not arise from nature but objectifies nature from a vantage point 
outside of nature. Whereas the sole purpose of theology is “to help cultivate faith” (ibid.), 
physics qua physics has no such corresponding relation to nature.  
Heidegger further illuminates the scientific character of theology by reformulating 
the purposes of the disciplines of historical, systematic, and practical theology and that of 
theology as a whole. First, the imparting of the revelation of “Christ, the crucified God” 
to, and its appropriation by, the faithful is historical in the sense of happening or 
occurring (geschichtlichen) rather than as past event (historische) (ibid.). This “Christian 
occurrence in its Christianness and historicity” is “the primary object” of theology (48). 
As for systematic theology, its task is “[t]o grasp the substantive content and the specific 
mode of being of the Christian occurrence, and to grasp it solely as it is testified to in 
faith and for faith” (47). Theology is also “‘innately’ homiletical” (and is therefore a 
practical science) because it is “the science of the action of God on human beings who act 
in faith” (48). These three theological disciplines are unified in their plurality by their 
founding in the revelation of “Christ, the crucified God” as disclosed solely to faith, 
which itself is understood as the mode of concrete Christian existence. 
  
65 
 
 
 
Heidegger’s reinscriptions of theology and its disciplines from its positum provide 
the basis for his claim that “theology is a fully autonomous ontic science” (50). His 
reformulations ward off attempts to regard theology as a form of the history, philosophy, 
or psychology of religion applied to Christianity. He does not deny that “theology 
represents a special case of the philosophy and history of religion,” but insists that 
theology, “itself founded primarily by faith,” need not “borrow from other sciences in 
order to augment and secure its proofs” (49).  
Next, let us turn to Heidegger’s analysis of the relation of philosophy to 
theology—and to faith. Compactly stated, “. . . faith does not need philosophy, [but] the 
science of faith [i.e., theology] as a positive science does” (50). I unpack these claims and 
argue for their relevance in thinking the RST relation. First, faith and philosophy are 
“mortal enemies,” as their relationship is “a basic (existential) confrontation of two 
possibilities of existence”—faithfulness vs. autonomous thought (53, n. 4). Otherwise 
said, “. . . what is revealed in faith can never be founded by a way of rational knowing as 
exercised by autonomously functioning reason . . .” (51). Yet Heidegger surprisingly does 
not rule out the possibility of genuine dialogue between philosophy and theology, as the 
science of faith: 
This existentiell opposition between faithfulness and the free appropriation 
of one’s whole Dasein is not first brought about by the sciences of 
theology and philosophy but is prior to them.  Furthermore, it is precisely 
this opposition that must bear the possibility of a community of the 
sciences of theology and philosophy, if indeed they are to communicate in 
a genuine way, free from illusions and weak attempts at mediation. (P, 53) 
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Second, as already stated in BT, all positive sciences need philosophy to clarify 
the ontological character of the region in which their basic concepts are operative; as a 
positive science, theology is no exception. This clarification is especially important when 
the nature of these basic concepts is under re-examination. For each nontheological 
science such as physics, say, this clarification secures for these basic concepts “their 
original foundation, the demonstration of all their inner possibilities, and hence their 
higher truth” (52). Heidegger’s claim for philosophy’s clarifying role with respect to 
theology is much more modest, however. As stated earlier, philosophy cannot found the 
positum of theology, because what is disclosed by faith is beyond the reach of 
autonomous thought. Nevertheless, philosophy has a “co-directing” role or function (aka 
formal indication) which points to the ontological concepts (e.g., guilt) that underlie 
theological concepts (e.g., sin) without influencing the content of the theological claims 
made therein. Heidegger argues that this weaker form of correction “does not serve to 
bind but, on the contrary, to release and point to the specific, i.e., credal, source of the 
disclosure of theological concepts” (ibid.).  
In sum, philosophy (as ontology) has a strong directive function vis-à-vis the 
nontheological positive sciences, as it founds the basic concepts of these sciences by 
disclosing the ontological character of the region in which these concepts are operative. 
Due to the autonomy of faith from philosophy, however, philosophy’s role with respect 
to theology is much weaker and merely formal, in the sense of pointing to the ontological 
concepts that undergird theological concepts, but in a nonfoundational manner. 
Nonetheless, an asymmetry in the theology-philosophy relation is evident. Heidegger 
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contends that philosophy is not required to play this co-directing role for theology; 
instead, he says, theology should “demand” the assistance of philosophy to clarify its 
own concepts (53).
85
 However, this asymmetry also maintains the legitimacy—and 
necessity—of employing theological concepts to grasp the “inconceivability” of faith. 
Indeed, faith would otherwise remain “mute,” and theology would have abdicated its 
responsibility as a positive science to thematize its positum, faithful existence (50). In 
this way, Heidegger thinks against those who would isolate faith from all contact with 
conceptual thought.  
In this lecture, claims regarding the RST relation are mediated through the 
primary analysis of the philosophy-theology relation and the hypothetical assumption that 
both are sciences, interpreted phenomenologically. In light of these given conditions, we 
can say the following: First, science (taken now as the nontheological positive sciences) 
and theology as science (taken here as Christian theology, centered in faith) are related in 
the sense that they share two basic characteristics: (i) both are positive sciences, and (ii) 
both are absolutely different from philosophy (i.e., ontology). Second, theology is a fully 
autonomous ontic science, insofar as it has no need of other ontic sciences to help 
legitimize its claims. And third, theology is unique among the ontic sciences in that its 
positum is co-constituted by faith, which cannot be objectified, since faith is an 
appropriation of revelation.  
Under such conditions, does “dialogue,” in some sense, obtain between theology 
and science in the RST relation? Recall that Barbour’s criteria for Dialogue requires 
                                                 
85. We shall see in the following section, however, that Heidegger later abandons urging theology 
to turn to philosophy to clarify its basic concepts. 
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“indirect interactions between science and religion [or science and theology] involving 
boundary questions and methods [i.e., methodological parallels]” (RIAS, 16).86 As the 
previous paragraph attests, Science and Theology do interact indirectly, as their 
relationships are mediated through philosophy, understood as phenomenological 
ontology. Moreover, these interactions involve boundary questions in the form of the 
ontological status of their respective regional ontologies. However, methodologically 
speaking, I would say at this point that differences outweigh similarities. For example, as 
noted earlier, theology is unique among the positive ontic sciences in that philosophy 
does not determine the positum for theology. This positum is co-constituted by faith, 
which is beyond the scope of autonomous thought. A major task for this entire inquiry is 
to examine whether similarities in other dimensions of the science-theology relationship 
might outweigh this fundamental difference as we continue to think the RST relation with 
Heidegger. In sum, I conclude that the question of genuine Dialogue remains open at this 
point of the inquiry. 
 
2.4 Theology, Natural Science, and Objectification 
Thirty-seven years after delivering the first lecture on “Phenomenology and 
Theology” to the theological faculty at Tübingen, Heidegger wrote a “letter” to another 
group of theologians, as they prepared for a discussion at Drew University on the topic: 
“The Problem of a Nonobjectifying Thinking and Speaking in Today’s Theology.” At 
issue for the conferees was whether or not—or to what extent—is objectifying language 
                                                 
86. See Section 1.2.1 for an explanation of the appropriateness of applying Barbour’s fourfold 
typology to the science-theology relation as well as to the religion-science relation.  
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unavoidable, otherwise possible, or even impossible for theology. As Robert Funk’s 
overview article and the discussion papers themselves indicate, the six presenters 
(including Heidegger, in absentia) covered a wide spectrum of positions.87 
The purpose of this section is to explicate Heidegger’s reformulation of the 
problem statement for this Second Consultation on Hermeneutics and his claim that 
theological discourse is necessarily nonobjectifying. In so doing, I shall begin to examine 
the multiple meanings of object and its cognates from Heidegger’s employment of Objekt 
in the 1964 letter and Gegenstand in the 1927/28 lecture. His letter also addresses two of 
the guiding questions of this chapter—the nature of the philosophy-theology relation and 
the nature of the theology-science relation. 
What prompted this formulation of the question posed by the Second Consultation 
organizers? Heidegger presumed that it stemmed from “the widespread, uncritically 
accepted opinion that all thinking, as representing, and all speaking, as vocalization, are 
already ‘objectifying’ [objektivierend]” (P, 56). Given this interpretation, the task would 
then seem to be one of establishing that nonobjectifying (nichtobjektivierenden) thinking 
and speaking is possible in contemporary theology. As we shall see, Heidegger defends 
an even stronger claim. 
                                                 
87. The “letter” was read as the opening keynote address for the Second Consultation on 
Hermeneutics: Theological Discourse and the Proclamation of the Gospel held at Drew University, April 9-
11, 1964.  (Heidegger was unable to attend, at the direction of his physician.) This information, together 
with a summary, background, and commentary on the Consultation itself, is contained in Robert W. Funk, 
“Colloquium on Hermeneutics,”  in Theology Today 21, no. 3 (October 1964): 287-306, doi: 10.1177 
/004057366402100305. Funk, Associate Professor of New Testament at Drew, was a moderator for one of 
the Consultation’s sessions. This Colloquium was conceived as a sequel to the First Consultation at Drew 
two years earlier, in which Heidegger’s thought was prominently discussed. The six papers presented at the 
Consultation are compiled in Drew University, Consultation on Hermeneutics, 2nd: Theology and the 
Proclamation of the Gospel (Madison, NJ: Drew University, 1964). 
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As indicated by the following quotation from near the beginning of the letter, 
Heidegger continues to maintain several basic themes of the PAT lecture, while at the 
same time signaling a possible widening of the divide between philosophy and theology: 
. . . the requisite of its [i.e., theology’s] major task [is] not to borrow the 
categories of its thinking and the form of its speech from philosophy or the 
sciences, but to think and speak out of faith for faith with fidelity to its subject 
matter. If this faith by the power of its own conviction concerns the human being 
as human being in his very nature, then genuine theological thinking and speaking 
have no need of any special preparation in order to reach people and find a 
hearing among them. (P, 55; emphasis added) 
 
Thus, faith remains at the center of Heidegger’s view of Christian theology; theology is 
still thought by him to be fully independent of the nontheological sciences; and theology 
still has a rightful place in the “public square.” On the face of it, however, the italicized 
portion above seems to point away from Heidegger’s claim in 1927/28 that philosophy 
has a “co-directive” role in clarifying the ontological region out of which theological 
concepts arise—albeit in a formally indicative manner (P, 52-53; cf. Section 2.3 above). 
However, we must keep in mind that, in the PAT lecture, Heidegger is explicating the 
philosophy-theology relation as if both are sciences as defined phenomenologically in 
terms of disclosure. In this letter, however, there is no such presupposition. The 1964 
letter leaves the “co-directing” issue unaddressed. 
The continuities and the semblance of a discontinuity between the lecture and the 
letter just noted are consistent with notes taken during Heidegger’s conversation with a 
small group of “directors of study groups and colleagues” at the Protestant Academy at 
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Hofgeismar in 1953.88 Recorder Hermann Noack characterized the discussions as 
“occasioned by his [Professor Heidegger’s] philosophical writings and which were 
focused on the relationship between thinking and faith or between philosophy and 
theology” (Noack, 59). I focus here on the apparent discontinuity, in which Heidegger 
declares, in effect, a complete separation between philosophy and theology. According to 
Noack, Heidegger “literally said”: 
Within thinking nothing can be achieved which would be a preparation or a 
confirmation for that which occurs in faith and in grace. Were I so addressed by 
faith I would have to close up my shop . . . Philosophy engages in a kind of 
thinking of which man is capable on his own. This stops when he is addressed by 
revelation. (Noack, 64) 
 
Heidegger then spoke directly about the theology-philosophy relation. Noack writes: 
Theologians, Heidegger continued, have simply too little trust in their own 
standpoint and have too much to do with philosophy. . . . Because revelation itself 
determines the manner of manifestness and because theology does not have to 
prove or interpret ‘Being’, theology does not have to defend itself before 
philosophy. (ibid.)  
 
Somewhat later, Noack noted that “Heidegger denied that philosophy has any 
significance for theology” (65; emphasis added). Had the “absolute difference” between 
philosophy (as ontology) and theology (as an ontic science) in 1927/28 become an 
“absolute chasm” in 1953? Not quite. Noack notes Heidegger’s remark that “. . . this does 
not mean that we must all simply withdraw into our mutual positions! There are historical 
                                                 
88. “Appendix: Conversation with Martin Heidegger, Recorded by Hermann Noack,” in The Piety 
of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger, trans.  James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1976), 59-71. (Hereafter cited as “Noack.”) According to the translators, 
Professor Noack stated in a letter to them that he had sent a copy of his notes to Heidegger and the others 
present before publishing them, and that “Professor Heidegger did not find anything in the text or in 
Professor Noack’s concluding summary with which he chose to take exception” (Heidegger, Piety of 
Thinking, 182).  
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encounters which entail passing closely by one another without indifference” (ibid.). In 
sum, Heidegger’s endorsement of the centrality of faith and the possibility of “dialogue,” 
in some sense, between philosophy and theology continue to shine through Heidegger’s 
thinking. 
Thus, any claim of an actual discontinuity of viewpoints in the 1927/28 lecture 
(i.e., philosophy has a “co-directing” role with respect to theology to help clarify the 
ontological basis for its concepts) and this 1953 consultation (i.e., philosophy has no 
significance for theology) appears to be groundless. As stated before, the PAT lecture is 
an exploration of the possibilities of the theology-philosophy relation as if both members 
were sciences—while formally suspending the question of their actual nature, or essence. 
On the other hand, as is the case with the 1964 letter, the 1953 discussion makes no such 
formally indicative assumptions. 
I turn now to another important contrast between the 1927/28 lecture and the 1964 
letter—the striking difference between the meaning of “object” and its cognates in these 
two works. The focus of the PAT letter is to examine “what is intended by objectifying 
thinking and speaking” (P, 54; original emphasis).  He concludes that: 
Thinking and speaking objectify [sein objektivierend], i.e., posit as an object 
[Objekt] something given, in the field of natural-scientific and technical 
representation. Here they are of necessity objectifying [objektivierend], because 
scientific-technological knowing must establish its theme in advance as a 
calculable, causally explicable Gegenstand, i.e., as an object [Objekt] as Kant 
defined the word.
89
 Outside this field thinking and speaking are by no means 
objectifying [objektivierend]. (P, 60; GA9, 75-76; emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
89. Heidegger briefly described Kant’s position earlier: “For Kant object [Objekt] means what 
exists as standing over against [Gegenstand] the experience of the natural sciences” (P, 58). 
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Throughout the PAT letter, “object” and its cognates are translates of Objekt and its 
cognates. However, in the much earlier PAT lecture, “object” and its cognates are 
translates of Gegenstand (literally, “that which stands over against”) and its cognates. For 
example, immediately following the formal definition of science in the PAT lecture, 
Heidegger writes:  
Every region of objects [Gegenstandgebiet], according to its subject matter and 
the mode of being of its objects [Gegenstände], has its own mode of possible 
disclosure . . . . Their characteristic feature lies in the fact that the objectification 
[Vergegenständlichung] of whatever it is that they thematize is oriented directly 
toward beings, . . . (P, 41; GA9, 48) 
 
Roughly speaking, then, beings thematized by positive sciences are Gegenstände; beings 
thematized by the natural sciences are Objekte. Thus, all such thematized Objekte are 
Gegenstände, but not conversely.90  
It would be totally incorrect, however, to infer that all entities are, factically 
speaking, either Objekte or Gegenstände. In the first place, as the discussion is Section 
2.2 indicates, these terms are not inherent characteristics of entities that can serve to 
“sort” the class of all entities (if such a notion is even meaningful) into two subclasses. 
Rather, they are different possible modes of presencing of the Being of any given entity; 
and second, for some entities, the presencing of their Being is neither as Objekt nor as 
Gegenstand (P, 62). The blooming rose and the redness of the rose may serve as 
examples—depending upon our comportment as Dasein to them.  
Our everyday experience of things, in the wider sense of the word, is neither 
objectifying nor a placing over against [wieder objektivierend noch eine 
                                                 
90. Note that, in the above passage that begins “Thinking and speaking . . . ,” Heidegger provides 
criteria to distinguish between Objekt and Gegenstand: namely, the former is a “calculable, causally 
explicable Gegenstand” (P, 60). 
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Vergegenständlichung].  When, for example, we sit in the garden and take delight 
in the blossoming rose,  we do not make an object [Objekt] of the rose, nor do we 
even make it something standing over against us [zu einem Gegenstand] in the 
sense of something represented thematically. When in tacit saying (Sagen) we are 
enthralled with the lucid red of the rose and muse on the redness of the rose, then 
this redness [of the rose] is neither an object nor a thing nor something standing 
over against us like the blossoming rose. [Wenn . . . , dann ist dieses Rotsein 
weder ein Objekt, noch ein Ding, noch ein Gegenstand wie die blühende Rose.] 
There is accordingly a thinking and saying that in no manner objectifies 
[objektiviert] or places things over us [vergegenständlicht]. (P, 58; GA9, 73; 
underlined emphasis added).
91
  
 
Heidegger comes to this nuanced view of different modes of presencing of entities 
primarily from his understanding of language as “speculative-hermeneutical”—in sharp 
contrast to the “technical-scientistic view of language,” exemplified by the thinking of 
Rudolf Carnap. According to Heidegger, thinking such as Carnap’s seeks to “subjugate 
all thinking and speaking, including that of philosophy, . . . , to secure them as an 
instrument of science” (56). The danger, as Heidegger sees it, is not the use of 
objectifying language per se, but the threat that this mode of thinking and saying “will 
spread to all forms of life” (60).  
In contrast, Heidegger contends that  
Language, in what is most proper to it, is a saying of that which reveals itself to 
human beings in manifold ways and which addresses itself to human beings 
                                                 
91. Hart and Maraldo detect “ambiguities” in this passage “when Heidegger first says we do not 
make a Gegenstand of the rose, then opposes the blossoming rose as a Gegenstand to the redness of the 
rose” (Piety of Thinking, 175, n. 6). As I see it, their interpretation of this passage amounts to declaring a 
contradiction in Heidegger’s thinking—not merely “ambiguities.” I offer an alternative interpretation of the 
passage that obviates either claim. My interpretation entails regarding the underlined portions in the 
passage above as specifying our comportment to the entities in question. First, when our comportment to 
the blooming rose is one of everyday experience (and not of thematic representation), then the blooming 
rose is not objectified in either sense. Second, when our comportment is focused upon the redness of the 
blossoming rose, instead of upon the blooming rose itself, the blooming rose has “shifted,” so to speak, 
from the foreground to the background of our comportment and is now plausibly objectified as “something 
standing over against us” (Gegenstand). The larger point to be made is that our comportment to entities 
“co-determines,” in a sense, the mode of the presencing of their Being. (See Section 2.2 above.) 
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insofar as they do not, under the dominion of objectifying [objektivierenden] 
thinking, confine themselves to the latter and close themselves off from what 
shows itself. (P, 60; GA9, 76)  
 
Here, Heidegger is emphasizing the interconnectedness, phenomenologically understood, 
of thinking, speaking, and that which is thereby revealed. “Objectification” in the sense 
of Objekt severs this interconnection. This is the heart of his critique of scientistic-
technical thinking. 
Heidegger concludes his analysis of objectifying thinking and saying by 
proposing a more precise formulation of the theme for the theological discussion at Drew 
as “‘the problem of a nontechnological, non-natural-scientific thinking and speaking in 
today’s theology’” (61; emphasis added). (The italicized words replace the single word, 
“nonobjectifying,” in the original problem statement for the Consultation.) “From this 
more commensurate reformulation, it is very clear that the problem as stated is not a 
genuine problem insofar as it is geared to a presupposition whose nonsense is evident to 
anyone” (ibid.). 
To recap, Heidegger holds that theology does not engage in objectifying thinking 
and speaking—if by “objectifying” we mean the thinking and forms of speech that 
characterize the natural sciences. To those who might hold that today’s theology does 
exhibit in practice such thinking and saying (at least from time to time), he has stated, in 
effect, another qualification for his claim. At the beginning of his letter, he stresses that a 
requirement of theology’s major task is “not to borrow the categories of its thinking and 
the form of its speech from philosophy or the sciences, but to think and speak out of faith 
for faith with fidelity to its subject matter” (P, 55; emphasis added).To say this more 
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simply, Heidegger’s claim is that theological thinking and speaking are not 
objectifying—if “objectifying” is taken in the sense of “object” as Objekt. However, as I 
read it, he has left unaddressed the question of whether or not theology is objectifying in 
the sense of “object” as Gegenstand.  
Otherwise said, Heidegger has ruled out theology as a natural science 
(Naturwissenschaft), which objectifies in the sense of Objekt, but has left in abeyance 
whether theology can still be a science (Wissenschaft), which objectifies in the sense of 
Gegenstand. The question still lingers, even as Heidegger closes the letter by reaffirming 
the legitimacy of theological thinking and speaking in the public square:  
The positive task for theology is for theology to place in discussion, within its 
own realm of the Christian faith and out of the proper nature of that faith, what 
theology has to think and how it has to speak. This task also includes the question 
whether theology can still be a science—because presumably it should not be a 
science at all. (P, 61; emphasis added) 
 
As we have emphasized more than once, Heidegger does not take a stand in the 
PAT lecture as to whether or not theology is, factically speaking, a science 
(Wissenschaft). However, in the same letter of August 1928 in which he described the 
purpose of the PAT lecture (given in the first paragraph of this section), he unequivocally 
stated his privately-held position on this question:  
I am personally convinced that theology is no science—but I am today not yet in a 
position to actually show this and indeed so that thereby the great function of 
theology as a history of ideas is comprehended as positive.
92
 
 
                                                 
92. “Zwar bin ich persönlich überzeugt, daβ Th[eologie] keine Wissenschaft ist—aber ich bin 
heute noch nicht im Stande, das wirklich zu zeigen u. zwar so, daβ dabei die groβe geistesgeschichtliche 
Funktion der Theologie positiv begriffen ist.” Martin Heidegger to Elisabeth Blochmann, Heidegger-
Blochmann Briefwechsel, 25 (my translation, with assistance from Stephanie Carlson). 
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Thus, the public 1964 letter and the private 1928 letter together support the claim that, on 
Heidegger’s view, theology is not a science—natural or otherwise. In other words, he 
held that theology is totally non-objectifying— i.e., nonobjectifying with regard to 
“object” taken either as Objekt or Gegenstand.  
Finally, I read the 1964 letter as tacitly signaling to theologians the manner in 
which theology might enact its interrelationality with religion. That is, is it possible that 
the manner by and through which theology is totally nonobjectifying might resemble the 
“mannering” of the blooming rose, the redness of the blooming rose, and poetry in any 
significant way or ways? I shall take up this second question with regard to poetry in 
Sections 4.2 and 5.1 that follow. 
 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 Let us return to three guiding questions of this chapter: Is philosophy necessary in 
thinking the RST relation? Is theology, in some sense, a “science”? And more generally, 
what can be said about the essential nature of the RST relation itself? 
 With regard to the first question, our preliminary response must be “yes,” given 
our intention to think the RST relation with Heidegger. This inquiry accepts that our 
thinking will be done in light of the question of Being—not beings as such and in their 
entirety. As Heidegger sees it, thinking the question of Being is the true task of ontology. 
In this Chapter, we have attempted to think the RST relation through the lens of 
phenomenology. The nature of thinking, however, remains unthought. We shall take this 
up in Section 4.4 below. 
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 With regard to the other two guiding questions, let us consider the three dualities 
within the RST relation and the beginning thread of comportment to things in light of the 
method of phenomenology and Heidegger’s works engaged so far.  
 Religion and science. In this chapter, religion and science are interpreted as 
modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Religion is interpreted as Christian factical life 
experience (aka, Christianness), grounded faithfully in the apostolic proclamation, “Jesus 
is the Messiah” (equivalently, “Christ, the crucified God”). Science is interpreted in terms 
of “disclosure.” In terms of their meaning, or sense, religion is “three-directional” 
(content-, relational-, and enactment-senses), while science is “uni-directional” (content-
sense dominant). Science is limited to addressing the whatness of the phenomenon (aka, 
experience) at issue, while religion engages as well the manner, or the how, of the 
experience in its relationality and enactment.  
 Religion and theology. As Christian factical life experience, religion is the ground 
of theology: “Knowledge of one’s own having-become is the starting point and the origin 
of theology” (PRL, 66). Provisionally taking theology to be a science and interpreting 
religion as faith-filled Christianness, the religion-theology relation is reciprocal: 
“Theology . . .  is the science of faith, not only insofar as it make faith and that which is 
believed its object, but because it itself arises out of faith” (P, 46). Moreover, on these 
assumptions, theology needs philosophy to clarify its basic concepts, for otherwise faith 
would be “mute.” However, unlike all the nontheological positive sciences, theology does 
not need philosophy to ground its basic concepts, as theological concepts are grounded in 
faith. Taking theology as the science of faith creates an opening for re-thinking its 
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widespread formulation as reflection on religious experience and belief. However, the 
essence of “reflection” is as yet unthought. (See Section 3.4 below.)  
Science, theology, and Objectification. In the PAT lecture, theology shares with 
the other positive sciences the defining attribute of having a positum, yet they differ in a 
fundamental way. Philosophy (as ontology) has a strong directive function vis-à-vis the 
nontheological positive sciences, as it founds the basic concepts of these sciences by 
disclosing the ontological character of the region in which these concepts are operative. 
Due to the autonomy of faith from philosophy, however, philosophy’s role with respect 
to theology is much weaker and merely formal, in pointing to and clarifying the 
ontological concepts that undergird theological concepts, but in a nonfoundational 
manner.  
 Is theology actually a science, in Heidegger’s view? Roughly speaking, he says 
“no,” if science objectifies in the sense of Okjekt; he is silent in public if science 
objectifies in the sense of Gegenstand. (In private, however, he says “no” in the second 
case as well.) Examples of non-objectifying modes of the presencing of Being are given 
in the PAT Appendix: the blooming rose, the redness of the blooming rose, and poetry. I 
suggest that these are implicit, but public, “invitations” by Heidegger for theology to 
explore in clarifying its own essential nature. (See Sections 3.3, 4.2, and 5.1 below.) 
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Chapter 3: Truth and the RST Relation 
 
 
Heidegger regarded the question of truth as compelling, urgent, and fundamental.  
In the late 1930s, he described this question as “the most questionable of our previous 
history and the most worthy of questioning of our future history.”93 He also challenged 
the conventional view that truth is an intellectual abstraction, a topic reserved for logical 
analysis: 
The essence of truth is not a mere concept, carried about in the head. On the contrary, 
truth is alive; in the momentary form of its essence it is the power that determines 
everything true and untrue; it is what is sought after, what is fought for, what is suffered 
for. (BQP, 41)   
 
For Heidegger, the question of truth is inseparable from the question of Being. In 
his view, the goal of philosophy and the seeking of that goal are the same. And both the 
goal of philosophy and the seeking of that goal entail the question of truth and the 
question of Being. “To posit the very seeking as a goal means to anchor the beginning 
and the end of all reflection in the question of the truth—not of this or that being or even 
of all beings, but of Being itself” (BQP, 6-7). Thus for Heidegger, to seek the essence of 
truth is to seek the truth of Being.  
This chapter will examine some of Heidegger’s engagements with the question of 
truth in view of the RST relation. The first section (3.1 Truth, Untruth, and Dasein) 
                                                 
93. Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy (BQP), 23. This work is based upon his lecture 
course of the same title during winter semester 1937-38 at the University of Freiburg. 
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focuses primarily upon Heidegger’s explication of truth as disclosedness and the 
intertwining of truth and untruth in light of the existential analytic of Dasein presented in 
Being and Time. In the second section (3.2 The Essence of Truth and the Truth of Being), 
I examine Heidegger’s treatment of these claims ten years later in Basic Questions of 
Philosophy without tethering them to the existential analytic of Dasein. In this work, he 
raises the question of whether the “intertwining of opposites” that he discerned with 
respect to truth and untruth in Being and Time is, in some sense, constitutive of Being 
itself. I shall give special attention to implications for thinking the RST relation in view 
Heidegger’s claim that Plato’s explication of idea has been “disastrous” for Western 
thought. In the third section (3.3 Truth, Rationality, and Reason), I shall examine 
theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s thesis that theology and science share common 
resources of rationality, rooted in biological evolution, which can provide a basis for 
meaningful and fruitful dialogue. I shall argue that Heidegger and van Huyssteen agree 
that “intelligibility” plays a critical role in coming to terms with understanding and 
rationality, respectively, but that their views differ profoundly with respect to the 
ubiquitous practice of seeking and giving of reasons.  
In the final section (3.4 Truth and Reflection), I shall examine anew the widely-
used definition of theology as “reflection on religious experience and belief” (introduced 
in Chapter 1) in light of Heidegger’s distinction between two modes of reflection: 
Reflexion and Besinnung. Each of these terms is commonly translated as “reflection.” My 
guiding questions are: In light of Heidegger’s explication of truth, which understanding 
of “reflection” is more fruitful for thinking the essence of theology in general and 
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thinking the RST relation specifically? Or, are both senses of “reflection” important—and 
possibly necessary—in these matters? 
 
3.1 Truth, Untruth, and Dasein  
In Being and Time, Heidegger explicates the relation of truth and Being via the 
existential analytic of Dasein. In what follows, I shall examine Heidegger’s recovery of 
the early Greek understanding of truth as disclosedness and his critique of the customary 
formulation of truth as agreement (or correspondence) between assertions or judgments 
and their referents. Next, I shall explicate his “primordial appropriation” of this early 
Greek understanding of truth in terms of the existential analytic of Dasein. Specifically, I 
shall examine his claim of the inescapable intertwining of truth and untruth in connection 
with his treatment of authenticity/inauthenticity, fallenness, and temporality as 
fundamental modes of Dasein. And finally, I shall examine Heidegger’s inversion of the 
Kantian view that privileges knowledge over understanding and its implications for 
thinking the essence of truth. 
Truth as disclosedness. Heidegger’s defense of the “truth as disclosedness” thesis 
against traditional interpretations of truth hinges on three arguments. First, “truth as 
disclosedness” may be derived etymologically from the Greek. The Greek word for truth, 
aletheia, is compounded from the prefix a- (a privative, meaning “not”) and a stem that 
means “to be concealed” (BT, 33, n. 1; 222). Second, Heidegger cites several references 
from Aristotle and the pre-Socratics that support this formulation of truth (213). And 
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third, traditional characterizations of truth can be derived from Heidegger’s interpretation 
of truth as disclosedness. 
Heidegger bases his third argument upon an etymological analysis of logos, 
coupled with the fundamental ontology of Dasein. He argues that the customary 
understanding of truth fails to acknowledge the ontological relationship between “an 
ideal entity [i.e., a judgment] and something that is Real and present-at-hand” (216). The 
result is a separation into two different levels, or ways, of Being that renders any rigorous 
notion of “agreement” impossible. In sum, he contends that such misconceptions arise 
because of the derivative character of the phenomenon of agreement.   
In brief, here is Heidegger’s explanation of how truth as disclosedness becomes 
truth as agreement with its referent. First, logos and legein (“to talk” or “to hold 
discourse”) share the same etymological root (25, n. 3). As discourse, logos is talking, 
speech, assertion—ways “to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s 
discourse” (32). More precisely, logos “lets what the discourse is about” be seen: i.e., 
logos “discloses” or uncovers what the discourse is about. Assertion points to the “how” 
of that which is uncovered. “What is expressed becomes . . . something ready-to-hand 
within-the-world which can be taken up and spoken again” (224). The entities referenced 
in the assertion are either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. “[T]he relation itself now 
acquires the character of presence-at-hand by getting switched over to a relationship 
between things which are present-at-hand” (ibid.). That is, the comportment of Dasein 
toward these entities becomes one of scientific detachment and analysis. In sum: “Truth 
as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities . . . has become truth as 
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agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world” (225). The 
ontological has become ontic.  
In Being and Time, truth as disclosure is, more precisely, disclosure as and in 
Dasein. Truth and Dasein are inextricably linked. Dasein’s basic state as Being-in-the-
world and, in particular, Being alongside entities-in-the-world, imply that (i) “truth” in 
the primary sense is Dasein’s comportment as “Being-uncovering (uncovering)”, and (ii) 
“truth” in the secondary sense is entities as “Beings-uncovered (uncoveredness)” (220). 
Disclosure of a phenomenon is necessarily a disclosure in Dasein, namely, in the there 
(the Da) that Dasein is given to be (sein).
94
 Thus, the occurrence of truth rests upon the 
existence of Dasein; no Dasein means no disclosure, and hence no possibility of truth in 
Heidegger’s framework (226). In sum, “The Being of truth is connected primordially 
with Dasein. . . . Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially” (230). 
From his analysis of the worldhood of the world and of Dasein’s mode of Being-
in-the-world, Heidegger identifies the constituents of disclosedness as state-of-mind, 
understanding, and discourse. These three constituents are equiprimordial ways of Being-
there, existential structures for its maintenance. “State-of-mind” is revealed ontically in 
our moods, but ontologically is expressed in modes (such as fear, anxiety, etc.) that 
disclose our submission to the world and encounter with what matters to us (136-39). 
“Understanding” points ontically to comprehension, manageability, etc., but points 
ontologically to possibility—to Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being (143). “Discourse” is the 
                                                 
94. I thank Frank Seeburger for this clarification. 
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ontological foundation of language, interpretation, and assertion, which is integral to 
understanding (160-61).  
Truth and untruth. The relationship between truth and untruth in Heidegger’s 
thought can be initially grasped as a relationship of opposites, but fundamentally is one of 
complementary intertwining--a “yin-yang” relationship, so to speak. Both levels involve 
the interplay between disclosure and disguise (i.e., covering up). In what follows, I 
examine Heidegger’s analysis of the truth/untruth duality in relation to 
authenticity/inauthenticity, fallenness, and temporality as basic modes of Dasein. But 
first, two general observations. 
Heidegger’s treatment of the logos illustrates a mapping of true/false onto 
disclosure/covering up, but with a twist. Since the logos functions merely as letting-
something-be-seen, it can be either true or false (33). The “Being-true” of the logos is the 
discoveredness of that which has been hidden via disclosure; the “Being-false” of the 
logos is also still disclosure—but one in which something like a distortion occurs that 
covers over or conceals the very thing the discourse is about, rather than letting it be seen 
just as it shows itself from itself. Thus truth and falsity are both results of disclosure, but 
in different senses.
95
 
The relationship between truth and untruth in Heidegger’s thought is intimately 
connected with Dasein: “Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth” 
(223). Consider the first half of this claim. Dasein is that being “in” and “as” which the 
                                                 
95. For Heidegger, the primordially true is noien—taken in the sense of “perception,” sheer 
“apprehending,” rather than of rational thought or mentation, as it comes to be predominantly taken in the 
philosophical tradition—as it merely discloses and never covers up (BT, 33). Logos does not have this 
characteristic. I thank Frank Seeburger for this clarification. 
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Being of entities, including other Dasein, disclose themselves. Thus, the ontological 
character of Dasein is truth—truth as disclosedness, in the sense of truth as that which 
makes it possible for any beings, whether Dasein itself or other beings, to disclose 
themselves. Otherwise said, Dasein is the “clearing” within which such disclosure is 
possible (133). In this sense, then, Dasein is always “in the truth.”  
To establish the second half of his claim, Heidegger draws upon his notions of 
authenticity vs. inauthenticity and fallenness. Heidegger introduces the 
authentic/inauthentic binary early in Being and Time. The distinction between these two 
modes of the Being of Dasein is grounded in two fundamental characteristics of Dasein: 
its “essence” (which lies in its existence), and its “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit). The former 
points to the range of possibilities for Dasein to be; Dasein “comports itself towards its 
Being as its ownmost possibility” (42). The latter acknowledges Dasein’s inescapable 
mode of Being as, so to speak, “Being-as-having-to-decide-over-itself.” That is, “Dasein 
has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je 
meines]” (ibid.). The inescapability of Dasein’s having to decide over the “how” of its 
own Being-itself is reflected, for one example, in the familiar statement, “Not to decide is 
to decide.” Authenticity for Dasein is to “‘choose’ itself to win itself”; inauthenticity is to 
“lose itself and never win itself” (ibid.). Authentic Dasein chooses to choose itself, to 
make itself “mine,” whereas inauthentic Dasein fails to choose itself in such a manner, 
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choosing instead not to choose, without ever even seeing or saying that is has so 
chosen.
96
  
Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is necessarily immersed in the “everydayness” of 
the world. Heidegger characterizes this ontological state of Dasein’s Being as one of 
falling and thrownness. “Falling” points to the Dasein’s inordinate fascination with its 
on-going relationships as Being-in-the-world, to the domination of prevailing public 
opinion, and to a mode of tranquilized, groundless floating. “Thrownness” reflects the 
turbulence and ceaseless movement of Dasein within “the groundlessness of nullity of 
inauthentic everydayness” (178). The inauthenticity of everyday Dasein is factical for 
Heidegger; “fallenness” does not imply deviation from some earlier pristine condition of 
wholeness nor any moralistic judgments regarding Dasein’s “corruptibility.” Yet 
authenticity is a possible mode of Being for Dasein within such everydayness—not as a 
“floating above” such fallenness, but as “a modified way in which such everydayness is 
seized upon” (179). 
How, then, is Dasein “in untruth”?  In Heidegger’s analysis, the falling 
thrownness of everyday Dasein is reflected in its everyday, inauthentic modes of 
discourse, state of mind, and understanding, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Each of 
these modes of Being of Dasein serves to cover up that which is hidden—but in ways 
analogous to that of the “Being false” of the logos discussed earlier.  
Idle talk discloses to Dasein a Being towards its world, towards Others, 
and towards itself—a Being in which these are understood, but in a mode 
of groundless floating. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in 
                                                 
96. The authentic self and the inauthentic self are not two different selves but, rather, two different 
ways of being one and the same self, the self Dasein is given to be—or has to be. I thank Frank Seeburger 
for this clarification. 
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such a way that Being-In is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides 
nothing from Dasein’s understanding, but only in order that Being-in-the-
world should be suppressed in this uprooted ‘everywhere and nowhere’. 
(BT, 177; emphasis added) 
 
In sum, insofar as Dasein’s mode of Being as discourse always tends toward taking such 
a “fallen” form—that of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity—Dasein is inescapably “in 
untruth.” 
Division Two of Being and Time deepens Heidegger’s analysis of the 
authentic/inauthentic dualism, falling, the everydayness of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, 
and truth/untruth by reformulating them through the lenses of temporality and death. 
Given the indubitable inauthenticity of everyday Dasein, these lenses sharpen the rather 
general characterizations of authenticity found in Division One.  
The inevitability of death is a given for all human beings. Heidegger posits Dasein 
as “Being-towards-death” in the sense that Dasein lives each moment with this facticity, 
yet without certainty of the ontic time of its occurrence. Given such, Heidegger locates 
authenticity in resoluteness—a mode of Dasein’s disclosedness that is “ready for 
anxiety” and that self-projects upon its ownmost Being-guilty. “In resoluteness we have 
now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most primordial because it is authentic” (297; 
emphasis added). “Resoluteness” means intentionally accepting the call of conscience to 
be who I am. Authentic Dasein is everyday Dasein as Being-in-resoluteness. 
 On Heidegger’s view, Dasein is not “in” time; rather, Dasein is time in the sense 
of temporality, or more precisely, in the sense of Dasein as a mode of temporalizing 
temporality. Moreover, Dasein embodies this tri-partite dimensionality of temporality—
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not sequentially or linearly, but integrally. Heidegger fleshes out the three-fold 
conceptualization of temporality via two of the components of disclosedness, plus falling. 
“Understanding” is futural, in the sense of opening up a horizon of possibilities via 
projection; “state-of-mind” is primarily past-oriented, expressed via moods that reflect 
my thrownness; and “falling” (especially as manifested as curiosity) is temporalized, via 
Dasein’s fascination with Being-in-the-world, as the present. The third component of 
disclosedness—discourse—cuts across all three temporal dimensions as the self-
articulation of Dasein, expressed as silence as well as “talk.”97  
Understanding and Interpretation. In Being and Time, Heidegger explicates the 
relation between knowledge and truth from out of the existential analytic of Dasein as 
Being-in-the-world. Heidegger inverts the customary primacy of knowledge over 
understanding. For Heidegger, “understanding” is not merely one sort of cognizing 
among others (such as “explaining”), but rather is a fundamental mode of Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world (143). As such, “understanding” is grounded in possibility, “the most 
primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically” 
(ibid.). Compactly stated, Dasein is “Being-possible”—always more than any factual 
inventory of its qualities or characteristics. It is not that Dasein has possibilities, but that 
it is its possibilities. “Understanding” has the existential structure of projection, and so is 
always pressing forth into possibilities. This projection is a “throwing” (Entwurf) of 
Dasein into its possibilities without grasping them in a systematic and reflective manner. 
                                                 
97.The three elements of disclosedness plus “falling” are the constituents of “care” as Dasein’s 
primordial totality (BT, 335).  
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As one of three equiprimordial elements of disclosedness, understanding discloses 
Dasein’s possibilities to “Become what you are” (145).   
 In turn, interpretation is the development of the understanding in the sense of 
“working- out of possibilities [of/for Dasein] projected in understanding” (148). 
Interpretation does not depend upon knowledge or information about what is understood; 
rather, it is the articulation of that which lies before us as something—for example, as a 
table, as a bridge, etc. Interpretation precedes assertion or characterization of that which 
has come into sight. “The ‘as’ makes up the structure of the explicitness of something 
that is understood” (149). Guided by his explication of equipment as the “ready-to-hand,” 
Heidegger grounds the “as” structure of interpretation upon the “fore-structure” of 
understanding: fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. That is, understanding 
entails the having in advance of a totality of involvements; the sighting-in-advance—a 
“first-cut,” so to speak—of that totality; and a preliminary grasping or conceptualizing of 
that totality (150). Thus, understanding and interpretation operate hand-in-hand; neither 
has primacy over the other. Indeed, Heidegger says, they operate within a “virtuous 
circle,” so to speak: “Any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding, must 
already have understood what is to be interpreted” (152).  
Truth and knowledge. Recall the primary and secondary senses in which 
Heidegger has primordially appropriated the tradition: namely, “truth” as “Being-
uncovering” and as “Being-uncovered,” respectively (220, also cited above). “Being-
uncovering” (aka “Being-true”) is a mode of Being for Dasein. “Understanding” is also 
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such a mode. (143) and so is “knowing” (62). Entities, or beings, are “that which has 
been uncovered” (20).  
Conventionally understood, “knowledge” is what is true (216). This can be 
affirmed, if we take “truth” in the secondary sense of “Being-uncovered.” Knowledge, 
roughly speaking, is that which gets demonstrated or uncovered. This is consistent with 
the earlier claim in this section that “knowledge” is a derivative of “understanding.”   In 
more detail: 
When does truth become phenomenologically explicit in knowledge itself? It does 
so when such knowing demonstrates itself as true. By demonstrating itself it is 
assured of its truth. . . . What gets demonstrated is the Being-uncovering of the 
assertion. In carrying out such a demonstration, the knowing remains related 
solely to the entity itself. . . This uncoveredness is confirmed when that which is 
put forward in the assertion (namely the entity itself) shows itself as that very 
same thing. . . . Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between 
knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to 
another (the Object). (BT, 217-18; original emphasis) 
 
 I have concentrated in this section on highlighting Heidegger’s formulation of 
truth as disclosedness (aletheia) and how the traditional conception of truth as agreement 
of an assertion with its object is derivative of this primordial formulation. Heidegger 
establishes these claims from the existential analytic of Dasein. I have also highlighted 
his arguments for the inseparable intertwining of truth and untruth In the next section, I 
shall draw upon Heidegger’s later work that retains the two in their inextricable 
interweaving, but does not repeat the analysis explicitly linking them to the existential 
analytic of Dasein. 
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3.2 The Essence of Truth and the Truth of Being 
The primary purpose of this section is to explicate Heidegger’s critique of the 
customary formulation of the essence of truth as the correctness of an assertion in favor 
of a more originary explication of truth from the standpoint of the question of the truth of 
Being. Here, his explication of truth is no longer dependent upon the existential analytic 
of Dasein. I shall focus upon three questions with an eye toward their relevance in 
thinking the RST relation: First, why is the statement that “truth is the correctness of an 
assertion” problematic in itself, as well as derivative from the pre-Socratic understanding 
of truth as unconcealedness? Second, how are we to understand Heidegger’s claim that 
“to seek the essence of truth is to seek the truth of Being”? And third, what is the 
connection between the truth-Being relation and the question of what it means to be 
human?  
In Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger takes the question of truth—
understood as the truth of Being—as his basic question. Once again, he begins his inquiry 
by interrogating the customary view of truth, compactly expressed as “the correctness of 
an assertion” (BQP, 9). Traditionally, he says, the question of truth, expressed in this 
form, has been regarded as a problem or question of logic. Correspondence, he says, is 
customarily taken as the standard of correctness. For example, “Truth is correctness, or in 
the more usual formula: truth is the correspondence of knowledge (representation, 
thought, judgment, assertion) with the object” (16); and “. . . truth is the correctness of a 
representation, the correspondence of an assertion (a proposition) with a thing” (22). 
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Heidegger problematizes the customary understanding of truth in several ways. 
First, what does correspondence mean? How are we to understand a correspondence 
between a being or entity (such as an object or thing) and a string of words referencing 
such? In discussing Aristotle’s understanding of correspondence as the assimilation of 
the assertion to the thing via Aristotle’s example, “The stone is hard,” Heidegger asks: “. 
. . how is the representation [i.e., the proposition  itself] supposed to assimilate itself to 
the stone? The representation is not supposed to, and cannot, become stone-like . . .” (15). 
Second, he points out that the centuries-old debate between realism and idealism lies 
completely within the orbit of this customary understanding of truth. That is, both 
positions start from the premise that “truth is the correctness of a representation . . .” The 
basic difference between them lies in the extent, or “reach,” of such representations. For 
realism, representations “reach the things themselves,” whereas for idealism, 
representations “relate only to the represented” (17). Thus the essence of truth must lie at 
a deeper level. And third, Heidegger argues that the question of the essence of truth 
cannot be divorced from the question of the essence of what it means to be human. For 
Heidegger, conceiving of truth as the correctness of an assertion is equivalent to thinking 
“man” as the animal rationale, the animal “endowed with reason” (20). Thus, his critique 
of the customary understanding of truth necessitates a rethinking of the essence of being 
human—an issue that I shall address more fully in the final chapter of this inquiry. 
Despite these flaws in the customary understanding of truth as the correctness of 
an assertion, Heidegger intends to show that this understanding “already in some way 
contains, even if not originally, the essence of truth” (42). He proceeds to do so by 
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examining in detail Aristotle’s multi-faceted understanding of essence. To comprehend 
the essence of truth, we must first ask, what do we mean by “essence” itself? That is, 
what is the essentiality (i.e., the truth) of the essence? Thus, Heidegger inverts the 
question of the essence of truth to the question of the truth (essentiality) of the essence.  
Heidegger justifies his engagement with Aristotle’s thought in several ways. First, 
Aristotle was the first to posit the customary understanding of truth (ibid.). Second, 
examples such as “The stone is hard,” merely provide occurrences of correctness but do 
not suffice to provide a ground, or foundation, for this understanding of truth (43). By 
engaging Aristotle’s explication of essence, Heidegger seeks to discern the origin and 
founding of the formulation of truth as the correctness of an assertion. And third, while 
Heidegger’s inquiry is pertinent because of the dominance of the traditional 
understanding of truth in contemporary thought, he fundamentally aims for “awakening 
the question of truth for the future as a–or perhaps the—basic question of philosophy” 
(41).  That is, Heidegger frames his analysis of Aristotle’s thought as a historical 
reflection oriented toward the future rather than a historiographical consideration that 
“turns the past into an object” (32-40). 
 Aristotle thought the essentiality of the essence in several different ways (53-58). 
Among them, Heidegger selects whatness for special analysis. “The essence is the ti 
einai—the whatness [Wasssein] of a being. . . . What something is is its essence” (56). At 
this point, Heidegger turns to Plato’s fateful characterization of whatness and describes it 
as “an answer which became henceforth perhaps the most consequential, influential, and 
disastrous philosophical definition in Western thinking: the essence is what something is, 
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and we encounter it as that which we constantly have in sight in all our comportment to 
the thing” (58, emphasis added). In what follows, I shall examine why Heidegger thinks 
that Plato’s characterization of whatness as constant presence is disastrous and its 
implications for thinking the RST relation. Plato’s characterization follows: 
. . . what the thing is, the constantly present, must be sighted in advance and 
indeed necessarily so.  “To see,” is in Greek idein; what is in sight, precisely as 
sighted, is idea. . . . The “what it is,” the whatness, is the idea; and conversely, the 
“idea” is the whatness, and the latter is the essence. More precisely, and more in 
the Greek vein, the idea is the look something offers, the aspect it has and, as it 
were, shows of itself, the eidos. (BQP, 56) 
 
In sum, the essence of something for Plato is idea—the look, or aspect, that it shows in its 
constant presencing, yet always sighted in advance.  
For example, consider “house-ness”—i.e., the idea of a house. Heidegger writes: 
When we enter a house and live in it, we constantly have “house” in sight, i.e., 
house-ness. If this were not seen, we could never experience and enter stairs, hall, 
room, attic, or cellar. But this house-ness, which stands in view, is not thereby 
considered and observed the way the individual window is, toward which we 
walk in order to close it. House-ness is not even observed incidentally. It is not 
observed at all; yet it is in sight, and precisely in an eminent way: it is sighted in 
advance. (BQP, 58-59) 
 
We see the window in the house but we do not—and cannot—see “house-ness.” 
Nonetheless, the essence of the house is always in sight and always sighted in advance; 
however, this essence is never noticed or observed. Yet each individual thing that we see 
is decisively shaped by what is sighted in advance.
98
  
                                                 
98. This strikes me as comparable to Thomas Kuhn’s fundamental distinction between normal 
science and science in a crisis state (see Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 77-91). Under the 
former, scientists go about their everyday tasks of exploration and explanation within the operating 
paradigms of their specific disciplines. From Kuhn’s standpoint, Heidegger’s claim that “science does not 
think” is perfectly understandable—if thinking includes examination of the presuppositions under which 
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But whence does Plato’s interpretations of whatness as idea—and idea as 
constant presence—come? And why is this characterization deemed disastrous? In 
response to the first question, Heidegger states: 
The reason the Greeks understand essence as whatness is that they in general 
understand the Being of beings (ousia) as what is constant and in its constancy is 
always present, and as present always shows itself, and as self-showing offers its 
look—in short, as look, as idea. (BQP, 61) 
 
Here, Heidegger links the truth (essentiality) of essence to the question of Being, as 
understood by the Platonic Greeks. Essence as whatness, he says, flows from the 
beingness of beings (ousia), understood as constant presence, i.e., as idea. Heidegger, 
however, contends that the pre-Socratics held to a more originary notion of Being, 
expressed as being as such. For them, this expression was understood as physis, 
fundamentally characterized by emergence (86). That is, beings as such emerge from 
concealment into unconcealedness. Thus the truth, or essence, of beings as such was 
characterized as unconcealedness, expressed as aletheia in Greek. Briefly stated, for the 
pre-Socratic Greeks, unconcealedness (aletheia) is the truth of beings as such (physis); 
equivalently, unconcealedness (aletheia) was understood by them as the truth (essence) of 
Being as the beingness of beings (ousia). Aletheia (unconcealedness), then, is the bridge 
for the equivalence of the essence of truth and the truth of Being, as understood by the 
pre-Socratic Greeks. On this view, truth belongs to beings—not to assertions about them. 
Plato and Aristotle reformulated this primordial formulation of truth as unconcealedness 
to truth as the correctness of an assertion (97-8). Thus, both formulations of truth have 
                                                                                                                                                 
scientific inquiries are made. That is, normal science employs “paradigm” as “idea” in Plato’s sense as the 
view in advance, the “look” that something offers.  
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been in play since Aristotle. Plato’s fateful contribution is the conflation of 
unconcealedness and constant presence as idea.  
Heidegger explicates the connections between these two formulations of truth in a 
twofold movement. First, he traces the origin of the traditional understanding of truth 
back to the early Greek understanding of truth as unconcealedness. Then he briefly traces 
the trajectory from its understanding as aletheia to truth as the correctness of an assertion. 
In so doing, he illuminates the consequences for our understanding of what it means to be 
human and defends his claim that Plato’s conflation of essence and constant presence as 
idea has been disastrous. 
Heidegger begins by asking: Is there a foundation, or grounding, for such claims 
involving essences—and in particular, the essence of the truth taken customarily (and by 
Aristotle) as correctness of an assertion or judgment? He tells us that Aristotle did not 
provide any foundation in his extant writings for this claim; he simply declared it to be so 
(64).  Indeed, Heidegger argues that founding any essence upon factual knowledge is 
impossible, for the purported essence would have to be posited to generate the factual 
knowledge employed to establish it: 
Every time we attempt to prove an essential determination through single, or even 
all, actual and possible facts, there results the remarkable statement of affairs that 
we have already presupposed the legitimacy of the essential determination, indeed 
must presuppose it, just on order to grasp and produce the facts that are supposed 
to serve as proof.
99
 (BQP, 71) 
 
                                                 
99. Note that Heidegger does not appeal to the argument of infinite regress—a form of argument 
that lies within the orbit of causality. 
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How, then, is the essence of truth to be grasped? Returning to his conviction that 
“truth as correctness of an assertion” is “on the way” to understanding the essence of 
truth, Heidegger re-examines more closely Plato’s explication of the essence of whatness 
as constant presence—i.e., idea. He provides a detailed argument to hold that the seeing 
in advance that characterizes idea is a grasping of the essence in the sense that it is a 
productive seeing and a bringing forth from concealment into the light, i.e., into 
unconcealedness (74-87). In this sense, truth as unconcealedness is a founding of truth as 
the correctness of an assertion. 
What accounts, then, for this transmutation of truth as the determinant of beings 
as such to truth as the correctness of an assertion? Heidegger offers two accounts. The 
first employs his understanding of the Greek notion of techne. On his view, techne means 
“to grasp beings as emerging out of themselves in the way they show themselves, in their 
outward look, eidos, idea, and, in accord with this, to care for beings themselves and to 
let them grow . . .” (155). Techne “maintains the holding sway of physis (emergence) in 
unconcealedness (aletheia)” (153). Otherwise said, techne acknowledges beings in their 
unconcealedness without calculation and utilitarian motives.  Heidegger contends, 
however, that, over time, the grasping of beings in the noninstrumental manner of techne 
inevitably leads, in effect, to the conflation of beings with their representations (i.e., their 
ideas): 
While the grasping of beings, the acknowledgment of them in their 
unconcealedness, unfolds into techne, inevitably and increasingly the aspects of 
beings, the ‘ideas,’ which are brought into view in such grasping, become the only 
standard. The grasping becomes a sort of know-how with regards to the ideas, and 
that requires a constant assimilation to them. . . . Beings become, to exaggerate 
somewhat, objects of representations conforming to them. Now aletheia itself is 
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also interrogated, but henceforth from the point of view of techne, and aletheia 
becomes the correctness of representations and procedures. (BQP, 156) 
 
Heidegger’s deconstruction of the history of the essence of truth illuminates the 
history of the transmutation of the essence of humankind and of reason itself. On his 
view, humankind was once the perceiver and preserver of beings in their beingness, but 
for centuries has been conceived instead as the animal rationale (121). Reason (logos) 
was once “the taking together and gathering of beings in view of the one which they are 
as beings,” but has become reason that “assumes for itself the planning, constructing, and 
making of the world” (122). He continues: “Beings are no longer physis in the Greek 
sense [i.e, of emergence] but ‘nature,’ i.e., that which is captured in the planning and 
projects of calculation and placed in the chains of anticipatory reckonings.”  
Heidegger’s second account of these transmutations of the essences of truth, 
humankind, and reason is based upon his interrogation of unconcealedness as the truth of 
beings as such. His interrogation of aletheia prompts the question of why the early 
Greeks did not conduct such an investigation. Heidegger argues as follows. First, the 
founding of any essence—including the essence of truth—must arise from the necessity 
of the question of the essence itself (104ff). Second, for the early Greeks, the question of 
the essence of truth was necessary, because their destiny and task “was to begin thinking 
itself and to establish it on its ground” (112). Third, they did so by interrogating and 
grounding aletheia as the unconcealedness of beings, but did not interrogate “the essence 
of aletheia, of unconcealedness as such” (105; emphasis added). They did not interrogate 
aletheia as such, since that was not their destiny and task. Heidegger takes up this task out 
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of the necessity of doing so in light of the abandonment of Being, heralded by Nietzsche 
and Hölderlin: 
What if this withdrawal itself belonged to the essence of Being? What if . . . 
Being in its essence is self-concealing? What if the openness were first and 
foremost the clearing in the midst of beings, in which clearing the self-
concealment of Being would be manifest? (BQP, 163) 
 
Thus the pre-Socratic notion of the essence of truth as unconcealedness—equivalently, 
the truth of beings as such—is giving way to understanding the truth of Being itself as 
self-concealing unconcealedness, an inseparable concurrence of disclosing and 
withdrawing. This emerging understanding of the essence (truth) of Being reaffirms the 
claim in Being and Time that truth and untruth are similarly intertwined. 
An inversion of sorts is taking place. The first sentence of the Introduction of 
Being and Time reads: “The question has today been forgotten” (BT, 2). That is, we, as 
Dasein, have forgotten the question of Being. Heidegger now writes in a more ominous 
key: 
The forgottenness of Being dominates, i.e., it determines our relation to beings, so 
that even beings, that they are and what they are, remain a matter of indifference. 
It is almost as if beings have been abandoned by Being, and we are heedless of it, 
. . . (BQP, 159) 
 
For Heidegger, the withdrawal of Being possibly heralds our abandonment by Being. It is 
as though Being itself has “turned the tables” on us.  
Thus far in this section, we have sketched Heidegger’s telling of the transmutation 
of the meaning of truth as disclosedness to truth as the correctness of the assertion, which 
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eventually comes to rely upon representational thinking. In a later essay,
100
 he traces the 
further transmutation of the meaning of truth to the certainty of representational thinking 
and locates its beginning at the start of what is commonly called the modern period 
(EOP, 22). That is to say, representational thinking becomes the means by which truth, 
certainty, and reality itself are interlinked. Quoting a passage from Descartes’ 
Meditations, Heidegger states: 
Something true is that which man of himself clearly and distinctly brings before 
himself and confronts as what is thus brought before him (re-presented) in order 
to guarantee what is represented in such a confrontation. The assurance of such 
representation is certainty. What is true in the sense of being certain is what is 
real. (EOP, 25) 
 
Hence, knowledge is confined to that which can be produced (by man) with certainty 
(26). Certainty is not something added to knowledge; rather certainty constitutes 
knowledge (20).  
On Heidegger’s view, understanding truth as certainty has its roots in the 
ubiquitous, frenetic search for the certainty of personal salvation as mediated by the 
“cultural Christianity” of the Middle Ages. “Before all, the creator god, and with him the 
institution of the offering and management of his gifts of grace (the church), is in sole 
possession of the sole and eternal truth” (21). By faith, medieval mankind sought the 
certainty of salvation. But even if that faith were lost, “modern culture is [still] Christian” 
(24), he says, in the sense that certainty is the essence of truth—whether certainty is 
                                                 
100. Martin Heidegger, “Metaphysics as a History of Being,” in The End of Philosophy, trans. 
Joan Stambaugh  (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 1-54. (The End of Philosophy is hereafter cited as 
EOP.) 
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realized through faith or by following Descartes’ dictum to accept as true only those 
“things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly.”101   
 
3.3 Truth, Rationality, and Reason 
 In this section and the next, I shall examine the possible relationship—even if it is 
that of mutual exclusion—between Heidegger’s reflection on truth and theologian J. 
Wentzel van Huyssteen’s two-part thesis that the question of the nature or character of 
rationality is decisive for thinking the RST relation and, in turn, that the nature or 
character of the RST relation itself is decisive for thinking the nature or character of 
theological reflection in general. In The Shaping of Rationality, he writes: 
. . . the problem of rationality thus emerges as at the heart of the current dialogue 
between theology and the sciences. . . . The current theology and science 
dialogue, then, will turn out to be at the heart of the debate on the interdisciplinary 
nature and location of theological reflection . . .  (Shaping, 7) 
 
Van Huyssteen frames his investigation of rationality by developing what he calls 
a postfoundationalist model of rationality, which draws heavily from postmodern 
epistemology and the philosophy of science. On his view, theologians can legitimately 
participate in interdisciplinary public discourse with their truth claims because 
theological statements can be considered to be rationally credible. Van Huyssteen’s 
postfoundationalist model emphasizes the seeking and giving of the best reasons possible 
for one’s claims or beliefs about the way things are, one’s actions, and one’s values. In 
contrast, I shall highlight key elements from Heidegger’s critique of Leibniz’ Principle of 
                                                 
101. René Descartes, Meditatio III, quoted in EOP, 25, n. 4.. 
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Reason, compactly (but not strictly) stated as nihil est sine ratione (nothing is without 
reason).  
Van Huyssteen’s postfoundationalist model of rationality is centered on the 
universal human quest for intelligibility—the drive to “make sense” of the world around 
us and our relationship to it. He contends that religion as well as science manifests this 
quest. “As many scientists and theologians today will acknowledge, the quest of 
intelligibility or optimal understanding will be incomplete if it does not include within 
itself the religious quest for ultimate meaning, purpose, and significance” (Shaping, 7). In 
Duet or Duel?, van Huyssteen locates the origin of this quest in evolutionary biology and 
its subsequent interplay with cultural evolution.
102
 In this work, he draws heavily upon 
the work of evolutionary biologist Franz Wuketits, but challenges Wuketits’ naturalistic 
explanation of the origin of religious and metaphysical beliefs. Appealing to the 
implications of Wuketits’ own analysis, he writes: 
If metaphysical beliefs, on this naturalistic view at least, do not tell us anything 
about ‘first causes’ or ‘last purposes’ (God), but rather about our own propensity 
for such beliefs, why then did these evolve on such a massive scale in the history 
of our species? And why should we distrust our phylogenetic memories only on 
this point? (Duet or Duel?, 155) 
 
In sum, van Huyssteen contends that the notion of intelligibility extends beyond 
naturalistic explanations to include religious and metaphysical beliefs as well. This is a 
                                                 
102. Van Huyssteen refers to the investigation of the implications for philosophical epistemology 
of the interrelationships between biological and cultural forces shaping human evolution as evolutionary 
epistemology (Duet or Duel?, 134). Cf. Philip Hefner’s claim that the religion-science relation is grounded 
in the beginnings of human history and the primordial search for both order and meaning (Hefner, 
“Religion-and-Science,” 563). Also see Subsection 1.2.1 below. 
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key step toward his broader claim that theological statements can be considered 
“rational.” 
Based upon this evolutionary account of intelligibility, intelligence—and its close 
relation, rationality—emerge together as primary survival strategies. By virtue of their 
common evolutionary heritage in the quest for intelligibility, van Huyssteen contends that 
theology—understood as “critical reflection upon religious experience” (Shaping , 
201)—and science together share in “the rich resources of rationality.” More specifically, 
van Huyssteen contends that the common thread in rationality across theology, science, 
and the demands of daily living is providing the best available reasons for our beliefs, 
actions, and values: 
In both theology and the sciences, then, rationality and the quest for intelligibility 
pivot on the deployment of good reasons: believing, doing, judging, and choosing 
the right things for the right reasons.  Being rational is therefore not just a matter 
of having some reasons for what one believes in and argues for, but having the 
best or strongest reasons available to support the comparative rationality of one’s 
beliefs within a concrete sociohistorical context. (Shaping, 129) 
 
In what follows, I shall examine key elements of van Huyssteen’s postfoundationalist 
model of rationality and his case for theological rationality. 
First, the deployment of rationality is always contextual and local, yet need not 
remain isolated within its own domain. This reflects van Huyssteen’s characterization of 
his postfoundationalist model of rationality as “splitting the difference” between 
supporting universalist epistemological claims of modernity and extreme relativist views 
of knowledge, reason, and truth in postmodern thought. 
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Second, rationality is multi-dimensional and includes noncognitive as well as 
cognitive elements. Van Huyssteen cites the work of Nicholas Rescher, who posits three 
primary dimensions of rationality: the cognitive, the pragmatic, and the evaluative (ibid., 
128). As Rescher explains, these dimensions reflect three domains in which human 
choices and decisions are required: belief (What claims regarding “states of affairs” 
should I believe or accept?), action (What “overt deeds” should I perform?), and 
evaluation (What ends and goals should I “prefer or prize”?).103 The common 
denominator across these domains of thought and action is the requirement to seek out 
and act upon the strongest reasons available to a person in making choices. Moreover, on 
van Huyssteen’s view, rationality entails “aligning one’s beliefs, actions, and evaluations 
with the best available reasons within specific contexts” (Shaping, 134). Thus, in some 
sense, reasons for our beliefs, actions, and value judgments must be congruent or 
consistent—at least at the local or contextual level. In sum, postfoundationalist rationality 
depends upon the seeking and giving of the best available reasons for our beliefs, actions, 
and values in order to align them in all areas of human life and thought within specific 
contexts.  
On van Huyssteen’s view, value judgments are integral to rationality. Drawing 
upon the work of Harold Brown and Bruce Wavel, van Huyssteen points to the 
undeniable role of values and value judgments in science: “In science the acceptance and 
rejection of hypotheses, and finally also theory choice, are indeed based on evaluation 
and deliberation. This places the making of certain kinds of value judgments at the heart 
                                                 
103. Nicholas Rescher, Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of 
Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 5. 
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of the scientific method itself” (141). Since science itself is unquestionably taken as the 
primary exemplar of rationality, it follows that values and value judgments are 
indispensable elements of rationality. Van Huyssteen then moves to declare that the 
employment of values and value judgments in theology is also rational: 
Because of the breakdown of the stark opposition between scientific and other 
forms of rationality in a postfoundationalism, it can now also be argued that there 
is no essential difference between the epistemic function of values and value 
judgments in science and their function in other modes of rational inquiry like the 
humanities, ethics, and theology. If the use of value judgments in science is 
therefore rational, so is the use of value judgments in the humanities, ethics, and 
in theology (Shaping, 142-43; emphasis added). 
 
Third, consonant with the thinking of Harold Brown and others, van Huyssteen 
argues for locating rationality primarily in rational persons. Rational beliefs are 
“derivative” in the sense that they are “arrived at” by rational individuals (145). On this 
postfoundationalist view of rationality, the absence of universally applicable norms and 
rules requires responsible judgment, exercised by the rational person, or agent, in 
discernment and sensitivity to the context and particulars of the matter at hand. This view 
entails one caveat and one consequence of great significance. A rational person 
necessarily engages in appropriate (roughly speaking, a “good faith”) dialogue with the 
epistemic community (or communities) that is (are) pertinent to the matter at hand. 
However, the rational agent has the final say. Consequently, on this view, consensus is 
not—and cannot be—a requirement for rationality.  
Fourth, our beliefs are embedded in “evolving, developing traditions” in science, 
art, theology and other domains. Van Huyssteen cites the work of philosopher of science 
Larry Laudan, who has proposed a criterion of “progressive problem-solving” to 
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adjudicate among competing theories and research traditions in science.
104
 Van 
Huyssteen employs this criterion to express the heart of postfoundationalist rationality:  
[W]e make what we believe to be a responsible judgment in favor of a theory, a 
viewpoint, or a research tradition, of which we are convinced—with good 
reasons—that is has the highest problem-solving ability for a specific problem 
within a specific context. (Shaping, 172)  
 
In turn, he combines problem-solving with rational agency to recast the quest for 
intelligibility: 
In our attempts to cope with our world on different levels, the universal intent of 
this quest for intelligibility is definitively expressed in our ability to solve 
problems through an ongoing process of personal judgment and intersubjective 
accountability. (Shaping, 174) 
 
And fifth, actions, beliefs, and value judgments can be rational without 
necessarily being true. Thinking with Rescher, van Huyssteen argues for “a weaker but 
vital” connection between rationality and truth. “[W]e proceed rationally in attempting to 
‘discover’ truth, and we take those conclusions that are rationally acceptable as our best 
estimates of the truth” (158). However, having better estimates of the truth does not 
imply having better approximations of the truth. That is, having better reasons for our 
beliefs, actions, and value judgments does not imply moving closer to the truth. In effect, 
on this view, truth serves a functional role as a kind of ideal, or imaginary, point which at 
best serves to orient our fallible efforts to discover or craft reasons for optimal 
understanding but forever lies beyond our reach.  
                                                 
104. Larry Lauden, Progress and Its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977).  
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However, van Huyssteen does not take up the converse claim that beliefs, actions, 
and value judgments can be true, in some sense, without being rational, in the sense of 
seeking and giving of the best reasons available to one. Thinking, with Heidegger, I 
address this matter in what follows. 
Circumscribing rationality within a framework of reason-seeking and giving can 
be traced back to the Greeks, as attested by Heidegger’s various critiques of the 
traditional understanding of truth briefly described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this inquiry. 
In The Principle of Reason, Heidegger explicates Leibniz’ comprehensive and decisive 
reformulation of the principle of reason as “the fundamental principle of rendering 
sufficient reasons” (POR, 33). Operating within the long shadow cast by Descartes’ 
cogito, the reformulated principle of reason not only governs cognition but its reach 
extends to all that is, in Leibniz’ system. Heidegger contends that the reformulated, 
“strict,” or “grand” principle of reason characterizes modern science, the modern era 
itself, and the still prevalent understanding of humankind in terms of the animal 
rationale. Moreover, on his view, the increasing hegemony of the reformulated principle 
of reason calls into question the destiny of the earth and human existence (129). By 
“inverting” the customary hearing of the principle of reason and by engaging poetry, 
Heidegger points to a path ahead for resisting the suffocating dominance of reason-
seeking and giving. I proceed to unpack these claims.  
For Leibniz, the principle of reason is one of the supreme fundamental principles 
of reason—possibly the most supreme one—because it founds all principles as principles 
(118). That is, it provides the basis, or ground, for principles, including such fundamental 
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principles as the principle of identity and the principle of non-contradiction (8). Yet, 
paradoxically, the principle of reason itself does not satisfy the very claim that the 
principle makes: namely (in an equivalent form), everything has a reason. For, if an 
underlying reason for the principle of reason were given, such a reason would have to 
have itself an underlying reason and so on, leading to an infinite regress (11-12). Leibniz 
resolves this conundrum by regarding the principle of reason as an axiom, understood by 
him as a principle “held by everyone as being obvious . . .” Heidegger signals his 
intention of critiquing the “grand” principle of reason by way of early Greek thinking by 
recovering the meaning of the Greek verb axiom as “I find something worthy” (15). 
Thought in a Greek way with respect to the relation of being human to what is, this 
declaration, according to Heidegger, means “to bring something to shine forth in that 
countenance in which it finds its repose, and to preserve it therein” (16). 
On Heidegger’s view, Leibniz’ genius was to bring to the forefront the precise 
role, or function, of reason within the principle of reason that had been operating without 
clarity for centuries. Namely, the principle of reason is a principle of rendering reasons, 
in which reason demands that reasons be rendered, in the sense of “giving back.” But 
given back to whom? As Leibniz was operating under the long shadow of Descartes’ 
subject-object binary, the principle of rendering reason was understood (and still is 
widely understood in modern thought) as a demand to give reasons back in 
representational form to the cognizing subject: 
After Descartes, followed by Leibniz and all of modern thinking, humans are 
experienced as an I that relates to the world such that it renders this world to itself 
in the form of connections correctly established between its representations--that 
means judgments--and thus sets itself over against this world as to an object. 
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Judgments and statements are correct, that means true, only if the reason for the 
connection of subject and predicate is rendered, given back to the representing I. 
(POR, 119) 
 
As this excerpt indicates, Leibniz is operating within the traditional understanding 
of truth as the correctness of assertions—expressed here grammatically as the agreement 
between the subject and predicate of a judgment or proposition. By coupling this 
understanding of truth with Descartes’ subject-object binary and reason as the rendering 
of reasons, the knowable, the objectifiable, and “the real” are all conflated. Reason 
demands that that which purports to be real be brought before the skeptical, cognizing 
subject. To be real, any thing which lies before the subject must be re-represented and 
brought before (vorgestellt) the subject, and brought to a stand there as an object 
(Gegenstand). Thus the “grand” principle of reason is not only a principle of cognition 
via representation (Vorstellung); it is also a principle of the objects of cognition, and 
hence a principle of all that exists in a world for those who operate within the Cartesian 
subject-object binary (27).
105
  
Heidegger brings to attention the growing pervasiveness in the present age of the 
reformulated principle of reason in all areas of life. On his view, the demand to render 
reasons—the hallmark of science—is now ubiquitous. The danger is that  
. . . the unique unleashing of the demand to render reasons threatens everything of 
humans’ being-at-home and robs them of the root of their subsistence, the roots 
from out of which every great human age, every world-opening spirit, every 
molding of the human form has thus far grown. (POR, 30) 
                                                 
105. As Heidegger notes later in this essay, the subject-object binary is itself disappearing in the 
final stages of modernity. He speaks of a world “where what is objective [Gegenständliche] must yield to a 
status [Ständigen] of a different sort. . . . Modernity is not at an end. It only begins its completion in 
directing itself to the complete availability of everything that is and can be” (POR, 34). I discuss this theme 
in Chapter 4 of this inquiry.   
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Heidegger challenges the hegemony of the principle of reason by turning to 
poetry and to an alternate hearing of the tonality of the principle of reason. He begins by 
explicating an equivalent form of the strict principle of reason as: nothing is without a 
why (35). He contends that the rose—a symbol of plants and all growing things—lies 
outside, but also within, the orbit of the why and the reach of the demand to render 
reasons (35-36): 
The rose is without why, it blooms because it blooms, 
 It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen. 
 
The incessant “why” is trumped by the “because” which stops the ceaseless striving for a 
complete reckoning. The rose lies outside the why because it is “without the seeking, 
peering-round rendering of the grounds on the basis of which it blooms” (38). On the 
other hand, when the rose becomes an object of our analysis and knowledge, it is within 
the orbit of reason and the why.
106
 
 Next, Heidegger observes that the principle of reason tells us nothing directly 
about the essence of reason (39ff). He then invites us to hear two tonalities in the 
principle of reason: first, the customary hearing as nothing is without reason, and, second, 
nothing is without reason. He contends that, in the second tonality, a response can be 
heard to the question of the essence of reason. On his view, the verb is always connotes 
being in the sense of the being of beings, whereas reason is the English translate of 
                                                 
106. This “double-seeing” of the rose is echoed by Heidegger’s claim that the scientist is capable 
of reflective thinking as well as the calculative thinking characteristic of science. See “Science and 
Reflection” in QCT, 181-82. This poetic couplet also resonates with Heidegger’s example of the blooming 
rose to illustrate non-objectifying “thinking and saying” in the Appendix to his lecture, “Phenomenology 
and Theology.” (See Section 2.4 above.) The couplet is also quoted in section 3.4 below. 
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Grund (ratio, in Latin), which connotes the double meaning of ground and reason. 
Mindful that only beings exist and not Being itself—equivalently, the Being of beings—
the second tonality can be expressed as: being and ground/reason: the same. Otherwise 
expressed, being and ground/reason “belong together” (104-5, 125). 
 Heidegger supports the hearing of this second tonality by tracing the etymological 
roots of weil—the German equivalent of “because.” In earlier times, its cognate, 
desweilen (whereas) meant “during”; another cognate, weilen (to while) means “to tarry,” 
“to remain still,” or “to pause and keep to oneself” (127). “Whiling” also names being 
and ground. On the one hand, “whiling” connotes an old meaning of sein (being). On the 
other hand: “The while . . . names the simple, plain presence that is without why—the 
presence upon which everything depends . . .”—that is, ground (ibid.). 
Heard in this second tonality, the “why” disappears from the principle of reason 
as Leibniz formulated it. In this second tonality, “The word of being says: being—itself 
ground/reason—remains without a ground/reason, which now means, without why” 
(126). Thus, the second tonality grounds the first tonality. The demand of rendering 
reasons has rested thus far upon the appeal to “Western humanity” of the word of being 
as “the word of ground/reason” (128). But that appeal is unheard in the cacophony of the 
current age. 
The second tonality illuminates the moves by van Huyssteen and others beyond 
foundationalism. “. . . every foundation—even and especially self-founded ones—remain 
inappropriate to being as ground/reason. Every founding and even every appearance of 
foundability has inevitably degraded being to some sort of a being” (111). 
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Finally, on Heidegger’s view, the tonality in which we hear the principle of 
reason decisively challenges our basic understanding of who we are as human beings. But 
also, the second tonality itself is problematic as we face the future. He asks: “Does the . . 
. determination that humans are the animal rationale exhaust the essence of humanity? 
Does the last word that can be said about being run thus: being means ground/reason?” 
(129, italics added). Heidegger has already responded many times to these rhetorical 
questions with an unequivocal “No,” as, for example, our engagements with Being and 
Time and Basic Questions of Philosophy have indicated. On his view, the fate of the earth 
and human existence hinge upon seeking other paths for non-calculative thinking (129).  
 
3.4 Truth and Reflection 
In this section, I shall examine Heidegger’s explication of the relation of 
reflection in relation to truth and bring his insights to bear upon the themes of truth, 
untruth, and rationality as discussed in the first three sections of this chapter. Heidegger’s 
analysis distinguishes sharply between Reflexion and Besinnung, which are both rendered 
in English as “reflection.” I shall take as our guiding question the following: If theology 
is taken to be “reflection upon religious experience and belief” or some close variant, 
which sense of “reflection” is appropriate for the theological enterprise itself and for its 
meaningful engagement in the RST relation? Or, are both senses important—and perhaps 
necessary? 
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What accounts, then, for this transmutation of truth (i.e., aletheia as 
unconcealment) as the determinant of beings as such to truth as the correctness of an 
assertion? 
As we have seen in Section 3.2 above, Heidegger has traced the transmutation of 
truth as the determinant of beings as such to truth as the correctness of an assertion. On 
Heidegger’s view, representational thinking is a hallmark of the latter formulation of 
truth, in which “[b]eings become . . . objects of representations conforming to them” 
(BQP, 156) In “Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics,”107 Heidegger explicates 
Reflexion as a basic characteristic of representational, conceptual, objectifying thought: 
Reflexion is bending-back, and as such it is the explicitly accomplished 
presentation of what is present; explicitly, that is, in such a way that what is 
present is represented to the representer. . . . reflexion strives for the identical, and 
for this reason reflexion is a fundamental characteristic of concept formation. 
(EOP, 60-61) 
 
Repraesentatio is grounded in reflexio in accordance with its essence. Hence the 
essence of objectivity as such first becomes evident where the essence of thinking 
is recognized and explicitly enacted as “I think something,” that is, as reflexion. 
(EOP, 62) 
 
Heidegger devoted an entire work to the topic of “reflection” in the sense of 
Besinnung: namely, Volume 66 of the Gesamtausgabe. The translators of this volume 
render the title as Mindfulness
108
 and offer this introductory commentary on the basic 
distinction between Besinnung and Reflexion: 
. . . Besinnung is nothing but an inquiry into the self-disclosure of being . . It 
differs from reflection [i.e., Reflexion] in that, as Besinnung, this inquiry is not 
                                                 
107. Martin Heidegger, “Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics,” in EOP, 55-74.  
 
108. Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: 
Continuum, 2006). 
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entirely and exhaustively in human discretion. What distinguishes this inquiry as 
Besinnung is that it is basically determined and shaped by the truth of being. 
(Mindfulness, xxiii-xxiv) 
 
In his lecture, “Science and Reflection,”109 Heidegger describes “reflection” in the sense 
of Besinnung as follows: 
To follow a direction that is the way that something has, of itself, already taken is 
called, in our language, sinnan, sinnen (to sense). To venture after sense or 
meaning (Sinn) is the essence of reflecting (Besinnung). This means more than the 
mere making conscious of something. We do not yet have reflection when we 
have only consciousness. Reflection [Besinnung] is more. It is calm, self-
possessed surrender [Gelassenheit] to that which is worthy of questioning. (QCT, 
180; GA7, 63; my insertions are in square brackets) 
 
Roughly speaking, then, Reflexion objectifies that which it encounters, whereas 
Besinnung is guided by the truth of Being—understood (since Basic Questions of 
Philosophy) as self-concealing disclosure. Moreover, Reflexion is “in control,” so to 
speak, of the enterprise. Its mode of comportment is objectifying, and its mode of 
thinking is calculative. In contrast, Besinning, guided by the truth of Being, is not merely 
a human enterprise; and, what is more, it is fundamentally responsive, rather than 
dominating, controlling, or even “directing.”110 What is worthy of questioning today is 
the marginalizing—and even outright dismissal—of ways of thinking other than the 
representational, calculative modes of thought that characterize science. 
In “Science and Reflection,” Heidegger differentiates Besinnung from science and 
what he calls “intellectual cultivation.” Such cultivation, he says, functions by means of 
rules, models, and forms—all under a guiding image and informed by reason. In this 
                                                 
109. Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” in QCT, 155-82. 
 
110. I thank Frank Seeburger for these clarifications. 
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work, he explicates modern science as the theory of the real (QCT, 157). He conducts a 
detailed, etymologically-based analysis
111
 of the root meanings of “theory” and “real” 
and their subsequent transformations in the present. On his view, the essence of the real 
and theory are characterized in terms of presencing. This differs markedly from their 
current meanings as “that which has followed from a consequence” (i.e., the real, 161) 
and that which is based upon observation, understood as “an entrapping and securing 
refining of the real” (i.e., theory, 167). Consequently, instead of presencing as “self-
exhibiting,” the real now presences as object via modern scientific representation. 
However, “objectness” is only one way in which what presences reveals itself: “. . 
. in principle the objectness in which at any given time nature, man, history, language, 
exhibit themselves always itself remains only one kind of presencing, in which indeed 
that which presences can appear, but never absolutely must appear” (176). Thus thinking 
“in the fashion of science” cannot be the only mode of thinking. Other ways of seeking 
sense or meaning (Sinn) are essential; reflection (Besinnung) is necessary. 
Our two guiding questions can now be restated in threefold form as: (1) With 
which sense of reflection does van Huyssteen’s construal of theology as reason-seeking 
and giving most strongly resonate? (2) In what sense of reflection is theology best 
formulated as reflection upon religious experience and belief? And (3) which sense of 
reflection as applied to theology is most fruitful for thinking the RST relation?  
                                                 
111. Heidegger defends this approach as follows:  “The mere identifying of old and often obsolete 
meanings of terms, the snatching up of these meanings with the aim of using them in some new way, leads 
to nothing if not arbitrariness. What counts, rather, is for us, in reliance of the early meaning of a word and 
its changes, to catch sight of the realm pertaining to the matter in question into which the word speaks. 
What counts is to ponder that essential realm as the one in which the matter named through the word 
moves” (QCT, 159). 
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With respect to the first question, I have already suggested that van Huyssteen’s 
model of rationality seems to favor Reflexion over Besinnung. Furthermore, he writes:  
The cognitive dimension of religion . . .is indeed the dimension of religion most 
interesting for and relevant to the sciences. . . . this dimension of religion presents 
itself to us forcibly in theological reflection and as such remains the aspect of 
religion most relevant for an interdisciplinary conversation with other reasoning 
strategies. (Shaping, 181) 
 
As I see it, centering the theological enterprise upon reason-seeking and giving—despite 
the inclusion of noncognitive dimensions of rationality—privileges coherence and the 
norms of academic discourse. It does so at the expense of marginalizing—and even 
covering over—the inexplicable, the contradictory, and the numinal dimensions of 
religious experience and belief. Consider the subtitle of The Shaping of Rationality: 
namely, Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science. By its subtitle, the book 
frames—better, enframes—theology within academic discourse. In such discourse, can 
there be noncalculative theological thinking beyond the why? If not, in what other forums 
and settings can such thinking be expressed?  
As for the second and third questions, I “tipped my hand” in my preceding 
discussion of the rose that is both within and beyond the why. I am suggesting that the 
incorporation of both senses of reflection is essential for a rethinking of the essence of 
theology in general and particularly so in thinking the RST relation. This claim is central 
to my entire inquiry and can only be addressed here in a preliminary way. As a 
beginning, consider the following as a starting point: 
In one of the last paragraphs of his lecture, “Science and Reflection,” Heidegger 
writes: 
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Even if the sciences, precisely in following their way and using their means, can 
never press forward to the essence of science, still every researcher and teacher of 
the sciences, every man pursuing a way through a science, can move, as a 
thinking being, on various levels of reflection [Besinnung] and can keep reflection 
vigilant. (QCT, 181-82) 
 
I hear in these words an invitation for all who employ calculative approaches in 
their thinking—and this includes those who center rationality upon reason-seeking and 
giving—to complement (or perhaps better, preface) such thinking with reflection as the 
“calm, self-possessed surrender to what is worthy of questioning.” With regard to the 
rose, Heidegger says that Leibniz’ strict principle of reason “holds in the case of the rose, 
but not for the rose; in the case of the rose, insofar as it is the object of our cognition; not 
for the rose, insofar as this rose stands alone, simply as a rose” (POR, 38; original italics, 
my underlining). Analogously, can we envision theology as, on the one hand, 
appropriately employing reason-seeking and giving as it reflects upon religious belief 
and experience “objectively”—but also giving itself with equal Gelassenheit to what is 
worthy of questioning in religious experience and belief as its simply stands? 
Notice also that Heidegger sets aside for a moment the abstract noun of “science” 
in favor of speaking to persons who do science: “. . . every researcher and teacher of the 
sciences, every man pursuing a way through a science . . . .”  These persons, he says, can 
move in various levels of thinking. I hear that as his affirmation of the possibility that all 
those who employ calculative thinking can embrace noncalculative thinking, and can 
move from within the why to outside the why, and back again. I daresay he would 
endorse the converse path of noncalculative to calculative back to noncalculative thinking 
as well. Indeed, isn’t this the practice of the effective and compassionate physician, who 
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moves seamlessly from encountering the patient as person needing care to applying the 
skills and techniques of medicine in diagnosis and treatment in an “objectified” manner, 
and back again to patient as person?
112
 
Analogously, can we envision persons doing theology and persons doing science 
addressing the issue of global climate change and its consequences
113—on the one hand, 
within the realm of reason-seeking and giving and its causal chains, and on the other 
hand, beyond it in the realm of wonder and enchantment of that which is, as it simply 
stands? And in so doing, what might the distinctive contribution of theology be, as 
contrasted with, say, poetry and art? I shall touch on this possibility in Chapter 4 by 
examining Heidegger’s treatment of the relation of art and poetry to technology. This can 
expressed as a guiding question: What can theology learn from Heidegger’s explication 
of the relation of art and poetry to technology? 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
What is truth? This chapter examines Heidegger’s deconstruction of this question 
as it stands, in light of thinking the question of truth out of thinking the question of 
Being. On the face of it, the question, What is truth?, seems to imply that truth is 
something “out there,” and that our task is to find it, represent or otherwise conceptualize 
it, and justify the results. Instead, recovering the pre-Socratic understanding of truth as 
disclosedness, Heidegger declares instead that “Dasein is already both in the truth and in 
                                                 
112. My father, Dr. C. E. Carlson, general practitioner in Minnesota for more than 40 years, was 
such a physician. 
 
113. See Section 5.4 below. 
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untruth” (BT, 223; also see Section 3.1). In Being and Time, this follows from positing 
Dasein as the clearing, or site, that makes it possible for entities to show themselves.  In 
Basic Questions of Philosophy, the truth/untruth duality is thought out of the 
disclosing/self-concealing essence (presencing) of Being itself, untethered from Dasein. 
 In these two works, Heidegger critiques the customary understanding of truth as 
the correctness of assertions—more precisely, the agreement, or correspondence, of an 
assertion about something with that thing itself. (Here, “thing” means any entity or being 
that is.) Moreover, he traces the trajectory from the pre-Socratic notion of truth as 
disclosedness to its transmutation over time to truth as correctness. In so doing, 
Heidegger explicates Plato’s “disastrous philosophical definition” of the essence of 
something as its whatness. (This illuminates a portion of the trajectory we are following 
in this inquiry of comportment to things.) 
Contemporary theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen works with a functional 
definition of truth that subordinates truth to rationality. Based upon his 
postfoundationalist model of rationality, theology is characterized in terms of seeking the 
best reasons available for one’s beliefs, values, and actions. On his view, this 
characterization of theology significantly strengthens the basis for genuine and fruitful 
interdisciplinary activity between theology and science. Heidegger’s extensive critique of 
Leibniz’ Principle of Reason brings to light that the disclosure of Being happens outside 
the orbit of reason-seeking and giving, beyond the reach of the why.   
The customary formulation of theology as reflection on religious experience and 
belief is illuminated by Heidegger’s distinction between two very different modes of 
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reflection: Reflexion and Besinnung. The former is based upon representational, 
conceptual thought—calculative thinking, for short; the latter, translated as mindfulness, 
is “nothing but an inquiry into the self-disclosure of being” and is “basically determined 
and shaped by the truth of being”  (Mindfulness, xxiii-xxiv). I contend that, despite van 
Huyssteen’s laudable extension of the notion of rationality beyond propositional 
language, construing the essence of theology in terms of reason-seeking and giving 
appears to confine theology as a reflective activity to Reflexion.  
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Chapter 4: Technology and the RST Relation 
 
 
 
Weeks before his death on May 26, 1976, Heidegger addressed the issue of the 
relationship between modern technology and modern science in the form of a question: 
Is modern natural science the foundation of modern technology—as is 
supposed—or is it, for its part, already the basic form of technological thinking, 
the determining foreconception and incessant incursion of technological 
representation into the realized and organized machinations of modern 
technology?
114
 
 
This question arises for Heidegger from the forgottenness of Being in “the age of a world 
civilization stamped by technology” (ibid.) In his view, taking up the question of the 
essences of modern natural science and modern technology and their interrelation could 
become a compelling way to engage the question of Being and thereby “prepare the 
possibility of a transformed abode of man in the world” (ibid., 4). 
This chapter will examine Heidegger’s analysis of the essences of modern 
technology and modern empirical science and their interrelation, together with his 
explication of the relationships of art and poetry to technology and to the holy and 
                                                 
114 Martin Heidegger, “Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und Moderne Technik” (“Modern Natural 
Science and Technology”),” in Research in Phenomenology 7 (1977): 3, http://0-gateway.proquest.com 
.bianca.penlib.du.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pao-us:&rft_dat=xri:pao:article:h148 
-1977-007-00-000001:1.These words are part of Heidegger’s written greetings to those attending the 10 th 
annual Heidegger Conference.  For more information about this colloquium and subsequent conferences, 
see www.heideggercircle.org. 
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divine.
115
 In the first two sections, I shall examine Heidegger’s twin claims that the 
common essence of modern technology and modern empirical science is beyond the 
control and mastery of humankind—and yet heralds the source for the “saving power” in 
the face of the extreme danger posed by this common essence. These claims are 
examined in relation to the nature of art and poetry in the first two sections, respectively 
(4.1 Art and the Essence of Modern Technology and 4.2 Poetry, Technology, and the 
Holy/Divine). The third section (4.3 The Thing, Science, and the Fourfold) explicates 
Heidegger’s contrasting analyses of scientific objectification and thingness as thought out 
of the fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals. In the fourth section (4.4 Modern 
Science, Technology, and Thinking), I shall engage the interrelation of the essences of 
modern science and modern technology with respect to Heidegger’s explication of 
thinking. This will entail examining the profound differences that Heidegger draws 
between calculative thinking—which characterizes modern science and technology—and 
reflective, meditative thinking. With regard to the RST relation, our primary guiding 
question throughout the chapter is: What can theology learn from Heidegger’s treatment 
of these themes in its own thinking and speaking of, and with, religion and science?  
 
                                                 
115. In Section 5.2, I shall highlight key elements of Ian Barbour’s analysis of ethics in relation to 
technology. 
  
124 
 
 
 
4.1 Art and the Essence of Modern Technology  
 
Heidegger’s essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,”116  is taken by some 
commentators to be the most important single expression of his thinking regarding the 
essence of technology.
117
 Most of the main themes of this essay are prefigured in the four 
lectures that Heidegger initially delivered in December 1949 (and subsequently revised) 
under the overall title of “Insight into That Which Is” (“Einblick in das was ist,” hereafter 
“Einblick”).118 Heidegger describes the QCT essay as “an expanded version” of the 
second Einblick lecture, “Das Gestell,” (QCT, x), which I find somewhat misleading.119  
These lectures also develop in detail Heidegger’s notion of the fourfold of earth and sky, 
mortals and divinities—a theme absent from the QCT essay but one that I shall take up in 
Section 4.3.  
                                                 
116. In Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays (QCT), 3-35 (see 
chap. 1, n. 51). The QCT essay (“The Question Concerning Technology”) was first published in 1954 and 
subsequently presented as a lecture in 1955 in the series “The Arts in the Technological Age” sponsored by 
the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts (QCT, x).  
  
117. See, for example, Richard Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), and Carl Mitcham, Thinking through Technology: 
The Path between Engineering and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 49-55, 257. 
 
118. The four Einblick lectures are: “Das Ding” (“The Thing”), “Das Gestell” (“The Enframing”), 
“Die Gefahr” (“The Danger”), and “Die Kehre” (“The Turning”). These four lectures, as subsequently 
revised, are presented together in German in the first half of GA79 and presented together for the first time 
in English translation in the first half of Martin Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into 
That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 2012). Partial information about earlier publications of these lectures in German and in 
English translation may be found in QCT, ix-x. 
 
119. On the one hand, “das Gestell” does provide Heidegger’s detailed explication of the essence 
of modern technology. On the other hand, several main themes in the QCT essay are not found in “Das 
Gestell” but are prefigured  in one of the other three Einblick lectures: for example, “causality” in “Das 
Ding,” “Hervorbringen” in “Die Gefahr,” and  Hölderlin’s couplet in “Die Kehre.” Thus I suggest that the 
QCT essay could be described more accurately as a stand-alone, creative re-weaving of key notions and 
themes from each of the earlier Einblick lectures, together with some new material that  identifies “art” as 
possibly confronting the essence of modern technology.  
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In the QCT essay, Heidegger thinks the essence of technology out of his critique 
of causality. In his view, causality—and technology—are modes of revealing. This is the 
basis for his claims that technology is “never a human handiwork,” nor something neutral 
or “merely technical,” but rather a force beyond humankind’s ability to control and 
master. He distinguishes modern technology from technology as understood by the 
ancient Greeks and argues that the essence of the former poses an extreme danger to 
humankind. Surprisingly, he also contends that a saving power is heralded by this very 
danger. Furthermore, he claims that, while humankind cannot control the essence of 
technology, we nonetheless participate in the revealing of this essence and thereby 
influence its impact upon our future. Finally, Heidegger defends the possibility that art 
may confront the extreme danger posed by the essence of modern technology. The 
purpose of this section is to unpack these claims.  
 Heidegger begins his analysis of the question of the essence of technology by 
critiquing the widespread understanding of technology as a means for achieving some 
end through human activity. Heidegger does not dismiss this instrumental, 
anthropological interpretation of technology out of hand; indeed, in his view, such an 
interpretation is correct, as far as it goes. On the one hand, the correct “always fixes upon 
something pertinent in whatever is under consideration” (QCT, 6). However, “the merely 
correct is not yet the true,” he says, because only the latter can “uncover the thing in 
question in its essence” (ibid.).120  
                                                 
120. Once again, Heidegger seeks to probe the essence of something by starting with its customary 
meaning. Cf. Section 3.2 above, in which I show that Heidegger approaches the question of truth by 
analyzing the widely-held understanding of truth as correspondence of statements with things. 
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 Heidegger locates the means-ends binary that characterizes the instrumental view 
of technology within causality. The traditional philosophical presentation of causality 
posits four causes—material, formal, efficient, and final—which together connote the 
bringing about of effects, or results. Thought phenomenologically, however, these four 
causes are “four ways of being responsible [that] bring something into presence” (9). 
“Causality” is therefore a revealing, or unconcealment, expressed in Greek as aletheia. 
Heidegger notes that its Latin translate is veritas—“truth” in English—which “we . . . 
usually understand as the correctness of an idea” (12). I shall show that Heidegger’s 
understanding of technology—in both its modern and ancient forms—depends in a 
central way upon his critique of the customary understanding of causality. 
To recap: the conventional, instrumental understanding of technology is a way of 
revealing or unconcealment, when thought phenomenologically. As for “revealing” itself, 
Heidegger posits two primary modes: revealing as a “bringing-forth” (Hervorbringen) 
that allows that which is before us to appear without coercion, and revealing as a 
“challenging forth” (Herausfordern) that demands or provokes such appearance.121 In his 
view, technology may manifest itself in either mode: modern technology as 
Herausfordern, and Hervorbringen (poiesis, in Greek) as the mode of the ancient Greek 
understanding of technology as techne. Techne encompasses “not only the activities and 
skills of the craftsman, but also . . . the arts of the mind and the fine arts” (13). Techne 
does not exhaust Hervorbringen as a mode of revealing, however, since the former 
requires human activity. Indeed, Heidegger regards physis as “poiēsis (Hervorbringen) in 
                                                 
121. Literally, Her-vor-bringen (hither-forth-bringing) (QCT, 10, n. 9) and Her-aus-fordern 
(hither-out-challenging) (QCT, 14, n. 13). 
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the highest sense,” since it is “the arising of something out of itself” and needs no human 
intermediary (10). (The blooming of a rose, and Nature itself—often, but misleadingly, 
according to Heidegger, equated with physis—are manifestations of physis.)  
The “challenging forth” mode of revealing (Herausfordern) does not in itself 
completely characterize modern technology, however. In order to enfold other aspects of 
modern technology within a unifying essence, Heidegger employs a constellation of 
verbs and their cognates, based upon the German infinitive, stellen. Stellen has several 
meanings, including “to put into place, to order, to arrange, to furnish or supply, and, in a 
military context, to challenge or engage.” Heidegger gathers together these various senses 
of stellen and its cognates under the rubric of Ge-stell (Enframing) in order to name the 
essence of modern technology.
122
  
Expressed compactly, Ge-stell names “that challenging claim which gathers man 
thither to order the self-revealing as standing reserve [Bestand]” (19).123 A few pages 
later, the essence of modern technology is characterized as “the way in which the real 
reveals itself as standing-reserve” (23). All that is stands ready for further employment at 
the beck and call of others: “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be 
immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further 
ordering” (17). Moreover, Enframing is not a framework or structure but rather, in 
                                                 
122. See Lovitt’s detailed explication of Ge-stell from stellen and its cognates (QCT, 15, n. 14).  
 
123. Other translators prefer to translate Bestand as “supply,” “stock,” or “reserve” (as in “coal 
reserves”). 
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Lovitt’s translation, “a calling forth, a demanding summons” (19, n. 17).124 Ge-stell is 
manifested in the ceaseless activity of producing, assembling, and ordering. In its 
essence, modern technology is not a noun but a verb of aggression.
125
 
What is the relationship of humankind to the essence of modern technology? 
Clearly, Heidegger does not see humankind as able to control this essence, for this 
essence is the revealing of being itself in our time. Is the essence of modern technology 
something completely independent of humankind? On the contrary.  He asks and 
answers: “Does this revealing happen somewhere beyond all human doing? No. But 
neither does it happen exclusively in man, or decisively through man” (24). How so? 
Humankind participates in this revealing through modern science, the character of which 
is epitomized by mathematical physics (21-23).
126
 Thus, Heidegger rules out human 
passivity. We are active participants via modern science in the essence of modern 
technology as the revealing of being itself in this era. But the question remains: Is our 
                                                 
124. Andrew Mitchell defends translating Ge-stell as positionality rather than Enframing: 
“Heidegger explicitly and painstakingly distinguishes what he means by positionality from any sense of 
‘enframing’ as the term has previously been translated. . . .Heidegger marks the difference himself when he 
explicitly distinguishes between positionality, das Ge-Stell, and framework, die Gestelle (GA79: 65/61). 
The spread of positionality is thus not a framework that surrounds from without, but, in part, a process of 
conscription (Gestellung) that adopts and compels whatever it encounters into the order of standing 
reserve” (Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, trans. Mitchell, xi). 
 
125. “Ge-stell” did not always have this sinister connotation in Heidegger’s work. In 1936, he 
presented three lectures, now available to us as a single essay, “On the Origin of the Work of Art" in Martin 
Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 1-56. (Hereafter Off the Beaten Track is cited as OBT.) In this essay, Heidegger 
employs “Ge-stell” simply as “placement” in order  to explicate the notion of figure: “What we here call 
‘figure’ is always to be thought out of that particular placing [stellen] and placement [Ge-stell] as which 
the work comes to presence when it sets itself up and sets itself forth” (OBT, 38). As Heidegger explains in 
the essay’s Appendix, the understanding of Ge-stell as placement is to be taken in the sense of “the 
gathering of the bringing forth” (OBT, 54)–i.e., in the spirit of Hervorbringen. He asserts, however, that the 
“derivation” of Ge-stell as the essence of modern technology “is the more essential one since it corresponds 
to the destiny of being” (ibid.).  
 
126. In Section 2.2 above, I briefly discussed Heidegger’s explication of mathematical physics in 
Being and Time. 
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participation in the essence of modern technology via modern science our destiny, our 
fate?  
From the characterization of the essence of modern technology as Ge-stell, 
Heidegger moves to establish three primary claims: first, Ge-stell is the supreme danger 
facing humankind in this era; second, yet Ge-stell heralds a saving power in the face of 
such extreme danger; and third, while humankind cannot control Ge-stell nor the saving 
power to which it points, we necessarily participate in its revealing and thereby 
participate in shaping our future. I now unpack these claims—and in the process reply—
to those who see Heidegger as a fatalist. 
Heidegger draws upon his earlier critique of the customary analysis of causality to 
examine the danger posed by Ge-stell. Earlier, he stated that “[t]echnology is a mode of 
revealing” (13) and contrasted ancient and modern technology in terms of their modes of 
revealing as Hervorbringen and Herausfordern, respectively. Now he characterizes the 
mode of revealing of modern technology more specifically: “The essence of [modern] 
technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger” (28, my emphasis). Let us unpack 
this claim in three steps to understand the following: “destining of revealing,” the danger 
inherent in such destining, and Ge-stell itself as the supreme danger.  
First, what does Heidegger mean by destining (Geschick)? Heidegger gives this 
name to the “sending-that-gathers [versammelde Schicken] which first starts man upon a 
way of revealing” (24).127 The destining-sending link is perhaps clear, but how is 
destining also a gathering, a starting, and a revealing? These general characteristics of 
                                                 
127. I shall examine Heidegger’s explication of Geschick in The Principle of Reason in Section 
5.4 below. 
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destining can be heard in Heidegger’s reformulation of the customary understanding of 
causality as a revealing:  
The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it 
come forth into presencing [An-wesen]. They set it free to that place and so start it 
on its way, namely, into complete arrival. The principal characteristic of being 
responsible is this starting something on its way to arrival. (QCT, 9; my emphasis) 
 
Heidegger reads destining into his earlier reinscribing of the four causes by 
pointing out that “[t]o start upon a way” ordinarily means “to send” (24). Thus, destining 
(Geschick), he says, is a “sending” (Schicken) that is a “starting.” The gathering aspect of 
destining resonates with Heidegger’s rethinking of “efficient cause” in the standard 
example of the silver chalice for differentiating among the four causes. Heidegger 
contends that the silversmith is not the efficient cause as the maker or producer of the 
chalice. Rather, the silversmith “considers carefully and gathers together the three 
aforementioned ways of being responsible and indebted” (8, my emphasis). Also, recall 
that Heidegger views causality as a unified co-responsibility within bringing-forth, which 
“brings hither out of concealment into unconcealment” (11). Thus, causality—and 
destining, by association—is embedded within “revealing.” 
Second, Heidegger contends that destining of revealing is itself danger as such. 
That is, “danger” is not merely one of the qualities or characteristics (among many) of 
destining, but is constitutive of the destining of revealing. Furthermore, it is danger as 
such for any mode of revealing and for any period: “In whatever way the destining of 
revealing may hold sway, the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at 
any given time harbors the danger that man may quail at the unconcealed and may 
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misinterpret it” (26, my emphasis). Thus, Heidegger’s analysis implies that 
Hervorbringen—as techne and, more generally, as poiesis—entails danger, as well as 
Herausfordern in the guise of Ge-stell. For example, when the unconcealed is everywhere 
embedded in a “cause-effect coherence,” theology faces the danger of reducing the 
mystery of God to the “causality of making” (ibid.). Similarly, when nature presents itself 
as a matrix of calculable matter and forces, “correct” results may obtain, he says, but “the 
true will withdraw” (ibid.). 
Thus, Heidegger’s critique of the customary understanding of causality paves the 
way for introducing the notion of “destining” and his claim of the danger inherent in the 
destining of revealing in all of its various modes, including—but not limited to—the 
essence of modern technology. Indeed, the central importance of destining in Heidegger’s 
thought extends well beyond his analysis of technology in its ancient and modern forms: 
“It is out of this destining that the essence of all history (Geschichte) is determined” 
(ibid., my emphasis).  
Third, in Heidegger’s view, the destining of revealing in our time as Ge-stell is 
the supreme danger in two senses. In the first instance, humankind itself is in danger of 
becoming mere standing-reserve (as discussed earlier). The very essence of what it means 
to be human is at stake. This danger is masked, Heidegger points out, by the delusion that 
the equipment, systems, and processes of modern technology can provide a path toward 
mastery of the earth. In the second, and more important, instance, Ge-stell not only 
conceals, but threatens to banish, all other modes of revealing. “When Enframing holds 
sway, regulating and securing of the standing reserve marks all revealing” (27). In sum, 
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the extreme danger posed by Ge-stell is its totalizing character as a mode of revealing and 
its threat to the essential nature of mankind:   
The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal 
machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affects man 
in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it 
could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to 
experience the call of a more primal truth. Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is 
danger in the highest sense. (QCT, 28) 
 
Is Heidegger, then, a fatalist in the face of the essence of modern technology as 
Enframing? As a mode of revealing, Heidegger understands Enframing as a sending-that-
gathers, a sending forth that starts humankind on a way, or path, of revealing. Is Ge-stell, 
then, as such a sending/starting, also a fatalistic, doom-laden determining? Some have 
thought so.
128
 In what follows, I shall argue otherwise by a close reading of Heidegger’s 
engagement with Hölderlin’s lines, 
But where danger is, grows 
The saving power also. 
 (QCT, 28) 
 
Heidegger hears in these words of Hölderlin that “. . . the coming to presence of 
technology harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving 
                                                 
128. See, for example, Andrew Feenberg’s threefold critique of Heidegger’s analysis of the 
essence of technology as ahistoricism, substantivism (equivalently, “fatalism”), and “one-dimensionalism” 
in Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (New York: Routledge, 1999) and Heidegger and Marcuse: 
The Catastrophe and Redemption of History (New York: Routledge, 2003). His critique is challenged by 
Iain Thomson in Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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power” (32).129 His defense of Hölderlin’s claim hinges upon examining the nature of 
“essence” itself.  
Heidegger begins by acknowledging that, up to this point in the lecture, he has 
used the term essence in its customary sense as the whatness of something. But limiting 
the meaning of essence to whatness with respect to modern technology runs the risk of 
mistakenly regarding Enframing as a genus within which Hervorbringnen and 
Herausfordern are regarded as two “species” of revealing. Enframing would then 
mistakenly be regarded as a means of classifying equipment, processes, and people. 
Interpreting essence merely as whatness entails imputing to the merely technological the 
essence of modern technology itself. From such a mistaken perspective, “the steam 
turbine, the radio transmitter, and the cyclotron . . . [and] the man at the switchboard and 
the engineer in the drafting room” (29) exemplify the challenging forth of all that is in 
terms of standing-reserve. Instead of such demonizing, Heidegger asserts that such 
equipment, processes, and people are within Enframing but are not themselves 
instantiations of the essence of modern technology. 
Probing more deeply into the nature of essence itself, Heidegger turns from its 
customary understanding as a noun (Wesen) to its original form as a verb (wesen). In 
verbal form, wesen, like währen, means “to last or endure” (30)—but not in a permanent 
sense, as Plato and Aristotle thought. With this deeper understanding of essence at hand, 
Heidegger re-engages Hölderlin’s couplet to probe for the saving power associated with 
the extreme danger of Enframing. As an essence (better yet, as an “essencing” [31]), 
                                                 
129. Here, Heidegger understands “to save” to mean “to fetch something home into its essence, in 
order to bring the essence for the first time into its appearing” (QCT, 28).  
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Enframing is an enduring. Heidegger now hears in währen (to endure) the associated 
words, wahren (to watch over, to keep safe, to preserve) and gewähren (to warrant, to 
vouchsafe, to grant) (31, n. 24).  
From these resonances, Heidegger explores whether, in some sense, Enframing 
itself might be a granting—despite its fundamental characterization as a challenging 
forth. He asks: What actually, and perhaps alone, endures? His twofold answer: “Only 
what is granted endures. That which endures primally out of the earliest beginning is 
what grants” (31). In a restricted sense, then, the enduring-granting relation is reciprocal. 
Heidegger subsequently removes the restriction and expands the scope of this claim:  
Every destining of revealing comes to pass from out of a granting and [comes to 
pass] as such a granting. . . .The granting that sends in one way or another into 
revealing is as such the saving power. (QCT, 32; my emphasis and insertion) 
 
Here, Heidegger is saying that, without exception, every destining of revealing 
comes to pass as a granting, and therefore is as such the saving power—despite the 
danger inherent in destining itself. That is, every destining of revealing—Enframing 
included (28)—not only harbors the saving power but, in a sense, is thereby itself the 
saving power.  
These remarkable claims illuminate a deep ambiguity within the essence of 
modern technology. On the one hand, Ge-stell blocks revealing in the sense of 
Hervorbringen, and its totalizing character threatens to conceal revealing itself. On the 
other hand, Ge-stell “first starts man upon a way of revealing” (24). Indeed, Heidegger 
says that “[t]he challenging revealing has its origin as a destining in bringing-forth 
[Hervorbringen]” (29-30). But destining is not consigning to a predetermined outcome. 
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As a destining of revealing, Ge-stell does entail the possibility of revealing as an 
“outcome,” so to speak. However, revealing itself cannot be domesticated. “Revealing is 
that destining which, ever suddenly and inexplicably to all thinking, apportions itself into 
the revealing that brings forth and that also challenges, and which allots itself to man” 
(29). 
Given this deep ambiguity within the essence of modern technology,
130
 Heidegger 
points to the essential role of humankind:  
On the one hand, Enframing challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering 
that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically 
endangers the relation to the essence of truth. On the other hand, Enframing 
comes to pass for its part in the granting that lets man endure—as yet 
unexperienced, but perhaps more experienced in the future—that he may be the 
one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of 
truth. Thus does the arising of the saving power appear. (QCT, 33) 
 
But how are we to act upon this appeal for safekeeping? Heidegger’s response: 
Everything, then, depends upon this: that we ponder this arising [of the saving 
power] and that, recollecting, we watch over it. How can this happen? Above all 
through our catching sight of what comes to presence in technology, instead of 
merely staring at the technological. (QCT, 32) 
 
In sum, Heidegger has argued for the possibility—and the urgency—of human 
responsiveness in fostering the saving power paradoxically heralded by the extreme 
danger of the essence of modern technology. On his view, however, “essential reflection” 
upon technology is insufficient; “decisive confrontation” is needed as well (35). 
Heidegger looks to art—as expressed in “all the fine arts, in poetry, and in everything 
                                                 
130. I shall discuss Ian Barbour’s characterization of technology as the “ambiguous exercise of 
power” in Section 5.2 below. 
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poetical”—for the possibility of such a confrontation. “On the one hand,” he says, such 
art is “akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from 
it” (ibid.). Yet such a possibility can only be realized if “reflection on art . . . does not 
shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are questioning” (ibid.).131 In the 
next section, I shall examine Heidegger’s engagement of art, as poetry, with technology. 
 
4.2 Poetry, Technology, and the Holy/Divine 
 Several years before composing the QCT essay, Heidegger engaged the question 
of the essence of technology through the lens of poetry rather than art in general. 
Heidegger’s essay, “Why Poets?,”132 is based upon a lecture that he delivered in 1946 to 
commemorate the 20
th
 anniversary of the death of the German poet, Rainer Maria Rilke. 
In both essays, Heidegger engages the question of the essence of technology in relation to 
Hölderlin’s couplet, 
   But where the danger lies, there also grows 
   that which saves.
133
 
 
Unlike the appeal to art in the QCT lecture as a means for fostering the presencing of the 
saving power, Heidegger lifts up poetry in “Why Poets?” as a pathway to the holy and 
divine in relation to the saving power. As he does in the QCT lecture, Heidegger in this 
essay regards poetry and art as closely related, if not synonymous. ` 
                                                 
131. Heidegger explicates the relation of art and truth in a much earlier essay, “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” in OBT, 1-56. 
 
132. Martin Heidegger, “Why Poets?,” in OBT, 200-241. 
 
133. Note the slight differences between Young and Haynes’ translation here (OBT, 222) and 
Lovitt’s translation (QCT, 28), which is included in Section 4.1 above 
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In this essay, Heidegger takes a free relation to Rilke’s poetry in the service of 
Heidegger’s own compelling project, the question of Being—here thought in relation to 
the question concerning technology. Heidegger does so by thinking with, as well as 
against, Rilke, through a close engagement with several of Rilke’s poems. For Heidegger, 
the guiding question in “Why Poets?”—in addition to the title itself—is his adaptation of 
a poetic line by Hölderlin: Is Rainer Maria Rilke a poet in a desolate time? (202, 204). 
Our guiding questions are rather different: What can we learn from this essay concerning 
the essence of technology as the danger and the possibility of nurturing the saving power 
therein? More broadly, how might the interplay between poetry and technology in this 
essay illuminate possibilities for genuine, meaningful interaction among religion, 
technology, and theology? 
In “Why Poets?,” Heidegger thinks the danger of the essence of technology as the 
danger in terms of the absoluteness of the will to will, rather than from the interpretation 
of causality presented in the QCT essay. Nonetheless, many statements in “Why Poets?” 
that name this danger clearly anticipate those found in the later essay. For example:  
What has long threatened man with death, indeed with the death of his essence, is 
the absoluteness of his sheer willing in the sense of his deliberate self-assertion in 
everything. . . . What threatens man in his essence is the opinion that 
technological production would bring the world into order, when it is exactly this 
ordering that flattens out each ordo, that is, each rank, into the uniformity of 
production and so destroys in advance the realm that is the perennial source from 
which rank and appreciation originate out of being. (OBT, 221) 
 
Heidegger quotes from several of Rilke’s poems in this essay, but he devotes by 
far most of his attention to the following untitled “poem” (published posthumously), in 
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order to engage Hölderlin’s couplet directly and thereby offer his own reflection on the 
vital role of poetry in relation to technology.   
As nature gives the creatures over 
to the risk of dull desire and shelters 
none in particular, in soil or bough, 
so we too are not more dear to the utmost depth 
 
of our being; it risks us. Only that we, 
still more than plant or animal, 
go with the risk, will it, sometimes even risk more (and not from 
self-interest), than life itself does, by a breath 
 
risk more . . . This fashions us, outside of all defense, 
a safebeing, there where the gravity 
of the pure forces takes effect; what saves us at last 
is our defenselessness and that seeing it threaten 
we turned it into the open 
 
in order, somewhere, in the widest compass, 
where law touches us, to say yes to it. 
(OBT, 206-7; original italics, my underlining)  
 
In the remainder of this section, I want to focus upon three things: Heidegger’s 
reading of Rilke’s employment of “risk” in relation to the essence of technology as the 
danger; Heidegger’s reading of lines 12-16 (underlined above) in relation to Hölderlin’s 
claim regarding the “saving power”; and Heidegger’s characterization of poetry itself as a 
path to the holy and divine. 
In lines 1-5, Rilke tells us that Nature gives all living beings, including human 
beings, over to risk and shelters “none in particular.” Heidegger says more: “The being of 
beings [i.e., Nature itself, in Rilke’s terminology] is the risk” (209; my italics). Heidegger 
understands the “giving over to risk” as a “double movement” of a casting off by 
being/risk and a casting into being/risk.  Such danger-laden riskiness characterizes the 
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very existence of all creatures, he says: “Beings are so long as they remain what is 
continually being risked” (ibid.; my emphasis).  
What is cast off by the being of beings (as the risk) is cast into the being of beings 
(as the risk); so, despite the riskiness involved all round, beings are evidently “retained,” 
in some sense. Heidegger puts it thus: “Although the unsheltered are risked, they are 
nevertheless not abandoned” (210). Heidegger illustrates this claim by means of a scale 
balance used to weigh items in the marketplace and by a reflection upon the notion of 
“gravity,” which is contained in line 10. Based upon the etymological similarities among 
the words in German for “to risk” (wagen), “balance” (Wage), “to weigh” (wiegen), and 
other cognates Heidegger contends that, although the object on the balance is in “danger” 
(in the sense of the uncertain outcome of the weighing), the object is nevertheless 
sustained by the balance itself. “Thereby what is risked [by being placed on the balance] 
is indeed unsheltered, but since it lies on the balance, it is retained by the balance” (ibid.).  
He subsequently engages Rilke’s poem, “Gravity,” to characterize gravity as “the 
center of beings in their entirety” (211). Gravity engages that which is cast off or let loose 
by the risk by means of a tugging, a “pull or traction (Zug), toward the center” (ibid.). 
Figuratively speaking, the “centrifugal force” acting on what is cast off is counter-
balanced by the “centripetal force” that attracts it to the center. Consequently, Heidegger 
establishes several equivalent expressions: “The gravity of the pure forces, the unheard 
center, the pure Bezug (attraction), the whole Bezug, full Nature, life, the risk are all the 
same,” and what they all name is “beings as such in their entirety” (212). By Heidegger’s 
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lights, risk entails the retaining, and sustaining, by the being of beings (as risk itself) of 
that which is risked.  
In Heidegger’s reading of Rilke, the two differ diametrically in their view of “the 
open.” As Heidegger sees it, Rilke characterizes the open in terms of the absence of 
barriers (ibid.), whereas Heidegger thinks of “openness in the sense of the unhiddenness 
of beings, an unhiddenness that lets beings as such come to presence” (213). 
Furthermore, on Heidegger’s view, Rilke’s characterization of the open in terms of the 
absence of all barriers implies that humankind is excluded from the open, as “encounter” 
is inevitable with the presence of humankind but impossible without the arising of 
barriers. Thus, plants and animals are in the world, but humankind is before the world—
and hence not in the world. But for Heidegger, humankind (as Dasein) is definitely in the 
world—indeed, as being-in-the world.  For Heidegger, this exclusion of humankind from 
the open is another indication of Rilke’s metaphysical thinking (214).  
From this explication of “the open,” Heidegger re-examines the relationship 
between humankind and risk as expressed by Rilke in lines 5-10. These lines tell us that 
we, unlike animal and plants, “go with this risk, will it, sometimes risk even more . . . 
than life itself does”—and do “by a breath.” Heidegger ties his exegesis of these lines 
primarily to his articulation of the essence of technology.
134
 For Heidegger, to go with the 
risk does not imply going along with the risk, in the sense of doing so out of free choice. 
Rather, it means that the risk “for man . . . is specifically represented . . . as something set 
before him” (215). Yet humankind is not passive in this process. As that risk,  
                                                 
134. In this essay, Heidegger does not name the essence of modern technology as Ge-stell. 
However, he does refer to its cognate, das Gestellte, as “that which is set up” (OBT, 215). 
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Nature is brought before man by human re-presentation [Vor-stellen]. Man sets 
upon the world as the entirety of objectiveness before himself and himself before 
the world. Man delivers [stellt zu] the world unto himself and produces [stellt her] 
Nature for himself. (OBT, 215; bracketed material in original) 
 
 We can hear in these words Heidegger’s earlier critique of science as the epitome 
of representational, objectifying thinking. Rilke tells us that humankind wills this risk 
(aka Nature).
135
 Heidegger tells us that this will “is the self-assertion whose intention has 
already posited the world as the entirety of objects that can be produced” (216). 
Humankind is in a closed loop: to “know” nature, humankind objectifies it and “re-
presents” it to itself as nature.  
Yet, Rilke tells us, we “sometimes risk even more . . . than life itself does.”  Who 
are these people that risk in such a way? Rilke offers no specific response, nor does 
Heidegger . . . yet. Nonetheless, Heidegger asserts that something can be said about the 
character of these persons. If the essence of the being of beings is the will (thinking with 
Rilke), they must be persons who will even more, but in a different sense. They “. . . stay 
more in keeping with will as the being of beings. They accord rather with being that 
shows itself as will” (223).  
Next, Heidegger turns to Rilke’s remarkable claims that, first, this “risking more” 
“fashions outside of all defense, a safebeing”; and second, that “what saves us at last is 
our defenselessness . . .” (lines 12-13). Here, Rilke invites us to consider how safebeing 
can be realized, outside of all defense. But how is it that we are defenseless, and in what 
sense does defenselessness “save” us? For Heidegger, we are blind—and therefore 
                                                 
135. Heidegger contends that Rilke’s representation of Nature as risk binds him to thinking Nature 
“metaphysically in terms of the essence of the will” (OBT, 209). 
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defenseless—before the threat to our essence as human beings from the essence of 
technology, in that we mistakenly regard technology as something neutral, something 
merely cultural, and something within humanity’s power to control and master. Our blind 
defenselessness, he says, is centered in the growing hegemony of technological thinking: 
“So long as man is set fast in deliberate self-assertion and establishes himself by the 
absolute objectification in departure against the open, he himself promotes his own 
defenselessness” (223).  
In what way, and in what sense, then, does our defenselessness before the essence 
of technology save us? For Rilke, “. . . seeing it [defenselessness] threaten we turned it 
into the open in order, somewhere, . . . , to say yes to it” (lines 13-16). Heidegger 
expresses this turning into the open as a reversal: “. . . defenselessness in reverse is that 
which saves us” (224). The reversal spoken of here is the step of turning around from our 
customary human tendency to flee danger in whatever form in order to seek security by 
looking for and constructing a defense. In this sense, Heidegger says, defenselessness—
as occasioned by the essence of modern technology (Ge-stell)—“sends us a safebeing” 
(225).
136
 I suggest that these claims are consonant with Heidegger’s later claim in the 
QCT essay that Ge-stell not only harbors the “saving power” but, in a sense, is the saving 
power.
137
 
                                                 
136. Heidegger articulated this claim earlier in his explication of risk in relation to the scale 
balance: “Only so long as what is risked rests safely in the risk, can it follow the risk, follow it, that is, into 
the unshelteredness of what is risked. What is risked is unsheltered; but not only does this not exclude a 
safebeing in its ground, it necessarily implies it.” (OBT, 210; my emphasis)  
 
137. Cf. “It is precisely in Enframing, . . . in this extreme danger that the innermost indestructible 
belongingness of man within granting may come to light, , , ,” (QCT, 32). 
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But who are those people who can point the way to such a reversal—to the 
seemingly impossible possibility of saying “yes” to our defenselessness in the face of the 
essence of technology as the absolute will to will?   
Heidegger begins this essay by describing the “desolate time” to which 
humankind—and poetry itself—are called to respond. He characterizes the current age as 
“the world’s night,” and “determined by God’s keeping himself afar, by ‘God’s default’” 
(200).
138
 There is a loss of enchantment, of wonder, in our time. “Not only have the gods 
and God fled, but the radiance of divinity is extinguished in world-history” (ibid.). By 
“desolation,” Heidegger means that “the essential realm in which pain and death and love 
belong together is withdrawn” (205). Heidegger understands this desolation, this default 
of God, as a total loss of ground, an abyss. He describes the fundamental human 
imperative in our time in terms of responding to this condition: 
Assuming that a turning point in any way still awaits this desolate time, it can 
only come one day if the world turns radically around, which now plainly means 
if it turns away from the abyss. In the age of the world’s night, the abyss of the 
world must be experienced and must be endured. However, for this it is necessary 
that there are those who reach into the abyss.  (OBT, 200-201) 
 
“Why Poets?” poses two fundamental questions: First, are poets in general—and 
specifically, Rilke himself—capable of “reaching into the abyss”? Second, are poets 
especially, or even uniquely, qualified to reach into the abyss of the world’s dark night? 
(Why poets and not, for example, scientists or theologians?) Heidegger provides an 
important marker: “To be a poet in a desolate time means: singing, to attend to the track 
                                                 
138. On Heidegger’s view, this default of God does not affect the possibility of authentic Christian 
faith and life. “However, the default of God . . . does not contradict the fact that a Christian relationship to 
God continues among individuals and in the churches, and it certainly does not disparage this relationship 
to God” (OBT, 200; my emphasis). 
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of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet, at the time of the world’s night, utters the 
sacred” (202). Heidegger returns to his understanding of poetry as “song” in the last few 
pages of the essay by way of reflecting upon the “breath” that enables those who risk to 
“even risk more” (lines 7-9).  
In these lines, Rilke tells us that those who risk more than life do so by a breath. 
Customarily, we would read this as risking such by only a little bit more, e.g., “by a hair” 
more. Rather, Heidegger invites us to link “breath” directly with “language.” He writes:  
The breath by which those who risk more risk more does not only or primarily 
mean the hardly noticeable (because fleeting) measure of a difference; rather, it 
signifies directly the word and the essence of language. The ones who by a breath 
risk more risk it with language. (OBT, 238)  
 
The riskiness of reversing defenselessness by turning into the open can only take place, if 
at all, within the realm of language. 
But not just any sort of talk or speech will do. To be language for a desolate time, 
it must be language uttered without self-interest (line 7), without objectification, without 
seeking to produce anything. It must be language that faces the world’s dark night 
unflinchingly, language which nevertheless moves us from ever-present unwholeness 
toward wholeness. Such language is song, he says, because it says more.
139
 Who utters 
such language? Heidegger writes: “The ones who risk more are the poets, but poets 
whose song turns our defenselessness into the open” (239). Such poetry can be a pathway 
to the divine and holy: 
                                                 
139. Heidegger notes that Rilke writes in his “Sonnets to Orpheus,” “Song is existence” (OBT, 
237). Heidegger cites this same three-word claim by Rilke in the closing section of his “letter” to the 
participants of the Second Consultation on Hermeneutics at Drew University in April 1964. (See 
Pathmarks, 62, and Section 2.4 above.) 
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Only in the widest compass of the whole [line 15], is the holy able to appear. 
Because they experience unwholeness as such, poets of the kind who risk more 
are underway on the track of the holy. Their song sanctifies over the land. Their 
song celebrates the unbrokenness of the globe of being. The unwhole, as the 
unwhole, traces for us what is whole. What is whole beckons and calls us to the 
holy. The holy binds the divine. The divine brings God closer. (OBT, 240) 
 
I close this section by suggesting that Heidegger’s explication of Rilke’s poetry—
and poetry in general—illuminates common ground for poets and theologians.   
First, Heidegger explicates “safebeing” in part by reflecting upon “security” as 
“without care” (sine cura)—that is, without resorting to “deliberate self-assertion” 
through technological thinking, production, and utilization (223). He and Rilke both think 
against the customary meaning of “security” as that (unattainable) state in which the risks 
of disease, death, and other misfortunes are successfully held at bay. Surely this resonates 
with the generally widespread impulse in religion to challenge egoic-centeredness (as 
well as, for example, tribal- and nationalistic-centeredness). Can theologians join poets in 
inviting reflection upon what truly constitutes “security,” and what “turning into the 
open” where it lies (if it is not in a crucial sense identical to such “turning”), might look 
like?  
Second, Heidegger insists that poets illuminate the wholeness (i.e., “the 
unbrokenness of the globe of being”) within the unwholeness that co-constitutes 
existence itself. Otherwise said, poets see the enchantment of the earth as it is now, in the 
midst of its unwholeness. Heidegger expresses this stance in the midst of desolation in 
terms of song—song as existence. I hear in “song” the human—and theological—notion 
of hope. Heidegger declares: “This era is neither decay nor decline. As destiny it lies in 
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being and lays claim to man” (240). Can theologians join poets in giving expression to 
the wholeness within unwholeness in ways that can be heard today?
140
   
 
4.3 The Thing, Science, and the Fourfold 
 In this section I shall engage Heidegger’s thinking of “the thing” in relation to 
science and to the holy/divine as expressed by the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and 
divinities. To do so, I draw primarily upon the first of his four Einblick lectures, “The 
Thing” (“Das Ding”).141 This section is an attempt to think the RST relation in terms of 
science and the holy/divine, “mediated,” in a sense, by their mutual connectivity with 
what Heidegger calls thingness (das Dinghafte)--that is, that which makes something a 
thing rather than an object. 
 “The Thing” is curious in a number of aspects. This work contains no overt 
mention of “technology”—much less any discussion of its essence and the danger and 
saving power to be found therein. Nor does this initial lecture explicate the primal notion 
of “revealing”—much less Heidegger’s basic distinction between the revealing modes of 
“bringing-forth” (Hervorbringen) and “challenging-forth” (Herausfordern), as in the QCT 
essay.
142
 That is to say, Heidegger does not lay out a thesis or provide a plan of analysis 
in this first lecture. Instead, the notions of nearness and distance, causality and thing, 
                                                 
140. See, for example, John Chryssavgis, Beyond the Shattered Image (Minneapolis: Light & Life 
Publishing, 1999), and contrast the immediacy of enchantment that he expresses with Thomas Berry, The 
Great Work: Our Way into the Future (New York: Bell Tower, 1999), in which re-enchantment of the earth 
is projected into the future.  
 
141. Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in PLT, 161-84. 
 
142. “Herausfordern” is first introduced in “Das Gestell” and then contrasted with 
“Hervorbringen” in “Die Gefahr.”  
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world and worlding, and the fourfold and thinking evidently provide the appropriate 
context, in Heidegger’s view, for engaging the question of technology fruitfully. 
 Heidegger provided a brief introduction (Hinweise) for the original Einblick 
lecture series in which he reflects upon the notion of nearness in relation to distance.
143
 
Heidegger gives no definition for “nearness” in these opening paragraphs, but asserts that 
it has nothing to do with “distance” in the sense of quantification: “Short distance is not 
in itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness” (PLT, 163). In order to reach this 
elusive nearness, in the essay on “the thing” Heidegger interrogates the notion of jug as 
something “near to us” and asks, “What makes the jug a thing?”  
 Once again, Heidegger approaches the central theme before him by rethinking the 
customary explication of causality. As I discussed in Section 4.1 above, his critique of 
causality in the QCT essay led to a thinking of causality as a unified “co-responsibility” 
of bringing forth (QCT, 9-11). In “The Thing,” however, his analysis of causality—and 
of thingliness itself—hinges upon the crucial distinction between thing and object. Here, 
Heidegger characterizes “object” in the sense of Gegenstand: i.e., that which lies before 
us, opposite us, or stands over against us.  
He engages the question, What makes the jug a thing?, by critiquing the 
application to this question of the customary framework of the four senses of causality: 
                                                 
143. The Hinweise (GA79, 3-4) consists of seven paragraphs that precede the four Einblick 
lectures; “Das Ding” is found in pp. 5-23. However, in Hofstadter’s translation of the stand-alone, 
expanded 1950 version of “Das Ding” (GA7, 167-87), these paragraphs (now eight in number) have been 
incorporated into “The Thing” (PLT, 163-64). Heidegger subsequently engages “nearness” in each of the 
individual Einblick lectures, as well as in the QCT essay itself.  
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i.e., material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, final cause.
144
 In Heidegger’s view, 
each of the four senses of causality, when understood conventionally, fails to illuminate 
the thingliness of the jug. 
 Heidegger begins his analysis by positing a working characterization of the jug as 
a “vessel . . . that holds something else within it” (PLT, 164). Then he applies the four 
senses of causality to the example of the jug, using conventional language such as the 
following: “The jug’s holding is done by its base and sides” (ibid.) (formal cause); “The 
jug consists of that earth . . .” (165) (material cause); “Self-support is what the making 
aims at” (ibid.) (final cause); and “its being made by the potter . . .” (166) (efficient 
cause). He does not say that such statements are incorrect, but rather that they obscure the 
nature, or essence, of the jug as a jug. The statements pointing to formal and material 
causes of the jug miss the mark because Heidegger argues that it is the void that holds 
(167). The statements indicating final and efficient causes are misleading, he says, 
because they are based upon the implicit assumption that the jug as something made 
constitutes its essence: “The jug is not a vessel because it was made; rather, the jug had to 
be made because it is this holding vessel” (166).145 He concludes that the traditional 
understanding of causality cannot “reach” the nature, or essence, of the thing as thing. 
 Scientific attempts completely miss the thingly character of the jug, according to 
Heidegger. Scientifically speaking, the jug is filled with air; filling the jug with wine 
                                                 
144. However, these different senses of causality are never explicitly named as such in “The 
Thing.” 
 
145. Heidegger has critiqued the notion that the “madeness” of something constitutes its essence 
in a number of earlier works. See, for example, his critique of the dominant interpretation of the “thingness 
of the thing” in terms of Aristotle’s matter-form binary in “The Origin of the Work of Art” (OBT, 8-12). 
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simply displaces the air by a liquid. To a scientist, talk of the jug’s “void” is merely 
“semipoetic,” Heidegger says (167). He does not deny the correctness of these scientific 
statements, and he acknowledges that, by such statements, “science represents something 
real . . .” (168). Heidegger’s objection, however, is this: “Science always encounters only 
what its kind of representation has admitted beforehand as an object possible for science” 
(ibid.). In so doing, he says, scientific knowledge “annihilates” things as things in the 
following sense:  “ . . . not only are things no longer admitted as things, but they have 
never yet at all been able to appear to thinking as things” (ibid.; my emphasis).146 In the 
language of “nearness,” viewing the jug though the lens of science prevents it from 
coming near to us. The reality of the jug remains distant, opaque. 
Yet, for Heidegger, the difference between thing and object apparently is not an 
absolute difference, nor is representation a determining criterion for distinguishing 
between them. It is possible, he says, for a thing to become an object without losing its 
thingliness “if we place it before us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it to 
mind in a recollective re-presentation” (165). As he says shortly thereafter, “The jug 
remains a vessel [i.e., a thing] whether we represent it in our minds or not” (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, we cannot derive the thingness of the jug from its independent standing 
forth nor from such representation or objectification. 
To sum up, the thingliness of the jug is not necessarily lost when it appears to us 
as object in its independence as standing-forth in immediate perception or represented 
                                                 
146. Heidegger locates the origin of this annihilating characteristic of science in Plato’s 
conception of the “presence of what is present in terms of the outward appearance” (PLT, 166). Cf., for 
example, Heidegger’s critique of Plato’s fateful conceptualization of the essence of that which is in terms 
of its “whatness,” taken to be its look, or aspect, that is, its idea or eidos (BQP, 56); also discussed above in 
Section 3.2). 
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recollectively in our minds. Rather, the thingliness of the jug disappears when science 
enframes the standing forth of the jug in a manner predetermined by its conceptual 
assumptions. It is not our encounter per se with the thing as object that annihilates the 
thing, but rather the objectification of the thing as mere object, via the prevailing 
paradigm of the specific science employed at the moment.  
Speaking affirmatively, Heidegger declares: “The jug’s thingness resides in its 
being qua vessel” (167). Heidegger proceeds to articulate a “fourfold” understanding of 
the jug in a manner very different from the customary “fourfold” senses of causality. As a 
vessel, the void of the jug takes in what is poured in and retains it, thence to give it as a 
gift in the outpouring. “The jug’s jug-character consists in the poured gift of the pouring 
out” (170). As water or wine, the gift in the outpouring may slake thirst or be part of an 
act of consecration. In the outpoured water or wine for mortals, whether from rock-spring 
or sun-drenched vineyard, “sky and earth dwell” (ibid.). If outpoured for consecration, 
the water or wine “is the libation for the immortal gods” (ibid.). Thus, the fourfold of 
earth and sky, mortals and divinities—each in its own way, yet enfolded together—
dwells in the “gift of the outpouring” (171). The jug, as thing rather than scientifically 
grasped object, brings together the four elements of the fourfold in nearness to one 
another. 
Moreover, the jug gathers the fourfold together in a way that stays [weilt] the 
fourfold—not as a mere persistence but a staying that “brings the four into the light of 
their mutual belonging” (ibid.). This light of mutual belonging is a mirroring that “sets 
each of the four free into its own, but it binds these free ones into the simplicity of their 
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essential being toward one another” (177). This “binding” in freedom is in the sense of 
mutual betrothing, entrusting  (171). This is how things bring the elements of the fourfold 
together in nearness.
147
  Heidegger calls this mirror-play “the world,” which presences as 
“worlding”—a primal term for Heidegger, unexplainable by other notions: “As soon a 
human cognition here calls for an explanation [of the world’s worlding], it fails to 
transcend the world’s nature, and falls short of it” (177).  
 In what way and when do things as things come about? And what is the human-
thing connection? By Heidegger’s lights, just as human beings cannot command the 
saving power within the essence of modern technology to appear, neither can they make 
things appear. Yet just as vigilance is required by mortals for the saving power to appear 
in the face of the extreme danger of Ge-stell, vigilance is required for things to appear 
(179). Such vigilance requires “stepping back” from representational, explanatory 
thinking to “a thinking that responds and recalls” (ibid.). Such vigilance is all of a piece 
with dwelling in the world as world (180)—a theme I shall engage in Section 5.1 below.  
On Heidegger’s view, do holy and divine allude merely—or even primarily—to 
anti-Christian, even pagan, manifestations of the religious impulse? Some have thought 
so.
148
 Less than two weeks following his delivery of an expanded version of “The Thing” 
on June 6, 1950, Heidegger wrote a letter to a young student—presumably someone who 
attended his lecture. (The letter is appended to the lecture as an “Epilogue.”) Heidegger 
formulates the student’s inquiry as follows: “[W]hence does thinking about Being receive 
                                                 
147. For another example, see Heidegger’s analysis of George Trakl’s poem, “A Winter Evening,” 
in Martin Heidegger, “Language,” in PLT, 192-208.   
 
148. See, for example, Hans Jonas, “Heidegger and Theology,” in Drew University, Consultation 
on Hermeneutics, 2nd (see chap. 2, n. 87). 
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(to speak concisely) its directive?” (181). Heidegger’s reply illuminates connections 
among thinking, responding, and erring, as well as the scope of the “divine” in his 
thinking. In view of this second theme in his letter, recall that Heidegger begins “Why 
Poets?” with references to the “default of God” and the flight of God and the gods (OBT, 
200; cited above in Section 4.2). Heidegger indicates in this letter that, for him, the 
“divine” extends beyond Athens to Jerusalem. Resonances may also be heard with the 
classical Christian doctrine of Deus absconditus, in which absence does not imply 
abandonment.  
The default of God and the divinities is absence. But absence is not nothing; 
rather, it is precisely the presence, which must first be fully appropriated, of the 
hidden fullness and wealth of what has been and what, thus gathered, is 
presencing of the divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in the 
preaching of Jesus. (PLT, 182) 
 
In closing this section, I want to raise a few questions for further thought 
prompted by “The Thing” that bear on thinking the RST relation. First, in some 
significant sense, can religion, science, and theology be said to be near each other—
despite their obvious differences? (I shall engage this question in Section 5.1 below and 
in the Epilogue.) 
  Second, is the “border” between object and thing open, closed, or 
“semipermeable,” figuratively speaking? On the one hand, 
An independent, self-supporting thing [such as a jug] may become an object if we 
place it before us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it to mind in a 
recollective representation. . . . [Nevertheless] the jug remains a vessel whether 
we represent it in our minds or not.  (PLT, 164-65) 
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On the other hand, however, Heidegger writes: “A mere shift of attitude is powerless to 
bring about the advent of the thing as thing, just as nothing that stands today as an object 
in the distanceless can ever be switched over into a thing” (PLT, 179).  
And third, in “Why Poets?,” Heidegger includes and reflects upon a letter of 
Rilke’s in which Rilke laments the loss of the “thingness” of things. He contrasts the 
“empty indifferent things, sham things” coming from America, produced by modern 
technology, with the things of his grandparents (house, spring, clothes)—each “a vessel 
in which they found the human, and preserved and added the human to it” (OBT, 218). 
Does the practice of religious rites, and the use of things therein, nurture the “thingness of 
things” whose loss Rilke laments? More generally, in hierophany, in which “profane” 
objects (Gegenstände) become signifiers of the “sacred,” do objects become things? 
 
4.4 Modern Science, Technology, and Thinking 
Let us return to Heidegger’s recurring question weeks before his death regarding 
the science-technology relation, quoted in full in the first paragraph of this chapter: “Is 
modern natural science the foundation of modern technology . . .  or is it . . . already the 
basic form of technological thinking . . . ?” On the face of it, Heidegger’s view seems 
clear enough in the QCT essay: “Because the essence of modern technology lies in 
Enframing, modern technology must employ exact physical science. Through its so 
doing, the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science” 
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(QCT, 23). A tilt toward the primacy of technology over the sciences also seems apparent 
in the following lines by Heidegger from What Is Called Thinking?
149
 a few years earlier:  
However, their essence [i.e., the essence of the sciences] is frankly of a different 
sort from what our universities today still fondly imagine it to be. In any case, we 
still seem afraid of facing the exciting fact that today’s sciences belong in the 
realm of the essence of modern technology, and nowhere else. . . . A fog still 
surrounds the essence of modern science . . . It arises from the region of what is 
most thought-provoking—that we are still not thinking; . . . .  (WCT, 14)  
 
On Heidegger’s view, then, engaging the question of the essence of thinking may 
disclose the essence of modern science and, possibly, its relation to the essence of 
modern technology. (One might also ask whether it is meaningful to speak of “the 
essence of modern science and modern technology.”) The purpose of this section is to 
unfold Heidegger’s analysis of the nature of thinking in view of our questions concerning 
these essences and their interrelation and to suggest some insights for thinking the RST 
relation. 
We begin with Heidegger’s startling claim, “Science does not think” (WCT, 8). 
Heidegger does not intend to disparage science, for he immediately follows this assertion 
with another: “. . . nonetheless science always and in its own fashion has to do with 
thinking” (ibid.). Moreover: “When we speak of the sciences as we pursue our way, we 
shall be speaking not against but for them, for clarity concerning their essential nature. 
This alone implies our conviction that the sciences are in themselves positively essential” 
(14). Nonetheless, on Heidegger’s view, there is an “unbridgeable gulf” between thinking 
and the sciences; only a “leap” can link them (8). These statements support our attempt to 
                                                 
149. This work is a compendium of 21 lectures on thinking that Heidegger delivered in 1951-52 
before his retirement from the University of Freiburg (WCT, v). 
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engage the question of the essence of modern science by examining Heidegger’s 
explication of the essence of thinking.  
How is it, then, that science fails to think? Heidegger characterizes “science” as 
one-sided, despite the unarguable fact that each science typically engages the entities in 
its domain of analysis from several perspectives. In his view, the one-sidedness of 
science stems from its inherent inability to examine its own essence. “The essence of 
their sphere —history, art, poetry, language, nature, man, God—remains inaccessible to 
the sciences. . . . The essence of the spheres I have named is the concern of thinking” 
(33). 
Heidegger does not consider the inability of science to examine its own essence to 
be any sort of defect, however. “The sciences are fully entitled to their name, which 
means fields of knowledge, because they have infinitely more knowledge than thinking 
does” (ibid.). But what is at issue for him is ignoring the “other side” of science—
namely, its essence. For Heidegger, the “covering up” of the gap between the two sides 
leads to a “leveling” of views: “Everything is leveled to one level. Our minds hold views 
on all and everything, and views all things in the identical way” (ibid.). 
As for modern technology, Heidegger contends that its essence is manifested in 
what he calls “one-track thinking.” As Heidegger tells us, the word “track” is chosen 
intentionally to evoke “rails” and “technology” (26). Tracks and rails connote a sense of 
single-mindedness at the core of technology that brooks no ambiguity: 
This one-track thinking, which is becoming even more widespread in various 
shapes, is one of those unsuspected and inconspicuous forms, mentioned earlier, 
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in which the essence of technology assumes dominion—because that essence 
wills and therefore needs absolute univocity.
150
 (WCT, 26) 
 
 Heidegger links “one-track thinking” and “one-sided view” in a way that, I 
suggest, begins to illuminate the relation between the essences of modern science and 
modern technology: 
For it is only on the plane of the one-sided uniform view that one-track thinking 
takes its start. It reduces everything to a univocity of concepts and specifications 
the precision of which not only corresponds to, but has the same essential origin 
as, the precision of technological process. . . . one-track thinking is not co-
extensive with the one-sided view, but rather is building on it even while 
transforming it.  (WCT, 34; my emphasis) 
 
I hear in these words a mutual interdependence between one-track thinking (that, for 
Heidegger, manifests the essence of modern technology) and the one-sided view (that, for 
Heidegger, is characteristic of modern science). As Heidegger says, the two are “not co-
extensive,” but one-track thinking requires the one-sided view as a basis while 
subsequently transforming that base.  
Heidegger locates the essence of scientific and technological thinking in “idea-
forming”—i.e., the forming of ideas and their representations.151 To illustrate, Heidegger 
reflects upon the human experience of simply standing before and beholding a tree in 
bloom. This reflection is informed by recalling that the Greek word, eido, is the origin of 
the word “idea” and means “to see, to face, meet, be face-to-face” (41). Heidegger traces 
                                                 
150. As Heidegger sees it, the aim of modern physics is to provide that univocity with regard to 
nature. Despite the increasing inscrutability of its representations of that which is, modern physics “is 
challenged forth by the rule of Enframing, which demands that nature be orderable as standing-reserve” 
(QCT, 23). 
 
151. Cf. Heidegger’s treatment of “idea-forming” and “representation” in BQP (56, 156) and 
discussed above in Section 3.2. 
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the back-and-forth beholding of the blossoming tree “in the head” and “outside the head” 
as scientifically analyzed, yet directly encountered. He asks: 
. . . while science records the brain currents, what becomes of the tree in bloom? . 
. . What becomes of the man—not of the brain but of the man, who may die under 
our hands tomorrow and be lost to us, and who at one time came to our 
encounter? What becomes of the face-to-face, the meeting, the seeing, the 
forming of the idea, in which the tree presents itself and man comes to stand face-
to-face with the tree? (WCT, 42) 
 
Heidegger’s purpose is to call into question the presumed superiority of the 
scientific comprehension of the human encounter of a blooming tree. “Whence do the 
sciences derive the right to decide what man’s place is, and to offer themselves as the 
standard that justifies such decisions?” (ibid.). In Heidegger’s view, the blooming tree, in 
effect, disappears under the scrutiny of science; the tree no longer can “stand where it 
stands” (44). In the language of the previous section, scientific analysis has “annihilated” 
the thingness of the tree. 
Heidegger is pointing to a “split-screen” seeing, or visioning, of that which is. The 
sciences “explain to us that what we see and accept is properly not a tree but in reality a 
void, thinly sprinkled with electric charges here and there that race hither and yon at 
enormous speeds” (43). Otherwise said, when we simply behold the blooming tree, we 
behold it as a thing—not as a scientifically scrutinized object. Heidegger appears to be 
saying that it is not the scientific “seeing” of the tree per se that he finds problematic, but 
rather it is the widespread view that labeling other ways of seeing are less valid—or even 
invalid. A question for this inquiry, raised at the close of the previous section, continues 
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to linger: Can we hold both ways of “seeing” the blooming tree without privileging—or 
patronizing--either one? 
Let us examine more closely the role of “representation” in idea-forming. On 
Heidegger’s view, it arises from the customary understanding of truth as “correctness” as 
determined by the correspondence, or conformance, of statements (i.e., propositions) to 
“facts.” Briefly put, “An idea is called correct when it conforms to its object” (38). 
Holding this traditional view of truth entails bringing before us (i.e., presenting) in a 
comprehensible manner (thus, re-presenting) such objects, or “facts” about them, in order 
to determine if they conform to our statements about them.
152
  
In a much earlier essay, “The Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger examines the 
notion of “representation” in some detail.153 He does so in order to clarify his claim that 
the essence of modern science (Wissenschaft) is research (OBT, 59)—comprised of 
“[p]rojection and rigor, method and constant activity” (65). He contrasts representing in 
the modern (i.e., “scientific”) sense with apprehending in the Greek sense. Apprehending 
is the opening of oneself to “that which rises up and opens itself; that which, as what is 
present, comes upon man” (68). Thus, that which is apprehended does not depend upon a 
“first look” from humankind; “[r]ather, man is the one who is looked upon by beings” 
(ibid.). In apprehending, we behold a revealing in the spirit of Hervorbringen, a bringing 
forth, without coercion. In modern science, however, “representation” means “to bring 
the present-at-hand before one as something standing over-and-against, to relate it to 
oneself, the representer, and, in this relation, to force it back to oneself as the norm-giving 
                                                 
152. See my earlier discussion of this in Section 3.2. 
 
153. Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in OBT, 57-85. 
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domain” (69, my emphasis). Otherwise said, the employment of representing by modern 
science places representing in the service of Herausfordern—the coercive, challenging 
forth mode of revealing.
154
 
On Heidegger’s view, however, representation per se is not inherently coercive 
(i.e., forcing). Recall that he states in “The Thing” that things may become objects 
(Gegenstände) without losing their thingness—even in representation. “An independent, 
self-supporting thing may become an object if we place it before us, whether in 
immediate perception or by bringing it to mind in a recollective re-presentation” (PLT, 
167). A few lines later, he adds: “The jug remains a vessel [i.e., a thing] whether we 
represent it in our minds or not” (ibid.). 
However, in modern scientific representing, the projection plans and 
methodologies of research that hold sway at any given point in time determine the 
manner by which objects are brought before us. In the language of Thomas Kuhn, the 
prevailing paradigms in “normal science” circumscribe the realm of the knowable. These 
paradigms are forcing in the sense that they provide the norms, enforceable in “normal 
science,” for adjudicating between science and non-science. But what is the origin of this 
forcing? Does it rest in modern scientific representing as such, or elsewhere? 
Modern science progresses because the fruits of scientific research drive the 
constant search for additional results. By means of such constant activity, science 
autonomously establishes its own “coherence and unity” (OBT, 64). Modern science—
unlike science before the modern era—is able to “take possession of its own complete 
                                                 
154. I thank Frank Seeburger for this formulation of the “forcing” nature of modern science. 
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essence” (ibid.). These words point to an autonomous, dominating dynamism within 
modern scientific research.  I suggest that this same dynamism is expressed in describing 
the extreme danger posed by Ge-stell: 
But Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and 
everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of revealing 
which is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other 
possibility of revealing.  (QCT, 27; my emphasis)  
 
That is, modern science and modern technology both derive from, so to speak, the same 
essence—an autonomous, dominating dynamism. 
As the title of this work indicates, the notion of call is central to Heidegger’s 
explication of thinking. Heidegger explicates the multiplicity of meanings in this word in 
connection with parsing the primary question of his inquiry as four interrelated 
questions
155
 that point to a single meaning: What is it that calls on us to think? That is, 
what makes a call upon us that we should think and, by thinking, be who we are? 
(121).
156
 This fourth question is decisive because it puts us into question. It is also 
decisive, he says, because it “does not just give us something to think about, . . . [but] it 
entrusts thought to us as our essential destiny . . .” (ibid.; emphasis added).157   
                                                 
155. Each of the four questions is rendered in several ways as a question. For example: (1) “What 
is it to which we give the name ‘thinking’? (2) [H]ow does traditional doctrine conceive and define what 
we have named thinking? (3) What is called for on our part in order that we may each time achieve good 
thinking? (4) [W]hat is it that calls us, as it were, commands us to think? (WCT, 113-14). The fourth 
question is restated extensively in (ibid., 114-21). 
 
156. In WCT, the question of Being is linked to the question of thinking. Heidegger devotes 
several chapters in Part II to parsing a fragment of Parmenides that he penultimately renders as “Useful is 
the letting-lie-before-us, so (the) taking-to-heart too: beings in being” (228). He concludes that what is to 
be thought about, what calls us, is the “presence of what is present” (240), i.e., the Being of beings (244). 
  
157. I shall examine the thinking-destiny relation in Section 5.4 below. 
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 Heidegger employs etymology to recover multiple meanings in “to call” and “to 
think.” In addition to the customary meaning of “to call” in the sense of “to signify” or 
“to name,” “to call” also means “to commend, entrust, give into safekeeping . . . to call 
into arrival and presence; to address commandingly” (118). By including these meanings, 
Heidegger hears the decisive question in What Is Called Thinking? as “What is that 
which appeals us to think? What is it that enjoins our nature to think, and thus lets our 
nature reach thought, arrive in thinking, there to keep it safe?” (ibid.). 
Heidegger then examines the close relation among thinking, thought, thanks, and 
memory from the “decisively and originally telling word . . . thanc [Gedanc]” (139).158 
Thanc, he says, “is the gathered, all-gathering thinking that recalls” (139). Thus, 
according to Heidegger, thinking is rooted in memory. Yet “memory” means more than 
recollection of the past. Rather, its root meaning is “a concentrated abiding with 
something,” a “devotion” to that something, which encompasses past, present, and future 
(140). Furthermore, he says, the thanc is pervaded by this original memory and what is 
designated by the word “thanks” (141).  
If thinking is grounded in thanks, what are we giving thanks for? Heidegger 
writes: “But the highest and really most lasting gift given to us is always our essential 
nature . . .” (142). And if thinking is a thanking for this “endowment,” what does it mean 
for us to thank? He replies: “Pure thanks is . . . that we simply think—think what is really 
and solely given, what is there to be thought” (143). This appears to be another way of 
saying that “thinking is our essential destiny.”  
                                                 
158. The etymological connections at play among thanc with thinking, thought, thanks, and 
memory are evident from the German equivalents of the latter: namely, Denken, Gedachtes, Dank, and 
Gedächtnis, respectively (GA8, 143). 
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I turn now to describe briefly Heidegger’s characterization of meditative thinking 
as the antithesis of modern scientific thinking.  In his 1955 “Memorial Address” 159to the 
people of Messkirch, his home town, Heidegger continues with his thesis in What Is 
Called Thinking? that “[m]ost thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that 
we are still not thinking” (WCT, 6). Despite the extensive planning, research, and 
inquiries everywhere, Heidegger insists that “man today is in flight from thinking (DOT, 
45). Yet, despite the thoughtlessness that springs from such flight, “we do not give up our 
capacity to think” (ibid.). He examines the apparent paradox of the absence of thinking 
with the presence of planning, etc. by contrasting what he calls meditative thinking  
(besinnliche Denken, Nachdenken) with calculative thinking (rechnenden Denken)
160
 —
another hallmark of modern scientific thinking, along with representing. Calculative 
thinking resonates with the determining characteristic of modern scientific research as 
constant activity: 
. . . calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such 
thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an 
adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever 
new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. 
Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking 
never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, 
not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is. 
(DOT, 46) 
 
                                                 
159. Martin Heidegger, ‘Memorial Address,” in Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. 
John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 43-57. (Hereafter, Discourse on 
Thinking is cited as DOT.) 
 
160. GA16, 525-26. English translations of Nackdenken include: to meditate, contemplate, ponder, 
ruminate, reflect. English translations of rechnen include: to calculate, compute, count, reckon. Beolingus—
Your Online Dictionary, s.v.v. “Nachdenken” and “rechnen,” accessed October 26, 2012, http://dict    
.tuchemnitz.de/dings.cgi?lang=en&service=deen&opterrors=0&optpro=0&query=Nachdenken&iservice=
&comment=&email=, and http://dict.tuchemnitz.de/dings.cgi?lang=en&service=deen&opterrors=    
0&optpro=0&query=rechnen&iservice=&comment=&email=. 
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 Meditative thinking is thinking that dwells on the meaning of events and trends, 
thinking that ponders the threat of rootlessness in our time (46-48). Such thinking, he 
says, is the essence of being human. Meditative thinking makes possible comportment 
toward technology that would enable us to use technical devices, but to freely let go of 
them at any time (54).
161
 (Heidegger is not anti-science, as both modes of thinking are 
necessary: “. . . each [is] justified and needed in its own way” [46].) Heidegger calls this 
comportment “releasement toward things” (die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen) (54) and 
“openness to the mystery” (55); such comportment, he says, keeps us open to the hidden 
meaning in technology.
162
 
 By Heidegger’s lights, meditative thinking is essential for such comportment; 
releasement toward things will not happen on its own. Furthermore, mankind’s essential 
nature is at stake. If calculative thought comes to reign someday as the singular way of 
thinking, “man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature—that he is a 
meditative being” (56). That is why the threat that calculative thinking, the hallmark of 
Ge-stell, may come to dominate all modes of thinking is a supreme threat. “Therefore,” 
Heidegger says, “the issue is the saving of man’s nature. Therefore, the issue is keeping 
meditative thinking alive” (ibid.) 
 
 
                                                 
161. Recall that Heidegger characterizes the enactment-sense of Christian life experience in terms 
of “comportment” as discussed earlier in Section 2.1. Also, in this passage, “comportment” is the translate 
of die Haltung  (GA16, 528), which also means “attitude,” “posture,”  and “approach.” Online Dictionary 
English-German, s.v. “Haltung,” accessed October 26, 2012, http://www.dict.cc/?s=Haltung. Cf. 
“comportment” as a translation of Verhalten (see chap. 2, n. 66). 
 
162. These descriptions of meditative thinking resonate with the characterization of reflection, in 
the sense of Besinnung, and Besinnung in the spirit of Gelassenheit, as discussed earlier in Section 3.4.  
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
 
 Broadly speaking, this chapter engages the RST relation indirectly by bringing 
modern science and technology into relation with the holy and divine through poetry and 
art. The chapter offers Heidegger’s explication of the common essence that is served by 
modern science and technology that threatens to extinguish all other ways of thinking and 
comportment to all that is. In so doing, the essential nature of what it means to be human 
is fundamentally threatened. 
  Briefly stated, this common essence is an autonomous, aggressive dynamism that 
purports to fashion its own essence. That essence is manifested in the essence of modern 
technology in its mode of the revealing of Being as “challenging forth.” It is manifested 
in the essence of modern science in calculative thinking. In contrast, Heidegger posits 
revealing forth as the primal mode of the revealing of Being, and meditative thinking as 
the essence of humankind. In turn, the calculative thinking of science manifests itself in 
objectification, which reduces all things to objects (Gegenstände). In contrast, things 
gather the elements of the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and divinities, in a “mirror-
play” that fashions the “worlding” of the world. 
Paradoxically, Heidegger holds that a saving power grows where the supreme 
danger of modern technology resides. Vigilance on the part of humankind is essential to 
fostering this growing saving power; art, poetry, the nurturing of the fourfold, and 
meditative, reflective thinking are seen by Heidegger as vital in service of such vigilance. 
Meditative, reflective thinking is rooted in thanking for the gift of our essential nature 
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and in memory, as devotion to the task of thinking “what is really and solely given, what 
there is to be thought” (WCT, 143).  
By Heidegger’s lights, poetry (inclusive of art) heralds the growing saving power 
in the face of the extreme danger posed by the essence of modern technology and science 
as song—understood as language that points to the wholeness within the unwholeness of 
the world’s “dark night.” Poetry locates the “saving power” in defenselessness that 
foregoes ultimately futile attempts to build walls to ward off the extreme danger posed by 
modern technology and science. Such poetry, Heidegger says, can be a pathway to the 
holy and divine. 
With regard to the formulation of theology as “reflection on religious experience 
and belief,” this chapter raises questions and possible opportunities: At the end of Section 
3.4, we asked, what sense(s) of reflection—Reflexion, Besinnung, or both—appropriately 
characterize(s) theology? Here, we ask the same question differently: What form(s) of 
thinking—calculative, meditative-mindful, or both—appropriately characterize theology? 
Heidegger regards poetry as a pathway to the holy and divine. Taking for a 
moment that theology regards itself similarly, in some sense, does “reflection on religious 
experience and belief” incorporate the sense of “reaching into the abyss occasioned by 
the world’s dark night”? Does this formulation of theology include pointing to the 
growing saving power in the midst of the extreme danger of the essence of modern 
technology? More specifically, can theology so understood articulate the paradox that 
such saving power is located in defenselessness? 
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To sum up, poetry and meditative, mindful thinking, each in their own way, are 
paths for confronting the essence of modern technology. Are these paths completely 
separate, or do thinking and poetry “belong together,” in some sense? We take up this 
question in the next and final chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Ethics and the RST Relation     
 
Heidegger never wrote an “Ethics” in the form of a separate publication by that 
title. On his view, the question of ethics must be thought from the question of the truth of 
Being. Such thinking, he says in “Letter on ‘Humanism’,”163 departs from regarding 
ethics and ontology as disciplines within the field of philosophy (P, 269). Instead, 
thinking the truth of being leads Heidegger back to the Greek term, ethos, which means 
abode or dwelling. On his view, the truth of being and the essence of what it means to be 
human are inseparable from “ethics”—understood in its originary meaning:   
If the name “ethics,” in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos, should 
now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking 
which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of the human being, as 
one who eksists, is in itself originary ethics. (P, 271) 
 
This chapter examines Heidegger’s explication of ethics in terms of abode or 
dwelling, thought out of the question of the truth of being, with an eye toward thinking 
the RST relation. Briefly put, the “arc” of the chapter is the linking of dwelling and 
destiny in light of the thinking-poetry relation. In the first section (5.1 Ethics and the 
Place of Being), I shall examine Heidegger’s treatment of the dwelling-building duality 
in relation to thinking and the poetic. In the second section (5.2 Ethics, Technology, and 
Values), I shall discuss Ian Barbour’s analysis of the role of values in ethics and its 
relation to technology, in light of Heidegger’s critique of the notion of “value” itself. The 
                                                 
163. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” in Pathmarks (P), 239-76. 
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third section (5.3 Ethics and Nihilism) focuses upon Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s 
explication of nihilism, in terms of “value” and “the will to power.” In the final section of 
this chapter (5.4 Ethics and Destiny), I shall examine Heidegger’s explication of 
“destiny” as the Geschick of Being, in contrast to its customary interpretation as 
something determined by fate. Finally, I shall conclude this entire inquiry with a brief 
Epilogue (The Question of Being and the RST Relation). 
 
5.1 Ethics and the Place of Being  
 For Heidegger, ethics, as ethos, is abode, or dwelling. More precisely, as quoted 
above, he says that ethics “ponders the abode of the human being.” Hence, ethics is the 
link between thinking, or pondering, and abode, or dwelling. Furthermore, dwelling 
clearly involves building, in some sense. In this section I shall draw primarily upon two 
works of Heidegger that engage the dwelling-building duality—first, from the 
perspective of thinking, “Building Dwelling Thinking,”164 and second, from the 
perspective of poetry, “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . .”165 
 On Heidegger’s view, dwelling “is the manner in which mortals are on the earth” 
(PLT, 146). Furthermore, building, in its originary sense, is dwelling. These claims are 
based primarily upon his explications of the verb, bauen (to build), its older cognate, 
buan (to dwell), and bin (the first person form of the verb “to be”).166 He writes: “The 
                                                 
164. Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in PLT, 141-59.  
 
165. Martin Heidegger, “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .,” in PLT, 209-28. 
 
166. This move is consistent with his characterization of this work as a venture that “traces 
building back into that domain to which everything that is belongs” (PLT, 143). 
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way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is 
Buan, dwelling” (145). Yet our ordinary understanding of “building” and “dwelling” 
suggests that the relation of the former to the latter is that of a means to an end, or goal. 
On Heidegger’s view, this is correct, in a sense, but also misleading, as “to build is in 
itself already to dwell” (144). 
Heidegger notes that bauen also connotes the manner in which the building-
dwelling link is manifested: “. . . to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, 
specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine” (145). He extends this agriculturally-
grounded understanding of “building”167 beyond that of the cultivation of growing things 
to “building” in the sense of constructing edifices. Thus, he writes:  “To dwell” means “to 
remain at peace within . . . the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature” (147). 
Its fundamental character is “sparing and preserving”—not only protecting from harm but 
leaving each thing “in its own nature.” More specifically, the sparing and preserving 
inherent in dwelling safeguards the “fourfold” of earth and sky, divinities and mortals.168 
It does so by “bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things” (149).  
Heidegger illustrates the connection between dwelling and the fourfold by the 
example of a bridge: 
The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold,
169
 but in such a way that it allows a 
site for the fourfold.  By this site are determined the localities and ways by which 
                                                 
167. The German word for farmer is Bauer. 
 
168. Cf. the earlier discussion of the fourfold in Section 4.3 above. 
 
169. Here, Heidegger once again draws upon the ancient meaning of “thing” as a gathering or 
assembling. (He elicited this meaning in his earlier work, “The Thing.” See my discussion of this in Section 
4.3 above.) This meaning is in contrast to the conventional representing of “thing” as “an unknown X to 
which perceptible properties are attached” (PLT, 151). 
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a space is provided for. . . .  Space is in essence that for which room has been 
made, that which is let into its bounds. That for which room is made is always 
granted and hence is joined, that is, gathered, by virtue of a location, that is, by 
such a thing as the bridge. (PLT, 152) 
 
On this view, the bridge is not built upon a pre-existing site or location; rather, the bridge 
provides a site for the fourfold and is itself a location (153, emphasis added). Moreover, 
as a location, the bridge makes room for and shelters the fourfold (156). From this 
explication of “space,” Heidegger proceeds to derive the customary understanding of 
“space” in terms of extension and its quantifiable formulation in terms of dimensions 
(153-54).  
His analysis also illuminates the relation of space to humankind. Space is not 
something that lies above and over us. Rather, “space” in its primal sense is “always 
provided for already within the stay of mortals” (154). As mortals, we stay within things 
in the fourfold, even if they are beyond our immediate reach. We dwell with these things; 
that is who we are. “The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling, 
strictly thought and spoken” (155). 
Although building “produces things as locations,” the things produced, such as 
bridges, are not to be understood as a result or consequence of such building. Rather, 
such building is 
. . . a producing that brings something forth. For building brings the fourfold 
hither into a thing, the bridge, and brings forth the thing as a location, out into 
what is already there, room for which is only now made by this location . . . . 
(PLT, 157; original emphasis)
170
  
 
                                                 
170. Such building, he says, is “accomplished” (PLT, 157).  In “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” he writes: 
“To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this 
fullness—producere” (P, 239). 
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Thus, he says, building is a “distinctive letting-dwell” (156).  
Furthermore, building and thinking are essential for dwelling, but not necessarily 
sufficient:  
Building and thinking are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling. The 
two, however, are also insufficient for dwelling so long as each busies itself with 
its own affairs in separation instead of listening to one another. They are able to 
listen if both—building and thinking—belong to dwelling, if they remain within 
their limits and realize that the one as much as the other comes from the workshop 
of long experience and incessant practice. (PLT, 158) 
 
We shall see an analogous claim for thinking and poetry with respect to dwelling in his 
work, “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .,” to which we now turn. The title of this lecture is 
taken from a poem of Hölderlin’s that Heidegger engages throughout this work. 
In this lecture, Heidegger argues that it is poetry that “first causes dwelling to be 
dwelling” (PLT, 213). He challenges widespread views of poetry as “a flight into 
dreamland” or “part of literature” (211). Poetry is not otherworldly, he says: “Poetry does 
not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it. Poetry is 
what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into 
dwelling” (216). 
So how is it that poetry is so “down to earth,” and what is its connection to the 
dwelling-building duality? Let us take this two-part question as our guide. With respect to 
the first half of our question, Heidegger declares that language is the gateway toward 
discerning the essence, or nature, of any thing: “Language beckons us, at first and then 
again at the end, toward a thing’s nature” (214). Moreover, human beings are not in 
control of language—quite the reverse. Heidegger regards the “unbridled yet clever 
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talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words” across the globe as an inversion of 
the true relationship of language to humankind. 
Poetry has this “down-to-earth” character, Heidegger says, because, in a sense to 
be described, it “measures” dwelling. “Poetry is . . . measure-taking—its taking, indeed, 
for the dwelling of man” (221). Moreover, “poetry . . . is the primal form of building. 
Poetry first of all admits man’s dwelling into its very nature, its presencing being. Poetry 
is the original admission of dwelling” (224-25). In what follows, I sketch Heidegger’s 
defense of these claims. 
As in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger employs here the “fourfold” of 
earth and sky, divinities and mortals, in his analysis of the building-dwelling duality and 
of “measure-taking,” in particular. Here, poetry seeks to take the measure of the 
“between” of sky and earth. Heidegger calls this “between” the dimension (218). The 
measuring, or spanning, of this dimension, he says, is central to what it means to be 
human: “. . . man spans the dimension by measuring himself against the heavenly. Man 
does not undertake this spanning just now and then; rather, man is man at all only in such 
spanning” (ibid.).  
But how does poetry take the measure of this “dimension”? Heidegger writes: 
The measure consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, is 
revealed as such by the sky. God’s appearance through the sky consists in a 
disclosing that lets us see what conceals itself, but lets us see it not by seeking to 
wrest what is concealed out of its concealedness, but only by guarding the 
concealed in its self-concealment. Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown 
by way of the sky’s manifestness. This appearance is the measure against which 
man measures himself. (PLT, 220-21) 
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Heidegger is saying that the sky, which is familiar to humankind, is alien to the unknown 
god but nonetheless a medium for that god to evince the very character of this god’s 
unknownness to mankind.
171
 In Hölderlin’s words, by such measuring, “man not 
unhappily measures himself against the Godhead” (217). Heidegger says more: such 
measuring is integral to the essential nature of humankind.  
Like building and thinking, poetry and dwelling “belong together, each calling for 
the other” (225). Moreover, poetic measuring-taking is essential for building, Heidegger 
contends, in order for humankind to continue to be capable of cultivation and 
construction upon the earth:  
Man does not dwell in that he merely establishes his stay on the earth beneath the 
sky by raising growing things and simultaneously raising buildings. Man is 
capable of such building only if he already builds in the sense of the poetic taking 
of measure. (PLT, 225) 
 
Otherwise said, this poetic building “takes the measure” of the dimension between earth 
and sky that is shared by subsequent building and thinking as they belong together in 
dwelling.
172
 
In sum, ethics, as the pondering of dwelling (ethos), is a peaceful protecting and 
“letting be” of each thing in its own nature. Building, thinking, and—above all—poetry, 
are each indispensable for dwelling through their relationship to the fourfold of earth and 
sky, divinities and mortals. Building is primordially a gathering of the fourfold into 
things. Building is thus a producing, a bringing-forth, of things into dwelling. Poetry 
                                                 
171. In “Why Poets?,” Heidegger identifies poets as those who are capable of reaching into the 
“abyss of the world’s dark night” from which the gods have fled (OBT, 200-201); also see Section 4.2. 
 
172. I thank Frank Seeburger for pointing out these interrelationships. 
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“first causes dwelling to be dwelling” (213) by taking the measure of the dimension 
between earth and sky. In such measure-taking, poetry discloses—and yet safeguards—
the unknowableness of the self-concealing god against which, Heidegger says, mankind 
has always measured itself. By such poetic measure-taking, we manifest our essential 
nature as human beings. No lesser measure-taking quite measures up.  
Three questions for Christian theology come to mind in light of Heidegger’s 
explication of thinking and poetry in relation to dwelling. Does Christian theology, in its 
own way, attempt to take the measure of the between of earth and sky? Is such measure-
taking consonant with formulating theology as reflection on religious experience and 
belief? Does Christian theology appropriately disclose the unknown god [here, Deus 
absconditus] in its self-concealing?  
I conclude this section by gathering some pointers from Heidegger regarding the 
relation between poetry and thinking—all with an eye toward thinking the RST relation. 
The discussion above in this section clearly indicates that, on Heidegger’s view, poetry 
and thinking each “belong together” with dwelling. Do they themselves also belong 
together, in some sense? In “The Nature of Language,”173 Heidegger writes of the 
“neighborhood of poetry and thinking.” Expressed figuratively, this phrase means, he 
says, “that the two dwell face to face with each other, that the one has settled into facing 
the other, has drawn into the other’s nearness” (OWL, 82).174 Compactly stated, the 
                                                 
173. In OWL, 57-108 (see chap. 1, n. 41). 
 
174. Recall that Heidegger does not render “nearness” in spatio-temporal terms. He explicates this 
point in “The Nature of Language” (OWL, 101-5) as well as in “The Thing,” which I discussed above in 
Section 4.3.  
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neighborhood of poetry and thinking means “the encounter of the two facing each other” 
(ibid.). 
For Heidegger, the heart of language itself occasions this neighborhood of 
thinking and poetry. Furthermore, nearness, as “Saying,” brings about this neighborhood, 
rather than the other way around: 
Neighborhood means: dwelling in nearness. Poetry and thinking are modes of 
saying. The nearness that brings Poetry and thinking together into neighborhood 
we call Saying. Here, we assume, is the essential nature of language. (OWL, 93) 
 
By “Saying,” Heidegger means “to show, to make appear, the lighting-
concealing-releasing offer of world” (107). Poetry and thinking “Say” in divergent ways. 
For reflective thinking (besinnliche denken), “Saying” is the giving of Being by means of 
the gift of the word: “the word gives Being” (88). For poetry, “saying” is song: “In the 
poet’s song, the word appears as mysterious wonder” (89). The divergence of their 
Saying (the Same thing differently) is the encounter of thinking and poetry. Thinking and 
poetry draw near to each other in Saying the Same, albeit in divergent ways. The 
neighborhood occasioned by this nearness harbors the divergence of their Saying.
175
 In 
sum, despite the divergent modes of their saying, poetry and thinking are brought 
together in nearness by Saying itself as that which illuminates as well as conceals the 
essential nature of all that is.  
 Three questions for thinking the RST relation: Are religion, science, and theology 
“near” to each other, in some sense? Is their possibly a neighborhood in which their 
                                                 
175. Heidegger expresses this similarly In What Is Called Thinking?: “The essential closeness of 
poesy and thinking is so far from excluding their difference that, on the contrary, it establishes that 
difference in an abysmal [abgründigen] manner” (WCT, 134; GA8, 139). 
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divergences can encounter each other? What Sameness, so to speak, might “occasion” 
such a neighborhood? These closing questions prepare us for thinking the essence of the 
RST relation in terms of nearness and neighborhood. But before addressing in the 
Epilogue this crucial matter for our inquiry, we shall proceed in the final three sections of 
this chapter to establish the connection between dwelling and destiny. 
 
5.2 Ethics, Technology, and Values 
 In this section, I shall examine the central role of values in Ian Barbour’s analysis 
of the ethics-technology relation in light of Heidegger’s critique of the notion of “value” 
itself. In Ethics in an Age of Technology,
176
 Barbour conducts his analysis of this relation 
through the lens of values that promote the well-being of human life (individually and 
socially) and the environment. In contrast, Heidegger contends that employing the notion 
of “value” leads to the objectification of that which is “valued” and paradoxically reduces 
its essential worth.   
Barbour outlines and critiques three basic views of technology: technology as 
liberator, technology as threat, and technology as ambiguous instrument of power. 
Broadly speaking, the first two views are optimistic and pessimistic views of technology, 
respectively, while the third view—the view which Barbour defends—holds that 
technology’s “consequences depend upon its social context.” Barbour’s point is not that 
technology is inherently neutral, but rather that “[t]echnologies are social constructions, 
                                                 
176. Ian Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology: The Gifford Lectures 1989-1991 Volume 2 (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993). (Hereafter cited as EIAT.) 
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and they are seldom neutral because particular purposes are already built into their 
design” (EIAT, 15).  
Barbour contrasts these three views of technology in terms of how the science-
technology relation is understood. Compactly stated, technological optimists tend to 
regard technology as derived from science (“applied science”), whereas pessimists 
generally regard technology as “uncontrollable” and a driver of science itself. In each of 
these two cases, the technology-society relation is seen unilaterally as technology shaping 
society. The third view of technology as ambiguous instrument of power sees the science-
technology relation contextually, with no universal pattern in terms of dominance. In this 
third view of technology, the combinations of science-society, technology-society, and 
science-technology are understood as mutually influencing (EIAT, Chapter 1). 
Barbour bases his view of ethics upon a functional definition of “value.” He 
defines “value” as “a general characteristic of an object or state of affairs that a person 
views with favor, believes is beneficial, and is disposed to act to promote” (26). On this 
view, “values” are subject-centered—akin to the view held by J. Wentzel van Huyssteen 
and others that “rationality” is subject-centered.177 As characteristics, values in effect, 
“sort” the class of all “objects and states of affairs” into two disjoint subclasses—those 
possessing the characteristic or value, and those that do not. Functionally speaking, 
“values” differentiate, partition. Barbour justified this definition several years earlier by 
noting that, since “values” so defined are held by persons, “values” are amenable to 
empirical investigation by social scientists: 
                                                 
177. See my earlier discussion of this point in Section 3.3 above. 
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Data on attitudes and beliefs can be obtained through verbal testimony, 
questionnaires, and interviews; data on patterns of behavior can be obtained from 
research on allocation of time and effort, and on actual choices among 
alternatives.
178
 
 
Typically, he says, reasons are given or principles cited to justify and promote specific 
values. For Barbour, “ethics” is the domain of “[p]rinciples of right and wrong in human 
actions, and good and evil in the consequences of actions” (EIAT, 27). Briefly put, ethics 
is the examination of the “justification of [one’s] value commitments” (26).  
Barbour posits six human values (three individual, three social) and three 
environmental values with which to evaluate technology: In summary form, these values 
are:  
 
Figure 1: Values Relevant to the Appraisal of Technology  
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Individual values  Social values   Environmental values 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
food and health  social justice   resource sustainability 
meaningful work  participatory freedom  environmental  
           protection 
personal fulfillment  economic development respect for all  
     forms of life 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Figure 2 in Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology (EIAT), 81. 
 
 
His analysis of human values is conducted from three primary perspectives: science, 
philosophy, and religion. He argues that all three are interdependent and essential for 
responding to the challenges of an increasingly technological world. Barbour lists several 
                                                 
178. Ian Barbour, Technology, Environment, and Human Values (New York: Praeger, 1980), 60. 
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values purported to be intrinsic to science, such as disinterestedness, freedom of thought, 
and fidelity to truth. However, he holds that such characteristics—even if they were 
perfectly realized in practice—are insufficient to serve as a basis for “an adequate social 
ethic” (28-29). Nonetheless, science can contribute to ethics in at least three ways: by 
illuminating the biological, social, and psychological constraints upon human behavior; 
by providing “increasingly reliable estimates of the consequences of our decisions”; and 
by contributing to “the worldview within which our decisions are made” (32-33, original 
emphasis). Philosophy contributes to making ethically-based choices in a technological 
society in three primary ways: by clarifying ethical concepts, by examining the 
universality and consistency of ethical principles, and by providing metaphysical 
frameworks for understanding ultimate reality (33, 41). Specifically, Barbour holds that 
philosophically-framed approaches to ethics need to incorporate rights and duties 
(deontological) as well as results (teleological) to be effective. “I will use both a broad 
evaluation of consequences (going beyond Utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis by 
including nonquantifiable values) and a defense of rights and duties that avoids 
absolutism” (36). Religion also plays an essential role in ethical decision-making, he 
contends, because ethical principles alone are insufficient to motivate ethical action, 
“which involves the will and the affections as well as the intellect” (41). He summarizes 
the interplay among these three perspectives regarding human values as follows: 
In later chapters, then, I will frequently be drawing on science, especially for its 
estimates of the consequences of alternative technological policies and its 
understanding of the interdependence of humanity and the nonhuman world. I will 
be drawing on philosophy in referring to both the good of society and individual 
human rights.  From the Christian tradition I will draw on distinctive insights 
concerning each of the six values discussed here . . . .  (EIAT, 55) 
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With respect to the three primary environmental values listed above, Barbour 
similarly argues for indispensable contributions by science, philosophy, and religion. For 
example, environmental science, centered on the concepts of “ecosystem” and 
“ecological sustainability,” illuminates the physical and biological constraints within 
which ethical decisions are called for (60). He contends that process philosophy, as 
developed by Whitehead and his followers, values both human and nonhuman forms of 
life, yet “give priority to human needs without being anthropocentric” (70-71, original 
emphasis). Finally, Barbour holds that religious traditions can be sources for defending 
environmental values, although he acknowledges a mixed record in Christianity.  
Barbour’s defends two primary claims in Ethics in an Age of Technology. First, 
technology can be controlled in a democratic society by the proper governance, 
assessment, and redirecting of technology (213 et seq.). Second, his nine posited human 
and environmental values can significantly influence each sphere of the control of 
technology. For example, he supports methods of technology assessment that attempt to 
analyze the direct and indirect effects of new technologies—or of major changes in 
existing technologies—upon the environment as well as the economy and such effects 
upon specific stakeholder groups (229-31). Barbour readily acknowledges that tradeoffs 
among these posited values—such as meaningful work and environmental protection—
are frequently necessary. On his view, scientists have no privileged position on such 
tradeoffs. Indeed, “the basic decisions about technological policies are value-laden and 
political” (231, original emphasis). He concludes that fundamental judgments on 
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complex matters concerning technology that involve incommensurable values must 
ultimately be made by elected officials—albeit in view of the best scientific analysis 
available.    
Barbour concludes his analysis of the technology-ethics relation by calling for a 
“reorientation of technology toward justice, participation, and sustainability” (258). On 
his view, education, political involvement, and “catalytic crises” can contribute to a “new 
social paradigm,” but a “vision of alternatives” is arguably most important (264-68). He 
contends that religion and theology can contribute in significant ways to such visions. 
The Biblical prophetic tradition of judgment, repentance, and hope can foster needed 
changes in attitudes and values. Process theology emphasizes the intrinsic value and 
interdependence of both human and nonhuman forms of life. For Barbour, values are 
embedded in alternative visions that can direct the appropriate employment of technology 
to serve the common good: 
New visions can provide the motivation and direction for creative social change. . 
. . They summarize a set of values, using concrete images rather than abstract 
principles. . . . Let us keep before us that image of the spinning globe [as first seen 
by astronauts on the moon] with its natural environments and its social order. Let 
us imagine technology used in the service of a more just, participatory, and 
sustainable society on planet earth.  (EIAT, 266-67) 
 
 On Barbour’s view, then, values provide standards that enable one to differentiate 
between the favorable and unfavorable, the beneficial and unbeneficial, and the 
worthwhile and worthless. Human and environmental values, expressed in scientific, 
philosophical, and religious terms, such as those presented here, can significantly 
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contribute to the appropriate governance, assessment, and redirecting of technology in 
democratic societies.  
I now examine Heidegger’s critique of the notion of “value” itself. Thinking from 
the standpoint of the question of the truth of being and of the nature of thinking itself, 
Heidegger contends that, in the very act of valuing, something quixotically leads to a 
paradoxical de-valuation, as it were, of that to which some value is assigned. He 
summarizes his argument in “Letter on ‘Humanism’”:  
To think against “values” is not to maintain that everything interpreted as “a 
value”—“culture,” “art,” “science,” “human dignity,” “world,” and “God”—is 
valueless. Rather, it is important to finally realize that precisely through the 
characterization of something as a “value” what is so valued is robbed of its 
worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is 
admitted only as an object for human estimation. But what a thing is in its being is 
not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form 
of value. Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It 
does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid—solely as the objects 
of its doing. . . . To think against values therefore does not mean to beat the drum 
for the valuelessness and nullity of beings. It means rather to bring the clearing of 
the truth of being before thinking, as against subjectivizing beings into mere 
objects.  (P, 265; emphasis added) 
 
Heidegger’s claim that the very act of valuing a thing necessarily drains it of worth 
(Würde) rests upon his view that the very process of imputing value (Wert) to things 
amounts to “subjectivizing beings into mere objects.” That is, every valuing is performed 
by someone (i.e., a human “subject”) before whom the object or state of affairs is brought 
to a stand (Gegenstand): i.e., is objectified. Thus the process of valuing (i.e., evaluation) 
necessarily occurs within the orbit of human significance and meaning. Furthermore, he 
says, such objectification does not exhaust “what the thing is in its being.” This statement 
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heralds the approach that unfolds in Heidegger’s critique of value: namely, to think the 
question of value from the standpoint of the question of being.  
Heidegger asks: “What does ‘value’ mean ontologically? How are we to 
categorize this ‘investing’ and Being-invested?” (BT, 68). For his responses to these 
questions, we shall turn first to Introduction to Metaphysics
179
 and then to Being and 
Time, respectively. As we turn to these works, let us recall Barbour’s definition of value 
as “a general characteristic of an object or state of affairs that a person views with favor, 
believes is beneficial, and is disposed to act to promote” (EIAT, 26). 
In Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger’s discussion of “value” occurs in the 
context of his discussion of the distinction, traditional in the specific terms at issue at 
least since Hume and Kant, between “Being and the ought”—or between what is and 
what should be.
180
 On Heidegger’s view, the ultimate ground for the eventual opposition 
between Being and the ought arises in Plato’s notion of the whatness of Being in terms of 
idea and Plato’s claim that “the idea of the good” (i.e., the “highest idea”) lies beyond 
Being so understood: “. . . the ought arises in opposition to Being as soon as Being 
determines itself as idea” (IM, 211). “This process is completed in Kant,” Heidegger 
says, since the ought (in the form of the categorical imperative) is in total opposition to 
Being (taken by Kant as nature). 
The notion of “value” arises as a response to the “chasm” between Being and the 
ought that is created by thinking Being reductively as the Being of beings, in various 
                                                 
179. Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). (Hereafter cited as IM.) 
 
180. I thank Frank Seeburger for this clarification. 
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interpretations. Under these conditions, the role of the ought as the standard, or measure, 
of all that is, is endangered. “Value” arises to ground the ought, but “value” does not 
exist: “. . . because values stand opposed to the Being of beings, in the sense of facts, they 
themselves cannot be” (212). Therefore, although values provide “the measure for all 
domains of beings—that is, of what is present at hand”—one must settle for validity. In 
sum, perhaps we can say that “value” is the reductive expression of “the ought” that 
properly belongs to Being as something distinguished from it—and something that 
accordingly (and “nihilistically”) “is” not. 
Heidegger addresses the second question regarding “investing with value” in his 
interpretation in Being and Time of Descartes’ characterization of Thinghood, understood 
ontologically in terms of material nature. In such an understanding of Thinghood, 
Heidegger claims that “values” such as “useful” or “useless,” “beautiful” or “ugly,” are, 
in effect, merely labels affixed to things; they tell us nothing new about the essence of the 
objects or states of affairs that are matters at hand. Every thing that is—and values 
themselves— turn out to be merely present-at-hand: 
When we speak of material Thinghood, have we not tacitly posited a kind of 
Being—the constant presence-at-hand of Things—which is so far from having 
rounded out ontologically by subsequently endowing entities with value-
predicates, that these value-characters themselves are rather just ontical 
characteristics of those entities which have the same kind of Being as Things? 
Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of 
goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-at-
hand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics 
which a Thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand. . . . (BT, 99; original 
emphasis)  
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Valuing reduces that which is valued to its whatness, to merely its content-sense.
181
 In 
other words, valuing reduces things to objects.
182
 
By Heidegger’s lights, the process of valuing something amounts to “sticking” a 
label on it, but this fails to add anything significant to our understanding of the thing. 
Given Barbour’s definition of “value” as a “characteristic,” I suggest that his approach to 
“value” may be vulnerable to the same critique. I say “may” here, because Heidegger is 
critiquing Descartes’ understanding of Being as material nature. On one hand, Barbour 
clearly views the metaphysical framework of process philosophy as superior to that of 
Descartes’ “material nature” for understanding “reality.” On the other hand, Barbour 
offers no explanation as to how the value “label” becomes affixed to the thing valued.183 
To sum up, Heidegger’s critique of “value” makes no judgments concerning the 
worthiness of the things valued. Indeed, on his view, the very act of “valuing” something 
has the perverse effect of de-valuing it, in the sense of diminishing its worthiness. Viewed 
ontologically, the inherent belonging together of Being itself and the ought is shattered 
when Being is thought reductively as the Being of beings. Speaking figuratively, 
“valuing” vainly attempts to span the chasm separating the ought from all that is (i.e., 
everything that “is”)—exposing the nonexistence of valuing itself. Viewed ontically, 
attempts to think “value” in terms of characteristics or labels sever the thing valued from 
its essence. 
                                                 
181. See Section 2.2 for an explication of presence-at-hand in contrast to readiness-to-hand. 
 
182. See Section 3.3 on the thingness of the jug and the thing-object distinction. 
 
183. To my mind, the challenge of explaining how values get affixed to things seems akin to the 
challenge of explaining how assertions correspond to things in the conventional understanding of truth as 
correctness. 
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5.3   Ethics and Nihilism  
In this section, I shall examine portions of Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s 
explication of “nihilism” in terms of “values,” the “will to power,” and the relation 
between the last man and the overman. In particular, I shall focus primarily on 
Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s compact expression of nihilism as “God is dead” and 
Heidegger’s analysis of the relation of nihilism to thinking.184 Mindful of Heidegger’s 
characterization of ethics in terms of “dwelling” (ethos), I shall take as a guiding question 
for this section, the following section, and the concluding Epilogue: Where are the 
“places” of religion, science, and theology in relation to ethics if nihilism characterizes 
our past, present, and possible future (or lack thereof, as the case may be)? 
On the face of it, Nietzsche’s claim would seem to be the death knell for religion 
(or, at any rate, for theistically-based religion) and, consequently, for theology, taken as 
reflection upon religious experience and belief. Indeed, Nietzsche’s word does refer to 
the “death” of God, in the sense that “. . . faith in the Christian God is no longer tenable . 
. . .”185 On Heidegger’s view, however, Nietzsche understood “Christianity” as “the 
historical, secular-political phenomenon of the Church and its claim to power . . .” 
(164)—what today is referred to by many theologians and other scholars as 
                                                 
184. In this section, I shall draw primarily from Heidegger’s works, “Nietzsche’s Word: ‘God Is 
Dead’”, in Off the Beaten Track (OBT), 157-99, and What Is Called Thinking? (WCT). 
 
185. Nietzsche’s words are from the fifth book of La Gaya Scienza, cited in OBT, 162. 
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“Christendom.”186 Furthermore, Heidegger maintains that “Christianity” in Nietzsche’s 
sense (i.e., Christendom) has nothing in common with what Heidegger calls “the 
Christian life of the New Testament”187 nor with belief in “the Christian God of the 
biblical revelation” (164).  
The significance of Nietzsche’s aphorism, taken to express the essence of the 
completion of nihilism, reaches far beyond matters of Christian belief/unbelief and the 
Christian life of the New Testament. “God is dead” also points to the loss of meaning in 
the entire realm of the supersensory:   
If God—as the supersensory ground and as the goal of everything that is real—is 
dead, if the supersensory world of ideas is bereft of its binding and above all its 
inspiring and constructive power, then there is nothing left which man can rely on 
and by which he can orient himself. (OBT, 163) 
 
In terms of Heidegger’s explication of the relation of poetry and dwelling in Section 5.1 
above, poetically taking the measure of the dimension between earth and sky no longer is 
possible. But “man is man only in such spanning,”188 Heidegger says, so the very essence 
of what it means to be human is at stake. Furthermore, seen in this light, the loss of 
meaning across the entire realm of ideas envelops scientific thought as well as 
theology.
189
  
                                                 
186. See for example, Douglas John Hall, The Cross in Our Context: Jesus and the Suffering 
World (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003). 
 
187. More precisely, Heidegger has in mind “the Christian life that existed once for a short time 
before the Gospels set down in writing and before Paul disseminated his missionary propaganda” (OBT, 
164). 
 
188. In “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .” (PLT, 218) and cited above in Section 5.1. 
 
189. In the inaugural issue of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, the editors stated its 
purpose in terms of responding to the loss of the supersensory.  The writings of its founding editor, Ralph 
Burhoe, reflect this basic purpose as well. See Section 1.2.2.  
  
188 
 
 
 
 Thinking with Nietzsche, Heidegger identifies the arc of the loss of the 
supersensory with the history of Western thought. This history is the history of 
metaphysics—taken to be, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, “the truth of beings as 
such in their entirety” (157, 165). It is the destiny of metaphysics, Heidegger says, to end 
(i.e., complete itself) in the loss of the supersensory: 
Metaphysics is the space of history in which it becomes destiny for the 
supersensory world, ideas, God, moral law, the authority of reason, progress, the 
happiness of the greatest number, culture, and civilization to forfeit their 
constructive power and to become void. (OBT, 165) 
 
Nihilism, then, is a historical movement—not a “period of history.” As Heidegger puts it, 
“Nihilism, thought in its essence, is . . . . the fundamental movement of the history of the 
West” (163). Moreover, he says, “Metaphysics is an epoch of the history of being itself. 
In its essence, however, metaphysics is nihilism” (198). Since the sciences are the 
“offspring” of metaphysics (159), they are well within the reach of the “tandem” critique 
of “metaphysics-as-nihilism” in this work. Let us keep before us, then, the question of 
whether religion and theology are also. 
In this regard, consider Heidegger’s characterization of the role of theology in the loss of 
the supersensory that characterizes nihilism:  
But when the pure faith in God as defined by the Church fades, when theology in 
particular, as the doctrine of the faith, finds itself curbed and forced to one side in 
serving its role as the normative explanation of beings in their entirety, . . . (OBT, 
165, emphasis added). 
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The study of “beings—as beings—in their entirety” is another characterization of 
metaphysics. If theology is regarded as the “normative explanation” of such, does 
theology itself, then, necessarily lie within the orbit of metaphysical thinking? 
The loss of the supersensory is a consequence, or manifestation, of nihilism, but 
not its cause. Instead, Nietzsche locates this cause in the dispensation
190
 of “value” by the 
will to power (173). On Nietzsche’s view, the “death” of the supersensory is a 
devaluation of (and by) the highest values—such as beauty, goodness, and truth (166). In 
turn, this devaluation of the highest values by the highest values themselves, Nietzsche 
says, necessarily leads to a “revaluation of all values” and a seeking of “what is most 
alive” (ibid.).  
Heidegger then examines Nietzsche’s definition of “value” in detail: “The 
viewpoint of ‘value’ is the viewpoint of the conditions for preservation-increase in 
regard to the complex structures, relatively enduring, of life in the midst of becoming” 
(170). Heidegger expresses this simply as “. . . life in its essence proves to be that which 
sets values” (171). By Nietzsche’s definition, the life-giving conditions of preservation-
increase are for the sake of becoming, which, for Nietzsche, is equivalent to “the will to 
power” and “being in the broadest sense” (172). Thus, the setting and dispensation of 
values falls under the orbit of the will to power.  “The will to power is the ground for the 
necessity of dispensing values and the origin of the possibility of value-estimation” (172). 
The relation of value and the will to power is reciprocal—in the sense that the will to 
power is fundamentally thought out of the notion of “value” itself.   
                                                 
190. I.e., distribution, administration, or management. 
  
190 
 
 
 
Nietzsche hyphenates the two conditions of life as “preservation-increase” to 
emphasize two claims: first, that preservation is necessary for the increase of life; and 
second, that preservation without increase inevitably leads to the decline of life (171). He 
holds that the posited condition of continued increase in order for life to flourish holds for 
the will to power as well: “To will at all amounts to the will to become stronger, the will 
to grow . . . .”191 Thus the essence of the will to power is to constantly overpower (i.e., 
overreach) itself.  
On Nietzsche’s view, the essence of the will to power is the essence of beings in 
general. As Heidegger puts it, the essence of the will to power is “the fundamental trait of 
all reality” (176). For Nietzsche, this amounts to an “overcoming” of metaphysics. For, if 
the will to power establishes and dispenses all values, then all “values” posited by past, 
present, and future metaphysical systems (such as truth, justice, etc.) are “devalued”—
i.e., deemed worthless, irrelevant. A new “value,” so to speak, has been established in 
their place: namely, the will to power whose essence is to will itself. For Heidegger, 
however, Nietzsche’s thought remains within the orbit of metaphysics because he 
conflates being itself with the being of beings, thought by Nietzsche as the will to 
power—fundamentally tied to the notion of “value”:  
Because thinking in terms of values is grounded in the metaphysics of the will to 
power, Nietzsche’s interpretation of nihilism, as the process of devaluing the 
highest values and revaluing all values, is a metaphysical interpretation; it is 
metaphysical, in fact, in the sense of the metaphysics of the will to power. (OBT, 
187) 
 
                                                 
191. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, no. 675, from 1887/8, quoted in OBT, 175. 
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Indeed, Nietzsche’s thought itself is nihilistic, because the revaluation that occurs after 
the highest values are dethroned is. nevertheless, a value in itself. Nonetheless, both 
thinkers agree that metaphysics has reached its “end”—in the sense of completing the arc 
of its history from Plato and Aristotle to Nietzsche himself. 
In Heidegger’s eyes, the value-centered thinking in Nietzsche’s treatment of 
nihilism is disastrous for thinking the question of being. Nietzsche’s conflation of being 
itself with the being of beings, understood as the will to power, reduces being itself to a 
value. “. . . being has sunk down to a value in metaphysics” (193). Furthermore, in 
Nietzsche’s value-centric metaphysical system, “God” is constituted as that which is of 
the highest value, i.e., God is the “highest being” (194). Heidegger excoriates the 
employment of this interpretation by 
 the faithful and their theologians who talk of the beingmost of all beings without 
ever letting it occur to them to think about being itself and thereby become aware 
that this thinking and that talking, from the perspective of the faith, is absolute 
blasphemy when it is mixed into the theology of the faith. (OBT, 194) 
 
If there is to be a “place” for theology, then, by Heidegger’s lights, it will have to break 
out of the confines of metaphysical thinking.
192
 Is there a place for a non-metaphysical, 
non-valuing theology? 
 Heidegger’s antipathy for thinking in “values” is expressed vividly in connection 
with the Madman’s claim that “We’ve killed him [i.e., God]—you and I. We are all his 
murderers.”193 (161, 194). Heidegger writes: “. . . to think in values is to kill radically” 
                                                 
192. Recall from my discussion in Section 2.4 above Heidegger’s admonition to theologians (since 
at least the 1950s) to cease relying upon philosophy to shore up their theologizing.  
 
193. Friedrich Nietzsche, La Gaya Scienza, section 125, quoted in OBT, 161. 
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(196). He interprets the Madman’s exclamation and subsequent poetic explanations in 
terms of the history of Western metaphysics, starting with the subject-object split 
initiated by Descartes: 
This killing means the elimination, through man, of the supersensory world that 
has its being in itself. This killing identifies the process in which beings as such 
are not absolutely annihilated, but rather become otherwise in their being. 
However, in this process, man too, and above all, becomes otherwise. He 
becomes the one who eliminates beings in the sense of beings in themselves. The 
human uprising into subjectivity makes beings into objects [Gegenstand]. 
However, what is objective is that which, through representation, has been 
brought to a stand. The elimination of beings in themselves, the killing of God, is 
accomplished in the securing of duration through which man secures bodily, 
material, spiritual, and intellectual durables; however, these are secured for the 
sake of man’s own security, which wills the mastery over beings (as potentially 
objective), in order to conform to the being of beings, the will to power. (OBT, 
195) 
 
We can hear in the closing sentence a foregrounding of his characterization of the essence 
modern technology as Ge-stell—the challenging forth of all that is as standing-reserve 
(Bestand). The “killing of God” is the forgetting of the question of being itself, the 
reduction of beings in themselves to our objectification of them through representational 
thinking, in an ultimately futile gesture to find security in certainty. In effect, Heidegger 
issues a warning to theology in light of this “killing” of God: 
God ceases to be a living God if in our continuing attempts to master the real we 
fail to take his reality seriously beforehand and question it, if we fail to reflect 
whether man has so matured toward the essence into which he is forced from out 
of being that he withstands this destiny that sends him out of his essence, and does 
so without the false relief of mere expedients. (OBT, 190) 
 
In the face of the ever-increasing, essentially unstoppable exercise of the will to 
power as the essence of the “real,” Nietzsche posits the overman (Übermensch) as “[t]he 
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man whose essence is the essence that is willing and willed out of the will to power” 
(188). The overman is the “successor” of the last man (letzte Mensch) in the sense that 
the overman passes over—and overpasses—the last man. Who is the “last man,” also 
named by Heidegger as the “erstwhile man”—that is, the former, one-time man? 
According to Nietzsche’s metaphysics, erstwhile man is called erstwhile because 
although his essence is determined by the will to power as the fundamental trait of 
all beings, he nonetheless has not experienced and taken over the will to power as 
this fundamental trait. (OBT, 189) 
 
Otherwise said, the last man has not yet come into his own essence and embraced it as his 
own. 
Let us now turn to Heidegger’s examination of nihilism in What Is Called 
Thinking? In this work, two different paths of the analysis and possible “resolution,” so to 
speak, by Nietzsche and Heidegger, of the impasse reached by the “end” of metaphysics 
come together. Whereas Nietzsche personifies the impasse and possible resolution in the 
figures of the last man and overman, respectively, Heidegger expresses this impasse and 
possible resolution by contrasting calculative thought with meditative thinking. As the 
following two passages from this work clearly show, Heidegger draws these paths 
together by linking the figure of the last man with man as animal rationale and then with 
idea-forming, representational thinking:
194
   
The man [the last man] whom he who passes over [the overman] overpasses is 
man as he is so far. . . . Nietzsche calls him the as yet undetermined animal. This 
implies: homo est animal rationale. . . . Man is the beast endowed with reason. 
(WCT, 61)  
 
                                                 
194. Heidegger has previously linked the figure of humankind as animal rationale and calculative 
thought in, for example, The Principle of Reason (129). 
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In this species of last man, there, reason—the forming of representational ideas—
will inevitably perish in a peculiar way and, as it were, become self-ensnarled. 
Ideas then limit themselves to whatever happens to be provided at the moment—
the kind of provisions that are supplied at the enterprise and pleasure of the 
human manner of forming ideas, and are pleased to be generally comprehensible 
and palatable. . . . The last man—the final and definitive type of man so far—fixes 
himself, and generally all that is, by a specific way of representing ideas.
195
 
(WCT, 62, emphasis added)   
 
In sum, then, it can be said that nihilism, metaphysics, animal rationale, the last 
man, calculative thought, and idea-forming/representational thought—all say the same 
thing.
196
  
Heidegger expresses the crisis of nihilism and its equivalences in terms of the figure of 
the last man:  
Is the man of today in his metaphysical nature prepared to assume dominion over 
the earth as a whole? . . . Is the nature of this man of today such that it is fit to 
manage those powers, and put to use those means of power, which are released as 
the nature of modern technology unfolds, forcing man to unfamiliar decisions? 
Nietzsche’s answer to these questions is No. (WCT, 65; emphasis added)   
 
This can be heard as a question of the essence of humankind as well as a question of 
destiny—a question to which we turn in the next and final section of this chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                 
195. On Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, Nietzsche did not see the fundamental connection 
between idea-forming, representational thinking and the essential nature of the last man. Rather, on this 
reading, revenge characterizes this essential nature, and revenge itself is characterized by “the will’s 
revulsion against time and its ‘It was’” (Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part II, “On 
Deliverance,” quoted in WCT, 93). 
 
196. For Heidegger, such a multiplicity of meanings “is the element in which all thought must 
move in order to be strict thought. . . . we always must seek out thinking, and its burden of thought, in the 
element of its multiple meanings, else everything will remain closed to us” (WCT, 71).  
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5.4 Ethics and Destiny  
The meaning of destiny is customarily associated with one or more of the 
following interpretations: one’s fortune lot, or outcome; the succession of events that led 
to the outcome; and/or that which predetermines such events and the resulting 
outcome.
197
 This conventional meaning can be heard in the question Heidegger raises in 
the final sentence of his closing “Address” in The Principle of Reason: “. . . what will 
become of the earth and of human existence on this earth” (POR, 129). That is, what 
result or outcome might we expect in facing this question of the future of planet earth and 
its inhabitants? 
Heidegger succinctly describes this customary interpretation of destiny as 
follows: “We usually understand Geschick [destiny] as being that which has been 
determined and imposed through fate: a sorrowful, an evil, a fortunate Geschick. This 
meaning is a derivative one” (61). Heidegger hears the word “destiny” differently, 
however. On his view, “Geschick” names a family of meanings derived from cognates of 
the verb, schicken (“to send”), and original meanings of this pivotal word. For him, 
Geschick is a nonfatalistic Geschick of Being. 
The purpose of this section is to examine connections (if any) between destiny—
heard in the customary sense as well as in Heidegger’s interpretation of Geschick—and 
ethics, understood in terms of “dwelling” (ethos). I shall argue that the question of 
destiny—heard in either sense—is, at root, a question of dwelling. Thus, it could be said 
                                                 
197. Adapted from the definition of “destiny” from TheFreeDictionary, s.v. “destiny,” accessed 
June 9, 2012, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/destiny. 
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that dwelling is destiny. To support this claim, I shall draw upon Heidegger’s explication 
of thinking and poetry and their interrelation in earlier sections.  
In “Building Dwelling Thinking” and “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .,” 
Heidegger establishes that thinking and poetry, in effect, belong together in dwelling. 
Although neither by itself is sufficient for dwelling, they are each indispensable for 
dwelling. Heidegger’s initially describes dwelling as “the manner in which mortals are on 
the earth” (PLT, 146). Given this rather general description, can we say that dwelling is 
destiny? 
This increasingly seems to be the case, if we hear these words in their customary 
meaning. Robust evidence continues to accumulate, strongly indicating that the past and 
current manner of human activity across the globe is significantly affecting present and 
future conditions for life on earth. Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees are co-
founders of ecological footprint analysis, “an accounting tool that enables us to estimate 
the resource consumption and waste assimilation requirements of a defined human 
population or economy in terms of a corresponding productive land area.”198 The 
worldwide per capita demand for productive land in 2001 was estimated to be 2.2 
hectares per person, while the worldwide per capita supply to provide such productive 
land sustainably (aka, “carrying capacity”) was only 1.8 hectares per person.199 The 
difference is a worldwide unsustainable “ecological overshoot” of 0.4 hectares per 
                                                 
198. Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact 
on the Earth (Stony Creek, CT: 1996), 9. 
 
199. Mathis Wackernagel, Dan Moran, Sahm White, and Michael Murray, “Ecological Footprint 
accounts for advancing sustainability: measuring human demands on nature,” in Sustainable Development 
Indicators in Ecological Economics, ed. Philip Lawn (Northampton, MA: 2006), 251, 255. 
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person. Otherwise expressed, more than one “earth” is needed to maintain the current 
demand for land, water, minerals, and energy to support human life and activity across 
the planet. They describe “overshoot” and its consequences in stark terms: 
The depletion of ecological assets systematically undermines the well-being of 
people. Livelihoods disappear; irreconcilable conflicts emerge; families are hurt; 
land becomes barren; and resources become more costly before eventually 
running out. . . . If humanity does not react in time, we will face the prospect of 
collapse.
200
 
 
 
The growing ecological footprint of humankind is unmistakably impacting global 
climate patterns, primarily by increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in 
the atmosphere. The most recent comprehensive assessment of global climate change 
conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) includes these 
summary statements: 
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal . . . Observational evidence
 
from 
all continents and most oceans shows that many natural systems are being 
affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases. . . . 
[Subsection 1] 
Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the 
mid-20
th
 century is very likely [probability>90%] due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic GHG [greenhouse gas] concentrations. . . . [Subsection 2] 
Continued GHG emissions at or above current rates would cause further 
warming and induce many changes in the global climate system during the 21
st
 
century that would very likely [probability>90%] be larger than those observed 
during the 20
th
 century. . . . [Subsection 3] (emphasis added)
201
 
 
                                                 
200. Ibid., 248. 
 
201. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Core Writing Team (R. K. Pachauri and 
A. Reisinger, eds.), “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report: Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (Geneva, 
Switzerland: IPCC, 2007), 104 pp., https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html. 
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) involved “more than 500 Lead Authors and 2000 Expert Reviewers” 
(ibid., Foreward). 
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Indeed, the increasing impact of humanity upon the face of the earth has been recently 
recognized in a proposal to name the current geological epoch the “Anthropocene 
Age.”—that is, the “Age of Man.”202   
In the general and everyday sense of these terms, then, dwelling (or the lack 
thereof) is unquestionably shaping our destiny. 
Let us turn now to Heidegger’s understanding of destiny as the Geschick of being 
and investigate ways in which thinking and poetry inform that understanding. In The 
Principle of Reason, Heidegger identifies the history of Western thought with the history 
of being, also understood as the Geschick of being. As we have seen in the previous 
section, Nietzsche identifies this history with nihilism: “Nihilism is the destiny of [our] 
own history” (OBT, 164). This history, Heidegger says, is marked by the self-revealing 
and withdrawing of being (POR, 75). Moreover, the Geschick of being is not a one-way 
“sending” of—or by—being to beings as passive recipients. Indeed, Heidegger contends 
that a sense of reciprocity obtains between being and human beings via the Geschick of 
being in a way that should put to rest any charges of fatalism in his construal of destiny: 
As the ones bestowed by being in the Geschick of being we stand—and indeed do 
so in accordance with our essential nature—in a clearing and lighting of being. 
But we do not just stand around in this clearing and lighting without being 
addressed; rather we stand in it as those who are claimed by the being of beings. 
As the ones standing in the clearing and lighting of being we are the ones 
bestowed, the ones ushered into the time play-space. This means we are the ones 
engaged in and for this play-space, engaged in building on and giving shape to 
the clearing and lighting of being—in the broadest and multiple sense, in 
preserving it. (POR, 85, my emphasis) 
 
                                                 
202. See Paul J. Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” in Nature 415 (3 January 2002): 23, 
doi:10.1038/415023a, and Elizabeth Kolbert, “Enter the Anthropocene Age of Man,” in National 
Geographic 219, no. 3 (March 2011): 60-61, 64-65, 69-73, 75-77, 79, 81, 83, 85, http://0-search.proquest 
.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/873247302?accountid=14608. 
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This passage explicitly signals an active dimension in Heidegger’s characterization of the 
essence of humankind. 
Heidegger distinguishes between “the full Geschick of being” and the particular 
epochs in which the “clearing and lighting of being” is manifested.  On the one hand, he 
declares that epochs cannot be derived from each other or tracked. On the other hand, 
however, he asserts that each epoch leaves a legacy for the next. The legacy “always 
comes from what is concealed in the Geschick . . .” (POR, 91). By Heidegger’s lights, the 
legacy of each epoch since the pre-Socratics has been the forgotten question of Being 
itself.  
In the QCT essay, Heidegger characterizes the current epoch of the Geschick of 
being as Ge-stell (Enframing), the essence of modern technology. In this work, examined 
closely in Section 4.1 above, Geschick is translated as destining and described as a 
“sending-that-gathers which first starts man upon a way of revealing” (QCT, 24). Ge-stell 
is a particular form, or mode, of Geschick. More precisely, just as Nietzsche declares that 
nihilism is the end, or completion, of Western history, so Heidegger regards Ge-stell as 
the end, or fulfillment, of this history, whose single destiny is the Geschick of Being. In 
contrast to destining of revealing as a bringing forth (Hervorbringen), Ge-stell is a 
destining of revealing in the guise of a challenging forth (Herausfordern) that reduces all 
that is to instrumental usefulness. Can we dwell in an epoch of Ge-stell?  
Heidegger contends that, in every epoch, the Geschick of being poses a danger, 
but its particular manifestation as Ge-stell poses a supreme danger in two senses: the loss 
of humankind’s own essence and the possible elimination of humankind ever again 
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entering into destining as revealing in a mode of Hervorbringen. Nevertheless, thinking 
with the poets, Friedrich Hölderlin and Rainer Maria Rilke, Heidegger refutes any sense 
of fatalism in facing the supreme danger of Ge-stell. He contends that poetry, inclusive of 
art, can herald the saving power which lies near—and possibly within—this supreme 
danger, as attested by Hölderlin: 
   But where danger is, grows 
   The saving power also.
203
 
 
Despite Ge-stell’s characterization as challenging-forth, Heidegger contends that 
Ge-stell “has its origin as a destining in bringing-forth” (QCT, 29-30; emphasis added). 
Simply as a destining of revealing, Ge-stell comes to pass as a granting and 
consequently, he says, is as such the saving power (32; original emphasis). By thinking 
Ge-stell as the destining of revealing Being in our epoch, Heidegger has established that 
Hölderlin’s dictum holds in the case of the supreme danger of the essence of modern 
technology.  Otherwise said, the inherent riskiness in Geschick—understood as the 
destining of revealing Being in any epoch—is itself the door to the saving power to 
preserve and protect humankind in its essential nature as it confronts Ge-stell. 
In “Why Poets?,” Heidegger examines the relation between riskiness and the 
saving power primarily by pondering Rilke’s remarkable claim that our defenselessness 
in the face of risk is that which saves us. In his unpublished poem, Rilke speaks of risk in 
three senses, which Heidegger interprets of thinking the question of Being. First, 
Nature—life itself (i.e., Being itself, for Heidegger)—risks us (OBT, 208-9). Second, we 
                                                 
203. This is the translated version that appears in the QCT essay (QCT, 28). A slightly different 
translation appears in “Why Poets?” “But where the danger lies, there also grows/that which saves” (OBT, 
222). See Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. 
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go with the risk, Rilke says. On Heidegger’s reading, we go with it—not by going 
passively along with it—but rather  by willfully objectifying and re-presenting  the world 
to ourselves in order to attempt to manage and control this risk (215). Third, by 
sometimes risking even more than “life itself does,” a safebeing is fashioned, “outside of 
all defense” (207, 223). It is the poets, Heidegger says, who risk more. It is their song that 
“turns our defenselessness into the open” (239). Again, it is the riskiness of it all that not 
only opens the path to the saving power but, in a fundamental sense, constitutes the 
saving power itself. 
Let us return to Heidegger’s question at the close of the Address that follows the 
13 lectures in The Principle of Reason: “. . . what will become of the earth and of human 
existence on this earth” (POR, 129). This is the question of destiny as it is ordinarily 
expressed. What do Heidegger’s explications in this chapter have to say in response? In 
the preceding paragraphs, Heidegger tells us that the outcome to this question depends 
upon locating a path to noncalculative thinking. In turn, locating such a path hinges on 
rejecting the determination of the essence of human beings as the animal rationale—i.e., 
the reckoning, calculating creature. The question of humankind and the question of 
thinking are inseparable. Heidegger regards finding a path upon which the thinking of the 
essence of being is regarded as worthy of thought as “the world-question of thinking.” 
Moreover, he says, “Answering this question decides what will become of the earth and 
of human existence on the earth” (ibid.).  
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A few years after delivering his lectures that comprise The Principle of Reason, 
Heidegger stated that meditative thinking is humankind’s essential nature.204  So it seems 
likely that the sought-after path would accommodate such thinking. However, I do not 
hear Heidegger asserting that such a path is exclusively constituted by thinking of any 
kind. Rather, as he says, he seeks a path upon which thinking can think the essence of 
being. Thus, the path is not necessarily exhausted by thinking. Indeed, for Heidegger, the 
Saying of the essence of Being is a shared responsibility of both thinking and poetry.
205
  
To sum up, we have come “full circle,” so to speak, in thinking the dwelling-
destiny relation out of the thinking-poetry relation. Thinking and poetry each belong 
together with dwelling, and they belong together in their own right in the neighborhood 
occasioned by the nearness of their shared responsibility of Saying Being, each in a 
distinctive way. As I see it, thinking and poetry, in their belonging together, are upon the 
path that Heidegger envisions to respond to his world-question of thinking. In that sense, 
then, that which makes dwelling possible—thinking and poetry together—does determine 
our destiny. 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter defends the claim that dwelling is destiny—established by the 
belonging together of thinking and poetry. “Dwelling” (ethos) is the originary meaning of 
“ethics” for Heidegger. “Dwelling” means the peaceful abiding on earth in the mode of 
“letting be” (Gelassenheit). Building, thinking, and poetry are essential for dwelling. 
                                                 
204. See “Memorial Address,” in DOT, 56. Also see my discussion in Section 4.4 above. 
 
205. See “On the Nature of Language” in OWL, 82 and 89-90 as discussed in Section 5.1 above. 
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Here, thinking is the pondering, of dwelling (ethics), and poetry is the taking of the 
measure of the dimension between earth and sky. Such measure-taking, Heidegger says, 
has always been the means by which man has measured himself or herself. Thinking and 
poetry also belong together in their own right in “Saying” Being—i.e., giving Being by 
means of the gift of the word, each in its own distinctive way. On Heidegger’s view, 
destiny is thought as the sending of Being (Geschick) rather than as some sort of fateful 
outcome. Yet mankind is not a passive recipient of such sending, but instead is “engaged 
in building on and giving shape to the clearing and lighting of being” (POR, 85). 
The overarching context for this analysis is nihilism, variously interpreted as the 
loss of the supersensory as well as the end, or completion, of metaphysics—which itself 
is taken to be the history of Western thought. The loss of the supersensory, epitomized in 
Nietzsche’s word, “God is dead,” speaks not only to the widespread and growing loss of 
belief in the Christian God (or any god), but also the loss of meaning in ideas themselves 
and belief in their power to inspire and transform. In response to this void, thinking in 
values has come to the fore. Whether linked to “the will to power” in Nietzsche’s thought 
or to Ian Barbour’s functional conceptualization, values now take the measure of all that 
is. On Heidegger’s view, however, such talk of values arises from reductively thinking 
Being as the Being of beings and ruptures the inherent belonging together of the Ought 
and Being itself. (By purporting to take the measure of all that is, values themselves 
cannot be and thus are irreparably separated from the Being of beings.)  
The question of destiny is inseparable from the questions of the essence of 
humankind and the essence of thinking. It can be heard in Heidegger’s formulation of 
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Nietzsche’s question: “Is man in his metaphysical nature prepared to assume dominion 
over the earth?” Heidegger and Nietzsche each thinks the question with regard to the 
animal rationale—the customary and still dominant formulation of the essence of 
humankind as the reckoning, calculating creature. Nietzsche responds by positing the 
overman as successor to the last man. Heidegger thinks the question by positing 
meditative, mindful thinking in contrast to calculative thinking.  
With regard to the RST relation, these questions come to mind: First, thinking and 
poetry belong to the same neighborhood, Heidegger says, drawn there by the nearness of 
their shared responsibility to Say Being as Being. Despite their inherent divergences, is 
there a “neighborhood” in which religion, science, and theology belong together, in 
some sense? What might serve as a “catalyst,” so to speak? 
Second, poetry, Heidegger says, takes the measure of the dimension between 
earth and sky. If formulated as reflection on religious experience and belief, does 
theology take the measure of earth and sky, in its own way? Or does theology, so 
construed, remain “earthbound,” so to speak? 
Third, in light of the growing “footprint” of humankind on the earth, is there 
“room” on the path upon which noncalculative thinking can think and say Being for 
calculative thinking as well?  
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Epilogue: The Question of Being and the RST Relation 
 
Three primary questions initially motivated this inquiry: First, in general, how are 
the interrelations (if any) among religion, science, and theology to be understood?  
Second, in particular, is there an important sense in which religion and science 
(alternatively, theology and science) can be said to be in “dialogue”? And third, is there a 
meaningful place for theology in the “public square” that is still dominated by the view 
that science serves as the “gold standard” for rationality and truth?206 
I have attempted to think the RST relation in light of these motivating questions 
out of Heidegger’s engagement with the question of Being, in its many guises. In so 
doing, cross-cutting threads of comportment to things, reflection, thinking, and destiny 
have emerged. Each thread presences in two different modes: objectifying vs, 
nonobjectifying (Section 2.4); Reflexion vs. Besinnung (Section 3.4); calculative thinking 
vs. meditative, mindful thinking (Section 4.4); and fate vs. the sending of Being 
(Geschick) (Section 5.4). Roughly speaking, the first elements in the first three pairs 
collectively characterize modern science, whereas the second elements collectively 
characterize religion (specifically, Christian religious life) (Sections 2.1-2.3).  
However, I contend that no similar assessments can be made for theology—at 
least in its common formulation as reflection on religious experience and belief. Indeed, 
the binaries in comportment, reflection, and thinking serve to interrogate theology as to 
                                                 
206. As I briefly argued in Chapter 1, these questions fundamentally motivated the establishment 
and early development of the academic field of RST studies. 
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its essential nature. Thinking, with Heidegger, (Christian) theology is totally 
nonobjectifying, but in what specific manner—like the blooming rose, poetry, or . . . ? 
(Section 2.4). Is the essence of theology expressed in reflection as representional, 
conceptual, calculative thought (Reflexion), or as mindful, meditative thinking 
(Besinnung)—or both? (Sections 3.4 and 4.4). And does theology have anything of 
significance to say with regard to the future of the earth and life upon the earth? (Section 
5.4). As I see it, theology is the undetermined—or perhaps better, the underdetermined—
member of the RST triad. 
Before commenting further on the “question of theology,” I propose expanding 
the context for thinking the RST relation beyond that given earlier in Section 1.2 and the 
ensuing inquiry in Chapters 2-5. In my view, the context for thinking the RST relation 
today must also include the growing ecological footprint of humankind on the earth, 
including its climate-altering consequences (Section 5.4). 
 In addition, I regard as essential three compelling “world-questions” posed by 
Heidegger in these chapters: First, what will become of the earth and of human existence 
on the earth? (POR, 129; see Section 5.4). As I have suggested earlier, this question 
starkly expresses the question of destiny in its ordinary meaning. Clearly, however, it is 
unanswerable as formulated. What Heidegger does say is that the unfolding of the 
unknowable future depends upon answering a second question, expressed in two 
equivalent ways. Is there a path upon which noncalculative thought can think Being? 
(ibid.)  In other words, is the essential nature of humankind that of the animal rationale 
or ______________? (ibid.). Nietzsche filled in the blank with overman; Heidegger fills 
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it with man as mindful, meditative thinker. The third question, Nietzsche’s question as 
formulated by Heidegger, expresses all of this integrally: “Is man in his metaphysical 
nature prepared to assume dominion over the earth?” (WCT, 65; see Section 5.3). I 
suggest that the current and projected status of global ecology and these three world-
questions can serve to measure the significance of any attempt to think the RST relation 
in the “Anthropocene Age” in which some scientists say we now live (Section 5.4). 
As hinted in my questions for theology in Chapters 2-5, I contend that theology 
must incorporate or otherwise accommodate, in some sense, both modes of comportment 
to things, both modes of reflection, and both modes of thinking—including poeticizing—
in order to think and speak with significance about these compelling matters in the public 
square, as well as in the academy, and in religious communities today. Such a “multi-
modal” formulation of theology can serve to mediate, or bridge, the singular modalities 
that characterize religion and science. What is called for, in my view, are theologies that 
can foster a thinking-thanking-poeticizing (Denken-Danken-Dichten) mode of inter-
relationality among religion, science, and theology. To develop these claims further, let 
us return to the initial motivating questions. 
I begin with the last question: Does theology have a legitimate place in the public 
square? From the readings selected for this inquiry, Heidegger consistently affirmed such 
a place for theology, but not without some conditions (Sections 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, and 5.3). 
Briefly stated, the conditions are that theology think and speak in its own way, 
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independent from science and philosophy.
207
  Heidegger states this unequivocally in his 
letter to the Second Consultation on Hermeneutics at Drew University in 1964 (Section 
2.4). Namely, theology’s major task is 
not to borrow the categories of its thinking and the form of its speech from 
philosophy or the sciences, but to think and speak out of faith for faith with 
fidelity to its subject matter. If this faith by the power of its own conviction 
concerns the human being as human being in his very nature, then genuine 
theological thinking and speaking have no need of any special preparation in 
order to reach people and find a hearing among them. (P, 55; emphasis added) 
 
Roughly speaking, then, if theology has something to think and say that touches the core 
of what it means to be human in today’s global context, then by all means it should do 
such thinking and saying—and do it faithfully without any help from philosophy or the 
sciences. Given, then, that theology has a legitimate “right” to be in the public square, 
does it have a responsibility to be there? Heidegger’s PAT lecture supports such a view. 
Therein he emphasizes that religion without theology would be mute; theological 
concepts are necessary, Heidegger says, to grasp the “inconceivability” of faith (P, 50).  
Thinking with Heidegger, I therefore suggest that a fundamental task of theology 
is to assist faith-based religion in bringing its voice to the RST relation in the face of the 
challenges of the Anthropocene Age. That is, out of their reciprocal relation,
208
 theology 
can enable their joint participation with science in the academy, the public square, and in 
                                                 
207. In his 1927/28 lecture, “Phenomenology and Theology,” Heidegger did claim that theology 
should demand of philosophy assistance in clarifying the ontological concepts that undergird theological 
concepts (P, 53).  However, as I have shown in Section 2.4, later works do not mention any such role for 
philosophy. 
 
208. “Theology . . . not only . . . makes faith and that which is believed its object, but . . . itself 
arises out of faith” (P, 46). See Section 2.3 above. 
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scientific and religious communities to fashion effective responses in the mode of 
bringing forth (Hervorbringen) and letting be (Gelassenheit). 
Second, is there an important sense in which religion, science, and theology can 
be said to be in “dialogue”? Taking “dialogue” at first in its ordinary meaning, we are 
asking whether some important interconnections or “common ground” exists among 
them. Do they “belong together” in some sense? Heidegger examines the belonging 
together of thinking and poetry in terms of nearness and neighborhood. He holds that 
they belong to one neighborhood that is occasioned by the nearness of Saying. Each 
“Says” Being in its own way; Being is given by the gift of the Word.209 
 What is it that might occasion a “neighborhood” for religion, science, and 
theology? I suggest that the unprecedented perils—and opportunities—in the unfolding of 
the Anthropocene Age and Heidegger’s three world-questions may qualify. Thinking 
ontically, the most thought-provoking thing today, in my view, is that we have barely 
begun to acknowledge—let alone respond to—the unsustainable, climate-altering 
patterns of resource use and waste generation that threaten all life on earth. Thinking 
ontologically, that which threatens the extinction of Dasein threatens the elimination of 
the clearing for the disclosure of Being. Simply put, the survival of Dasein is essential for 
the truth of Being. I am suggesting that the unprecedented power of humankind to alter 
decisively the conditions necessary for life on this planet places this facticity at the 
“border,” so to speak, between the ontical and the ontological. 
                                                 
209. See “On the Nature of Language” in OWL (82, 89-90). Also see Section 5.1. 
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 For thinking and poetry, the Same that is the nearness that occasions their 
neighborhood of belonging together lies in the commonality of that which they do—i.e., 
giving Being as the gift of the word. For religion, science, and theology, could it be a 
common commitment to gazing steadfastly and truthfully into the abyss brought into view 
by the emergence of the Anthropocene Age and the three world-questions of Heidegger 
and Nietzsche? I am suggesting that the Same for the RST relation is not common 
activity but, first of all, commonality that springs from steadfast, truth-filled gazing at the 
abyss together, yet each element doing so in its own way.  
 Of course, there already is much staring at—and some looking into—the abyss, 
but reaching into it is another matter. Studies and reports come to the public’s attention 
regularly, pointing to the ecological “cliff” we face in a matter of decades, if not sooner. 
Although many individual, local, regional, and national actions are underway, the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere continues to rise and glaciers and 
ice caps continue to melt. Focused, effective action on a worldwide scale is not yet on the 
horizon. Thinking with Rilke and Heidegger, the essential nature of science and 
technology leads to going with this risk by objectifying it in calculable terms as a basis 
for fashioning defenses to ward off these dangers. Poets, in contrast, are those who risk 
more by reaching into the abyss to fashion a safebeing, outside of all defenses. In so 
doing, they take the measure of the dimension between earth and sky—and thereby the 
measure of humankind; they sing of the wholeness within unwholeness, of a saving 
power—precisely where the extreme danger lies. Can theology, in its own way, reach 
into the abyss—or otherwise facilitate such reaching by religion, say—and join poetry in 
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these tasks? And what about science? On Heidegger’s view, science does not—and 
cannot—reach into the abyss, as it objectifies the abyss initially as something threatening 
that stands over against us and subsequently as something representable to us and 
amenable to conceptual, calculable analysis and technical management.  
 I suggest, however, that the RST relation itself, so to speak, can—and must—
reach into the abyss. The individual elements cannot do so by themselves; however, I 
contend that such reaching together is possible and necessary. With respect to the first 
motivating question concerning the interrelations among the elements of the RST 
relation, the matter at issue is whether a mode of inter-relationality can be fashioned, out 
of which  a collegial reaching into the abyss might be possible. Simply put, we need the 
very best science possible to understand and describe in ontic terms the intertwined 
dynamics of human activity and the biosphere at local, relational, national, and global 
levels and projected consequences. Such analyses can provide a basis for an initial set of 
possible options for effective response. At the same time, in ontological terms, we need 
to inculcate and nurture the spirit of Gelassenheit—noncoercive  “letting be” that fosters 
contentment with “enough,” so that all others may have enough. Heidegger locates the 
spirit of Gelassenheit in mindful, meditative, remembering (besinnlich, nachdenkend, 
gedenkend) thinking. This spirit is also nurtured in each of the world’s great religions as 
the thread of the movement from egocentrism to concern for the well-being of the other. 
Thinking mindfully and meditatively in the spirit of Gelassenheit, modifications and 
additions to these initial options for responsible action may emerge. Here, the content-, 
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relational-, and enactment-senses of the phenomenon of Gelassenheit in the 
Anthropocene Age are all in play. 
 An example of reaching into the abyss from out of the RST relation is 
thoughtfully articulated in For the Common Good, co-authored by ecological economist 
Herman Daly and theologian John B. Cobb, Jr.
210
 They provide an extensive, rigorous 
critique of unfettered neoclassical economics and its subordination of the environment to 
economic processes and its axiomatic basis in individual self-interest. Instead, they call 
for constraining the size of the economy within the sustainable limits of the environment 
at local, regional, national, and global levels. Furthermore, they insist upon regarding 
individuals primarily as persons-in-community: “We believe human beings are 
fundamentally social and that economics should be refounded on the recognition of that 
reality” (Daly and Cobb, 164). While they acknowledge the great strength of market-
driven economic systems to bring supply and demand into equilibrium without central 
planning, they hold that such activity should be subordinate to maintaining the ecological 
integrity of the planet and fostering the well-being of all persons.
211
  
Daly and Cobb anchor their vision of biocentrism and the ultimate worth of 
human beings living in community out of an explicit religious vision, which they call 
theocentrism (ibid., Chapter 20). I pass over the details of theocentrism to cite a passage 
                                                 
210. Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy 
toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1994). 
 
211. In a move consonant with Heidegger’s recovery of originary meanings of familiar words, 
Daly and Cobb ground the primacy of the environment over economic activity by drawing upon Aristotle’s 
distinction between chrematistics and oikonomia (Daly and Cobb, Common Good, Chapter 7). The former 
focuses on short-term gains in exchange value for individuals, while the latter is the “economy of the 
household” and is centered upon fostering the long-term well-being of all those in the household (ibid., 
138).  
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that arguably exemplifies the clear-eyed, yet hope-filled, character of their formulation of 
the RST relation as Denken-Danken-Dichten: 
Yet there is hope. On a hotter planet, with lost deltas and shrunken coastlines, 
under a more dangerous sun, with less arable land, more people, fewer species of 
living things, a legacy of poisonous wastes, and much beauty irrevocably lost, 
there will still be the possibility that our children’s children will learn at last to 
live as a community among communities. Perhaps they will learn also to forgive 
this generation its blind commitment to ever greater consumption. Perhaps they 
will even appreciate its belated efforts to leave them a planet still capable of 
supporting life in community. (ibid., 406) 
 
 In my view, requiring “the very best science” in order to understand the interplay 
between human activity and the biosphere that is decisively shaping our future 
necessitates placing ecological economics as a primary and multi-faceted science in the 
RST discourse. Michael Welker cites works by Ted Peters, Robert Russell, and others as 
evidence that physics and biology have been the primary dialogue partners for theology 
since the inception of the RST academic field in the 1960s.
212
 Given the urgency of 
addressing unsustainable, climate-altering patterns of resource consumption and waste 
generation, I strongly suggest that it is time to grant comparable status to the emerging 
“trans-discipline” of ecological economics as a crucial discourse partner for religion and 
theology.
213
  
                                                 
212. Welker briefly describes a succession of three “phases” in thinking the science-theology 
relation: a methodological phase, a physics phase, and an emerging biology phase (Welker, “Science and 
Theology,” 553). 
 
213. Other theologians who have written insightfully about the interrelationships among religion, 
economics, and the environment include Larry L. Rasmussen, Earth Community Earth Ethics (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis, 1996) and Rosemary Radford Reuther, Integrating Ecofeminism, Globalization, and World 
Religions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). For a treatment of the science of ecological 
economics itself, see, for example, Herman E. Daly and Joshua Farley, Ecological Economics: Principles 
and Applications (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004). They write: “. . . ecological economics is not a 
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Let us return one more time to the formulation of theology as reflection on 
religious experience and belief. Expressed in this way, can theology possibly make the 
contribution of bridging the singular modalities of religion and science sketched above 
that seems called for? I suggest that Heidegger’s examination of different modes of the 
comportment to things, reflection, thinking, and destiny uncover latent meanings in this 
formula that can provide a path for genuine RST dialogue. Such a path entails a common 
commitment to desire-free gazing at the abyss, followed by reaching into it together in 
fruitful dialogue and mindful response.   
Consider the first half of the formula, “reflection on religious experience.” On 
Heidegger’s view, the meaning, or sense, of religious experience, taken as the 
phenomenon of religious life, unfolds in three “directions”—content-sense (the apostolic 
proclamation), relational-sense (having become, grounded in faith), and enactment-sense 
(comportment to everyday life) (Section 2.1, 2.3). His multi-faceted, phenomenological 
explication of the essence of religion (as factical life experience, oriented by faith) guards 
against forms of theological reflection that seek to objectify the essence of religion and 
therefore reduce it (as a science would) to its content-sense, that is, its “whatness.”214  
As for the second half of the theological formulation, “reflection on . . . religious 
belief,” Heidegger compactly links theology, faith, and belief in the PAT lecture: 
“Theology is the science of that which is disclosed in faith, of that which is believed” (P, 
                                                                                                                                                 
discipline, nor does it aspire to become one. For lack of a better term, we call it a ‘trans-discipline.’ . . . 
Real problems do not respect academic boundaries” (Daly and Farley, Ecological Economics, xvii). 
 
214. Recall Heidegger’s critique of Troeltsch’s objectification of religion: “Religion is for him an 
external object and can as such be integrated into different material complexes (as appropriate to different 
philosophical ‘systems’)” (PRL, 20). See Section 2.1. 
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45). That is, the content-sense of the phenomenon of believing is “not some coherent 
order of propositions about facts or occurrences which we simply agree to” (ibid.), but 
rather, is “Christ, the Crucified God” (44). The knowledge or understanding that faith has 
of itself is found in believing. On Heidegger’s view, then, faith is the undisclosed bridge 
that links the two halves of the customary formulation of theology as reflection on 
religious experience and belief.  
The chief matter at issue for both halves of this formulation of theology, however, 
is the manner, or mode, in which such reflection is carried out—i.e., within the orbit of 
representational, conceptual thought or mindful, meditative thought. Of equal importance 
is the mode, or manner, of theology’s comportment toward things (objectifying or not) 
and its thinking (calculating or mindfully meditative).  I suggested at the beginning of 
this Epilogue that, roughly speaking, religion is characterized by nonobjectifying 
comportment to things, meditative thinking, and mindful reflection, while science is 
characterized by the complementary cluster of objectifying comportment, calculative 
thought, and reflexive (egocentric) reflection. In part, my inquiry has delineated these 
two clusters as a compact expression of Heidegger’s claim that religion and science are 
two fundamental—and fundamentally different—ways of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. 
I suggest, then, that what is called for in this emergent Anthropocene Age are 
forms of theology that can bridge, or “traverse,” both of these modes of Being-in-the-
world. Forms of theology are needed to nurture and bring to intelligible public expression 
the ethic of love of neighbor, near and far, and the sacredness, or enchantment, of this 
earth as our ethos (dwelling-place). On the one hand, such theological forms should 
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engage science in academic dialogue regarding “boundary sensitivities and . . . 
conceptual limits,” as Michael Welcker calls for (Welker, “Science and Theology,” 558). 
On the other hand, theological forms are needed to help overcome the “muteness” of 
religion in the public square and the “deafness” of science to the relational- and 
enactment-senses of whatever phenomena are at issue in the public square. Such 
descriptions of theological engagements seem consistent with those expressed by Philip 
Hefner (and others) that the arenas for RST dialogue today must include the public square 
as well as the academy and religious and scientific communities. (See Sections 1.2.1 and 
1.2.2.) 
Let me say a bit more about “traversing.” I think that, for such theological 
“shuttling” between religion and science as modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world to be 
fruitful, it must grow out of the common gazing before the abyss. By “gazing,” I intend to 
connote Heidegger’s recovery of the root meaning of weil (typically taken to mean 
“because” in the sense of reason-seeking and giving) as weilen (in the earlier sense of 
tarrying, remaining still, keeping to oneself). He writes: “The while [das Weilen] . . . 
names the simple, plain presence that is without why—the presence upon which 
everything depends . . .”—that is, ground (POR, 127).215 In sum, “gazing” means “being 
present.” I hear in these words the tonalities of Gelassenheit and Hervorbringen: being 
present together—religion, science, theology—in releasement to the bringing-forth of the 
abyss. Speaking figuratively (as I have been doing for some time), theology  must 
“while” awhile with religion and science before that which is—the abyss of the emerging 
                                                 
215. See also Section 3.3 above. 
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Anthropocene Age and the world-questions of Heidegger and Nietzsche—and wait (not 
await) for that which must be done to come forth. 
Let us imaginatively return once more to the common gazing upon the abyss by 
religion, science, and theology. Recall that, on Heidegger’s view, the comportment to 
things—whether objectifying or non-objectifying—derives from Dasein’s distinctive 
modes of Being-in-the-world. Recall the “double-seeing” of the rose as, on the one hand, 
outside the why (“it blooms because it blooms”) yet within the why, when it becomes an 
object for our analysis and knowledge.
216
 He also declares that the research scientist can 
“see double”: 
Even if the sciences, precisely in following their way and using their means, can 
never press forward to the essence of science, still every researcher and teacher of 
the sciences, every man pursuing a way through a science, can move, as a 
thinking being, on various levels of reflection [Besinnung] and can keep reflection 
vigilant.
217
  
 
That is, the science researcher and teacher “can move . . .  on various levels of reflection” 
by thinking mindfully as well as calculatively when doing science.  
 This example suggests that perhaps it is time to move from thinking the RST 
relation in terms of nouns—religion, science, theology—to persons engaged in, or with, 
them. Thinking with Heidegger, let us consider modes of Dasein in which “theologizing,” 
“religionizing,” and “scientizing” are taking place. As we have seen in Being and Time 
and elsewhere, these activities reflect modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. And as I 
have argued (Section 2.2), these modes of Dasein, in a sense, “co-determine” Dasein’s 
                                                 
216. See The Principle of Reason, 35-37, and the discussion above in Section 3.3. 
 
217. Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” in QCT, 181-82. Quoted earlier in Section 3.4 above. 
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comportment to the entities in Dasein’s environment. The ready-to-hand becomes 
present-at-hand when Dasein’s mode shifts from that of everyday Dasein to the mode of 
science, for example.  
 Could this shifting, or traversing, of Dasein’s modes of Being-in-the-world—and 
the consequent comportment of Dasein to things in Dasein’s environment (objectifying or 
non-objectifying)—suggest imagining the “dialogue” within each Dasein and among the 
many Dasein, steadfastly gazing truthfully into the abyss? As I see it, this takes the 
possibility of “dialogue” beyond that of, say, theologian and scientist (as envisioned by, 
for example, Michael Welker) to that within each Dasein himself/herself. And is not that 
already prefigured, in a way, by Heidegger’s example of the science researcher and 
teacher quoted above? 
 I conclude this Epilogue by summarizing how this dissertation as a whole 
supports my thesis statement on page 2 of this inquiry. First, I have engaged the work of 
Ian Barbour and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen sufficiently to support my claim that 
“contemporary explications of the religion-science and science-theology relations are 
conducted in the mode of metaphysical (i.e., representational, reason-seeking and -
giving) thinking.” Second, in the course of examining several of Heidegger’s works that 
are germane to matters of continuing importance in the RST discourse (as expressed in 
the chapter titles), I have illuminated non-metaphysical modes of thinking that 
complement metaphysical perspectives which presently dominate this discourse. And 
third, I have imaginatively sketched from these resources a mode of interrelationality 
among religion, science, and theology (i.e., Denken-Danken-Dichten) that incorporates 
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both metaphysical and non-metaphysical thinking. In so doing, I have offered an 
interpretation of Dialogue (exemplified by Cobb and Daly’s For the Common Good) that 
I believe is pertinent to the unfolding challenges of the Anthropocene Age and the three 
“world questions” posed by Heidegger and Nietzsche. I have attempted to think the 
essence of the RST relation, in the sense of positing that these challenges and questions 
now serve as minimal criteria for any significant formulation of the RST relation in this 
epoch. 
Finally, this inquiry has called into question the essential nature of theology itself. 
Whereas I have argued that religion and science bifurcate rather cleanly along 
nonmetaphysical vs. metaphysical lines, I see no such inherent clarity for theology. 
Rather, the dualities in comportment to things, reflection, and thinking that come to light 
in Heidegger’s works serve to interrogate the customary formulation of theology as 
reflection on religious experience and belief. As I see it, the possibility of genuine 
Dialogue in this current Age hinges on whether or not theology can—and will—traverse 
nonobjectifying as well as objectifying comportment to things, mindful as well as 
Cartesian reflection, and meditative as well as calculative thinking in its interrelations 
with religion and science. By incorporating both modes of comportment to things, 
reflection, and thinking, theology can legitimately claim its rightful place in the public 
square, as well as in academia and religious communities. And if we accept Heidegger’s 
claim that religion, science, and theology are different modes of Being-in-the-world for 
us (as Dasein), then these tasks are not only for professional theologians but for each of 
us as well. 
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Appendix: Schema of the Dissertation 
 
Thinking, with Heidegger, the Religion-Science-Theology Relation 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Motivating 
Questions 
 How are the interrelations among religion, science, and theology to be understood?  
 Is a relation of “dialogue,” in some sense, possible among these three elements? 
 Does theology have a rightful place in the public square dominated by the view that  
science serves as the “gold standard” for rationality and truth? 
Context 
 Why RST?  Religion-Science (Hefner, Barbour) vs. Theology-Science (Welker)  RST 
 Proffered “bridge”:  theology as reflection on religious experience and belief 
 Significance of thinking RST relation: Whitehead (1926), Barbour (1966), Zygon (1966) 
Reformu- 
lated MQs 
o With regard to the RST relation (Gefragte), what is its essential nature (Erfragte)? 
o Does thinking its essence matter in any urgent, compelling way? If so, how? 
 
Chapters 2-5: Threads 
Q of Being 
(formulations) 
Sense of Being Truth of Being Place of Being 
Chapter Titles 
(Befragten) 
2. Phenomenology 
& the RST Relation 
3. Truth 
& the RST 
Relation 
4. Technology 
& the RST Relation 
5. Ethics 
& the RST Relation 
Thread #1 
Role of philosophy? Is 
theology a science? 
Truth in religion, 
science, theology? 
Status of technology 
wrt RST relation? 
Significance of RST 
wrt dwelling (ethos)? 
Science 
Content-sense 
(“whatness”) 
 
Religion 
(i.e., religious 
life) 
Content-, relational- 
(how) & enactment- 
(how) senses 
Theology undetermined 
Threads 
#2-#5 
Comportment to 
things (2 forms: ↓) 
Reflection 
(2 forms: ↓) 
Thinking 
(2 forms: ↓) 
Destiny 
(2 forms: ↓) 
Science 
objectifying 
(Gegenstand, Objekt) 
Reflexion calculative 
fate vs. Geschick 
(i.e., sending of Being) 
Religion non-objectifying 
Besinnung 
(mindfulness) 
meditative 
Theology undetermined  
Q of Being  The Question of Man, Mankind (der Mensch) 
 
Epilogue: The Question of Being and (Rethinking)the RST Relation 
Expanded 
Context 
 Emergence of the Anthropocene Age (Crutzen); ecological footprint (Wackernagel, Rees) 
 Heidegger’s world-questions:  What will become of the earth and its inhabitants? Is there a 
path of noncalculating thought? Is man, in his metaphysical nature,. ready to assume 
dominion over the earth? (Nietzsche) 
Theology 
Called to traverse (cut across) both forms of comportment, reflection, and thinking, 
thereby revitalizing its customary formulation (see “proffered ‘bridge’” above) 
Rethinking 
the RST 
Relation 
 What is called for? A thinking-thanking-poeticizing mode of interrelationality, arising from 
the commonality of steadfast gazing (being present) before the abyss of the emergent 
Anthropocene Age. 
 Bring the “trans-discipline” of ecological economics to the fore in thinking the RST relation. 
 
